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ABSTRACT	
 
 
 
Akrami, Rahimullah. M.A. Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 
2019. 
Revisiting Afghanistan’s Modern Political History: The Role of Ethnic Inclusion on 
Regime Stability 
 
 
This study examines the role of ethnic inclusion as a factor of regime stability in 
Afghanistan through an historical case analysis from 1880 until 2009. By utilizing case 
study research methods, the goal of the study is to examine all the past regimes in order 
to show whether there is a relationship between the dependent variable regime stability 
and the independent variable ethnic inclusion. The study assumes the hypothesis that an 
ethnically inclusive regime will be stable while an ethnically exclusive regime will be 
unstable. Five indicators are used to measure each variable respectively. Each indicator is 
assigned a score of 1 or 0, with a total possible score of 0 or 5. The differences of the 
combined scores on each variable are utilized to test the hypotheses, where a lower 
denominator indicates robustness and a higher denominator indicates weakness.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last few decades, Afghanistan has experienced a plethora of social, 
economic and political crises. The current Afghan government has struggled to provide 
security and bring stability to the country. A SIGAR (Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2017) finding shows the Afghan government in Kabul only 
had about 60% of the country’s total territory under its control in 2017, while 11% was 
under the direct rule of the insurgent groups such as the Taliban and ISIS, and 29% was 
contested among them (Clark, 2017).  Moreover, the Asia Foundation’s annual survey on 
observing the national and personal security of Afghan citizens, found that overall, 69% 
of Afghans felt their personal safety was at risk, while over 19% of all Afghan families 
had been victims of the violence and insecurity (Burbridge et. al., 2016, p. 7).  
However, President Ashraf Ghani current government’s failure to bring stability 
is only a reflection of Afghanistan’s frequent regime instability in the recent history. A 
brief historical review of each regime in the past 120 years shows that there have been 
numerous regime collapses and failures. From the founding of Afghanistan as state by 
Abdur Rahman Khan in 1880 until the country’s first full democratic government in 
2002, virtually all regimes have been unstable at some level. For example, although 
Abdur Rahman established a strong monarchic reign during his 21-year rule in 1880, his 
regime faced over 40 different rebellions from opposition groups (Wahab & 
Youngerman, 2010).  
Abdur Rahman’s son and heir to the throne, Habibullah Khan similarly faced 
tensions from organized uprising during his 19-year reign. Habibullah Khan’s son and 
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successor, Amanullah Khan’s monarchy was overthrown in an uprising by a Tajik rebel 
Habibullah Kalakani in 1929 after ten years in power (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). 
However, Kalakani’s own time on the throne lasted only nine months before Nadir Shah 
overthrew him as an “illegitimate ruler” and was himself appointed king for five years.  
After Nadir Shah’s assassination on November 8, 1933, his 19-year old son 
Muhammad Zahir was crowned king (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). The newly 
appointed King Zahir Shah ruled for forty years from 1933 to 1973, establishing a 
dominant Pashtun monarchy for decades. However, his cousin Daud Khan overthrew 
Zahir’s monarchy in a nonviolent coup in 1973 and established the country’s first 
Presidential Republic under the Democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. During his 
five-year tenure, Daud Khan saw rising ethnic violence and tensions as more political 
parties were created along ethnic lines (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). But his republic 
was short-lived. On April 27, 1978, the communist People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA), with support from the Soviet Union, staged a military coup, 
overthrowing Daud’s regime (Runion, 2007). 
PDPA soon split into two rival factions along ethnic lines over struggles for 
power and had four different heads of state from 1978 until 1992. The Soviets gradually 
lost faith in PDPA leaders and invaded Afghanistan in February 1979, marking the 
beginning of a ten-year occupation until their withdrawal in February 1989 (Runion, 
2007). When PDPA’s last ruler Najib’s government collapsed in 1992, the country 
plunged into complete chaos and lawlessness as the Mujahedeen factions, which were 
organized along ethnic lines, began internecine fighting to take control of the country in 
their respective regions (Runion, 2007).  
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The Mujahedeen parties eventually came to a stalemate that gave rise to a group 
calling itself the Taliban (Seekers of Knowledge), a predominantly Pashtun ethnic group, 
that saw an opportunity to fill the vacuum of power left by the internecine rivalries 
among Mujahedeen factions (Runion, 2007). The Taliban quickly rose to power amid a 
civil war, making sweeping victories leading to the capture of the capital Kabul in 1996, 
and subsequently over 90 percent of the country a year later (Runion, 2007). Although 
initially it was well received by Afghans, people came to resent the regime’s brutal 
practices and radical Sharia religious laws (Runion, 2007).  
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched a military invasion 
toppling the Taliban regime. Soon a UN mandated international conference in Bonn, 
Germany was convened to create a new transitional, democratic Afghan government. On 
June 22, 2002, a Loya Jirga (“Grand Assembly”) was convened, consisting of 
representatives from all ethnic groups. The assembly elected Hamid Karzai as an interim 
president for 2 years. Karzai then went on to win his first five-year presidential term in 
2004, and a second full term in 2009 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).  
This brief history review shows that for more than a century most political 
regimes in Afghanistan have been unstable. This regime instability raises an important 
question: what are the underlying roots of ‘political stability’ and how does ethnic 
inclusion impact regime stability in Afghanistan? One of the fundamental ways to find 
the answers, lessons and implications is to conduct an historical analysis of past regimes. 
 This study examines the role of ethnic inclusion as a factor of regime stability in 
Afghanistan. Through an historical analysis of past regimes from 1880 until 2009, this 
study informs the debate on whether there is a relationship between ethnic inclusion and 
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regime stability. By examining each regime separately, using a criterion I have 
developed, the study will examine the independent variable degrees of ethnic inclusion to 
determine its impact on the dependent variable regime stability. 
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CHAPTER TWO: TRENDS IN LITERATURE 
 
The Origins and Application of Ethnicity in Afghanistan 
 Since its founding, Afghanistan has been known to be a multiethnic and diverse 
nation-state (Rubin, 1995; Barfield, 2010, Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, Dupree, 2002; 
Maley, 1997; Mustafa & Khan, 2015). Dupree (2002) argues Afghanistan’s ethnic 
diversity is a product of its location at the crossroads of ancient trade routes and invasion 
paths extending from Central Asia to South and Southwest Asia “…where four great 
civilizations meet” (p. 976). Moreover, Dupree (2002) writes, “conquering armies, men 
of intellect, missionaries, pilgrims, traders, artisans, nomads and political exiles…[have] 
all contributed to Afghanistan’s heritage over the millennia” (p. 977). And, “It is in this 
reciprocal interaction of diverse influences that the medley of Afghan culture 
germinated” (Dupree, 2002, p. 997).  
 Contrary to this view, other scholars note that Afghans are a collection of 
“…disparate groups [which] have been brought together by historical accident and not by 
any shared historical experience or urge to live together” (Mustafa & Khan, 2015, p. 31). 
In either case, present day Afghanistan is a reflection of its past, and has been home to 
various tribes, clans, sub-clans and ethnic groups. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group at 
40% of population, followed by Tajiks at 33%, Uzbeks at 9%, Hazaras at 8%, Aimaq 4%, 
Turkmen at 3%, Balochi at 2% and others at 5% of the total population (Burbridge et. al., 
2016).   
 Pashtuns, who predominantly live in the South and South East, have dominated 
state politics since the creation of the Pashtun Durrani Empire in the seventeenth century 
(Mazhar et al., 2012). The Tajiks, who have recently gained more political power in the 
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post-Taliban regime in 2000s, are the second biggest group (Mazhar et al., 2012). 
Hazaras, who are descendants and “part of the invading hordes of Genghis Khan in the 
13th century”, have settled in the central part of the country and have been historically 
marginalized (Mazhar et al., 2012). Uzbeks, mostly concentrated in the northern 
territories, are “refugees and fighters escaping the Russian armies and subsequently the 
Soviet forces in Central Asia” (Mazhar et al., 2012).  
 However, like the historical roots of these groups, there is also considerable 
disagreement on the historical origins of the concept and application of ethnicity in 
Afghanistan. The arguments in the literature to this extent are twofold: one, the concept 
of ‘ethnicity’ is categorically complex, intertwined and ambiguous in the context of 
Afghanistan’s ethnic relations; and two, it is difficult to accurately pinpoint the concept’s 
origins. Simonsen (2004) notes the “essentialist concept of ethnicity [in Afghanistan] can 
easily be challenged… [Because] language, religion and descent have all [been] used to 
define ethnic groups” (p. 708).  
 Furthermore, other sources of identity, such as “tribe, region, and sub-groups 
within ‘ethnic groups’… and rural-urban (and indeed literate (educated) –illiterate)” are 
also interchangeably used to define one’s ethnic identity (Simonsen, 2004, p. 708). 
However, the basic term qawm, defined as a ‘solidarity group,’ has been traditionally 
applied to define ethnic affiliations in Afghanistan. The denomination of qawm is an all-
encompassing term which can be “situational and relative, and may thus (alternatively) 
describe tribe, region, ethnic group or profession” (Simonsen, 2004, p. 708).   
 Mazhar et al. (2012) also agree that Afghanistan does not have a single ‘uniform’ 
ethnic identity nor it is a ‘self-contained ethnic unit’ and its ethnic make-up consists of 
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‘multilayered identities’ (p. 97). However, “There had been no term of ‘Ethnic Groups’ 
till 19th century and more realistically, the ‘Foreign academicians and governments began 
to divide Afghan society systematically into ethnic categories by the difference in 
language, sect, culture etc.’” (Mazhar et al., 2004, p. 98).  
 Moreover, they note the term ‘ethnic groups’ is a foreign invented concept, which 
was “first used by the French researcher and anthropologist, named Dollot (1939:47), 
who “categorized Afghan people in several ethnic units” (Mazhar et al., 2004, p. 98). 
Regardless of the debate on the origins of ethnicity, Mazhar et al. argue that ethnic 
diversity is a major force in Afghanistan that drives “religious, ideological, economic and 
geographic and linguistic” differences among the ethnic groups but these groups “…apart 
from the Muslim faith, [have] little in common” (Mazhar et al., 2012, p. 99). 
 Arif Sahar (2014) argues ethnicity is socially constructed and is often politicized 
by Afghan elites for political agendas. Sahar explains, “ethnies” provide the basis for the 
primordial identities for ethnic groups, which give them a “…sense of belonging to a 
homeland (watan), ‘country’ (mamlakat), ‘peoples’ (qawm, tayfa), and religion 
(mazhab)…” (2014, p. 294) In the case of Afghanistan, the ethnicization of ethnic groups 
was “…strongly entrenched in the societal fabric and is fully institutionalized” as a 
consequence of civil wars and violent conflicts, especially after the 1978 PDPA coup 
(Sahar, 2014, p. 296). This opened up the “ethno-regional networks, which skillfully 
manipulated availability of malleable ethnic identities that were constituently created and 
negotiated in the face of other groups’ loss of power” (Sahar, 2014, p. 297).  
 Giustozzi (2006) agrees with the politicization narrative and presents the 2004 
presidential elections as a real life example, where candidates appealed to their own 
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ethnic core groups for votes. The voters reciprocated the candidates’ pleas by voting 
along ethnic lines: 95 percent of Pashtuns voting for Hamid Karzai; 90 percent of Uzbeks 
voting for Dostum; and 80 percent of Hazaras voting for their candidate, Mohaqiq 
(Centliveres-Demont, 2015, p. 211). Although the Tajik vote was nonpartisan to a larger 
degree, still over 60 percent voted for Qanuni. The parliamentary elections a year later 
followed a similar voting trend to the presidential elections.  
 Rubin (1995) has noted that ethnicity is not only limited to the domination of one 
large ethnic group such as the Pashtuns, but all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan utilize 
the principle of qawm or ethnic relations. The difference is that among some groups, such 
as the urbanized Tajiks, qawm is seen more on a regional level, while among Pashtuns, it 
is tribal. According to Rubin, ethnic political alliances in Afghanistan have often shifted 
from one to the other purely based on self-interest and political gains.  
 For instance, the Persian speaking Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mazari formed an 
unlikely alliance with the Pashtun Taliban to get on the winning side during the 1994 
civil war. However, when the Taliban lost the battle for capturing Kabul, they turned on 
Mazari, imprisoning him on charges of treason and being loyal to the anti-Taliban Persian 
speaking alliances. Similarly Hekmatyar, who was ethnically Pashtun, fought against the 
predominantly Pashtun Taliban militias, while simultaneously attacking the Tajik Ahmad 
Shah Massoud’s government during the 1990’s civil war.  
The Impact of Ethnic Politics on the Afghanistan as a Nation-State 
 The role, implications, and consequences of ethnicity date back to when 
Afghanistan was founded as a tribal nation in 1774 during the Pashtun Durrani Empire 
(Mishali-Ram, 2008). Although the Durrani king Ahmad Shah was able to force the 
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Afghan tribes into a loose ethnic federation and hence establish a strong Pashtun 
hegemony over the other tribes, his kingdom often faced ethnic revolts and power 
struggles by non-Pashtun groups (Mishali-Ram, 2008, p. 480). Tensions over the Pashtun 
hegemony of the political system has since then led to ‘power struggles’, ‘internal 
revolts,’ and fighting “within the Durrani ruling class and…by non-Pashtun 
groups…[who began] challenging Pashtun hegemony” (p. 480).  
 Nazif Shahrani (2002) similarly argues modern Afghanistan was founded on 
“...an utterly inappropriate model of a… ‘modern’ nation-state government structure with 
discriminatory policies…” (Shahrani, 2002, p. 717) According to this view, Afghan 
rulers have tended to manipulate and exacerbate the role of ethnicity, kinship and 
religious ideologies to benefit their private agendas (Shahrani, 2002). Such policies have 
had a massive impact on the Afghan society and politics because ethnicity, kinship and 
ideology are the “most fundamental bases for individuals and collective identities and 
loyalties…” (Shahrani, 2002, p. 717) 
 Hyman (2002), on the other hand, argues Afghanistan’s ethnic problems are a 
result of a false sense of nationalism created by the Pashtun hegemony over the other 
groups in the ‘form of internal colonialism’. According to Hyman, since the creation of 
the modern state in Afghanistan in the beginning of 19th century, the Pashtun elites have 
established dominance over the politics. Because of this dominance, “Afghan nationalism 
developed in tandem with state power and state control over peoples living in the 
kingdom” (Hyman, 2002, p. 306). Under Amir Abdur Rahman’s reign, “State power 
grew by a form of internal colonialism, with military pressure and coercion used against 
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unruly, often independent Pashtun tribes and against non-Pashtun minority peoples 
gradually brought under firmer control by the center” (Hyman, 2002, p. 307). 
 Rubin (1989), however, argues the opposite of the internal colonization thesis, 
namely that the historical roots of the ethnic fragmentation in Afghanistan lie in 
Afghanistan’s imperialist past when the country was a ‘buffer state’ between Czarist 
Russia and the British Empire in late 18th century. According to Rubin, “The state that 
developed within the boundaries drawn by these imperial powers never developed the 
capacity to extract sufficient resources from its own territory and population, but instead 
depended on the financial and military resources it obtained from foreign governments” 
(Rubin, 1989, p. 151).  
 Saikal (1998) joins Rubin in this view arguing that outside interventions have 
often “polarized the Afghans along ethnic lines…” in order to create an “ethnic clientele” 
state (p. 114). According to Saikal (1998), ethnicizing Afghan politics began with the 
Soviet Union who created an “ideological polarization” by installing a Marxist-Leninist 
regime in a traditionally Islamic country, which gave rise to guerrilla resistance factions 
generally referred to as Mujahedeen (p. 114).  
 Maley (1997) notes Afghanistan has not had a “full legitimate national 
government” in most of its recent history, and has failed to create a unified national elite 
(Maley, 1997, p. 168). According to Maley, in the past hundred years, only King Zahir 
Shah, who ruled from 1933 to 1973, enjoyed “a certain degree of traditional 
legitimacy…” and even he was “careful not to put it to the test through challenges to the 
core interests of Afghanistan’s micro-societies” (Maley, 1997, p. 168). But all the other 
regimes were dependent “…on non-legitimate forms of domination” (168). Maley adds, 
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Afghanistan’s failure to create a national legitimate government is result of a lack of a 
‘unified national elite,’ which “consist of competitors for control of the central 
government, and should be distinguished from local elites which have no aspiration to 
exercise nationwide power” (p. 169). 
 However, although ethnicity has often been a source of conflict and violence, and 
despite being an extremely ethnically diverse state, Afghanistan has not experienced 
ethnic secessionist movements (Adeney, 2008, p. 539). Adeney contributes this lack of 
secessionist movements to the existence of a strong ‘national Afghan identity,’ noting 
that an “Afghan national identity exists, irrespective of the complex of diversity in the 
country” (p. 539). Moreover, this “nascent sense” of the Afghan identity that emerged 
with Pashtuns was not only crucial to the nationhood, but “it also provided the Pashtuns 
with a lasting dominance over other ethnic minorities” (Jawad, 1992, p. 14). 
The denomination of qawm, an all-encompassing but relative term, is the 
overarching ethnic label that describes a tribe, region, ethnic group or profession in 
Afghanistan (Simonsen, 2004). Ethnicity as a social construct is often politicized by 
Afghan elites for political agendas because it provides the basis for the primordial 
identities for ethnic groups, such as a ‘homeland’ (watan), ‘country’ (mamlakat), 
‘peoples’ (qawm, tayfa), and ‘religion’ (mazhab) (Sahar, 2014).  
However, ethnicity is not only limited to one large ethnic group such as the 
Pashtuns or other smaller groups, but all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan utilize the 
principle of qawm or ethnic relations. The difference is that among some groups, such as 
the urbanized Tajiks, qawm is seen more on a regional level, while among Pashtuns, it is 
tribal.  
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In order to better understand Afghanistan’s unique ethnic history, ethnic nuances 
and ethnic conflict, it is essential to comparatively explore some common trends in the 
larger ethnic literature. The next few sections explore trends and the best systems in the 
literature on how to accommodate ethnically diverse societies and how to fairly represent 
ethnic minorities.  
Managing Ethnic Minorities through a Democratic Framework  
 Scholars have debated which approach is best suited to manage ethnically-diverse 
societies (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset, 1959; 
Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994). Ethnic conflicts can have many 
causes, but most often, lacking systems that accommodate all minorities equally leads to 
conflict of interests and hence violence (Reilly, 2001). Because ethnic groups are usually 
set along deep ethnic cleavages rooted in long historical divisions and differences, 
designing a system that represents all ethnic groups equitably is difficult (Reilly, 2001).  
Although scholars agree that any meaningful solution to accommodating ethnic 
minorities must come from a democratic arrangement, there is little consensus on which 
framework is the most effective (Anderson, 2013; Lijphart, 1969, 1991; Hartzell & 
Hoddie, 2003; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Sen 1999; Rustow, 1970; Dahl, Shapiro, & 
Cheibub, 2003). Technically many systems could provide accommodation to minorities, 
but every approach has consequences.  
Anderson (2013) best captures the essence of the issue at stake when discussing 
how to manage ethnic societies, noting, “The problem then is not just about resolving 
ethnic conflict– this can be achieved through a variety of coercive techniques, from the 
forcible suppression of ethnicity to the elimination of entire ethnic groups… [but] the 
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problem is how to do this within a peaceful democratic framework” (p. 2). Anderson 
adds, “…While democratic solutions to ethnic conflicts are undoubtedly difficult to 
engineer, the undemocratic alternatives (forced assimilation, or genocide, for example) 
are almost always far worse” (p. 3). Hence, along these assumptions, the present study 
argues that democracy by default, both in theory and practice, is the most desirable 
system to manage minorities. 
Engineering a Democratic Approach to Accommodate Ethnic Societies  
 
 While democracy is the best system to accommodate ethnic societies, there is 
little agreement among scholars on which approach is the best for that task. Since 
ethnically divided societies are usually more prone to violence due to a lack of an 
equitable system that can accommodate all groups in a society, building the best system 
to equally accommodate ethnic societies is debated (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 
2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset, 1959; Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994). 
The argument revolves around two competing perspectives— the consociational 
arrangement advocated by Lijphart and the centripetalist approach developed of 
Horowitz.  
In the consociational system, Lijphart (1969) proposes a power-sharing 
mechanism among the elites based on political compromise such as coalition building. A 
successful consociational democracy requires four conditions in order to survive: (1) the 
elites’ ability to represent everyone’s interests; (2) the ability to overcome conflicts of 
interests by joining rival groups; (3) the commitment to maintaining the system; and (4) 
the elites’ understanding of ‘political fragmentation’ (p. 216).  
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According to Lijphart (1969), competition in fragmented societies can drive the 
government to political instability because the stakes are extremely high. The elites 
would therefore voluntarily avoid political competition in order to “prevent passions 
aroused by elections from upsetting the carefully constructed, and possible fragile system 
of cooperation” (Lijphart, 1969, p.143). Lijphart (1969) notes that the consociation 
practice must be extended to the electoral system in order to function and bring political 
stability. The elites of a state must be willing to come to a compromise and build grand 
coalitions in order to form a government (Lijphart, 1969, p.145). Although Lijphart 
(1969) concedes that consociational arrangement of government does not always work 
since the experience failed in Cyprus, Nigeria and Uruguay due to various factors, he 
stresses that when all the conditions are met, it is a suitable option for any diverse society 
(Lijphart, 1969).   
Horowitz (2002) agrees that forming coalitions in ethnic societies is essential, but 
criticizes consociationalism on the grounds that the leaders, who hold the majority (i.e. 60 
percent votes), are not likely to enter into a coalition with others because it would not be 
desirable to give up power, and therefore, they will likely “retain control for 
themselves…” (p. 148) Second, “the assumption that elites in divided societies are likely 
to be more tolerant of other ethnic groups or less inclined to pursue advantage for their 
own group is extremely dubious” (Horowitz, 2002, p.148). Third, even if the elites agree 
to “compromise across ethnic lines in the face of severe divisions, there is usually a high 
price to pay” (Horowitz, 2002, p. 148).  
Instead, Horowitz (2002) argues that the incentive-based electoral systems are the 
best way to accommodate ethnic societies because it rewards them for working together. 
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According to the author, “If political leaders are likely to be more willing to compromise 
under some electoral systems than under others, it follows that the electoral system is the 
central feature of the incentives approach to accommodation” (Horowitz, 2002, p. 150).  
In summary, instituting a system that equally accommodates ethnic groups 
reduces the likelihood of ethnic conflict. And because sustaining some system is better 
than no system at all or an authoritarian system, many scholars suggest that a democratic 
arrangement is the correct framework to represent ethnic minorities.  
The two main approaches for engineering the best democratic arrangement are the 
power-sharing approach in the consociational arrangement developed by Lijphart and the 
incentive-based system of the centrepetalism developed by Horowitz. Both have merits 
and downfalls and their success and failure depends on further factors such as where and 
how they are applied and implemented. For the purposes of this study, a general 
introductory discussion on these relevant literature theories of these designs for the 
context of study should suffice. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE 
MEASUREMENT 
 
Research Design 
 
 This study is designed as a qualitative case study framework in order to examine 
the role of ethnic inclusion on regime stability. Through an in-depth analysis, the goal is 
to determine whether there is a relationship between the dependent variable regime 
stability and the independent variable ethnic inclusion. By applying the case study 
methodology, the study consists of two variables, each of which is measured by five 
indicators, where each indicator is assigned an individual score. Additionally, the 
process-tracing method, a qualitative analysis tool, is used within the case analysis to 
examine the relationship between the variables and test the hypothesis.  
Operationalization of Variables 
 Two sets of five indicators are assigned to measure the dependent variable regime 
stability and independent variable ethnic inclusion respectively. If the indicator meets the 
criteria, it is assigned a positive score of 1, for a total of 5 possible scores. However, if an 
indicator does not meet the defined criteria, it receives a score of 0. For example, if a 
regime is legitimate, then it will score 1 on the indicator legitimacy of the dependent 
variable regime stability. On the contrary, if a regime does not meet the criteria, it would 
score 0. This process of scoring consequently applies to all the indicators for both 
dependent and independent variables for all the cases under examination.  
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Dependent Variable Measurement 
 The criteria developed to measure the dependent variable regime stability include 
five indicators that are defined as follows:  
 
Regime Legitimacy: whether a Loya Jirga approved a regime in power.  
Loya Jirga, a traditional grand assembly of ethnic representatives, has historically 
been held to approve regimes by consensus before they assume power. Regimes 
that were ratified through this process score 1, and those that weren’t score 0.  
Regime Transition: whether transition of power was nonviolent.  
Regimes that transitioned to power through peaceful means, that is, without a war 
or violence, score 1 each. Those that took power through coercion or aggression, 
score 0. Hereditary transitions of power, where a ruler inherits the throne through 
dynastic linage, are considered too. 
Uprising Frequency: whether a regime faced uprisings while in power.  
This criterion does not assume the intensity of uprisings, but assigns scores on the 
basis of whether regimes have faced any uprisings or not. To maintain 
consistency, uprisings, rebellions, resistance movements, and revolutions are all 
used synonymously.  
Power Consolidation: whether a regime used authoritarian means to consolidate  
power. A distinction should be noted that this variable is not measuring a regime’s 
legal sovereign power to govern a state, but it is examining the concentration of 
power by regime through means of authoritarianism. 
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Regime Failure: whether a regime collapsed while in power.  
Examines regimes that were violently brought down by a rebellion, military coup, 
invasions, and civil war or combination of these factors.  
 
Independent Variable Measurement 
 The criteria for the independent variable ethnic inclusion include the following 
five indicators: 
Regime Leader: how the head of the regime was appointed.  
Examines who the ruler of each regime was, and whether the position was open to 
eligible candidates from across any ethnic groups to contest and hold.  
Army Head: how the head of the army was appointed.  
Examines who held the position of head of the national army, and if it was open 
to eligible candidates from across any ethnic groups. 
Government Positions: how key ministerial positions were filled.  
Examines how key ministers were appointed and whether the positions were open 
to eligible candidates from across any ethnic group. 
Political Representation: how seats in the parliament were allocated.  
Examines who held parliamentary seats in each regime, and whether ethnic 
groups were equally represented. 
Political Opposition: how the government allowed political dissent.  
Examines whether certain ethnic groups were banned from dissenting against the 
government based on their ethnic identity. 
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Hypothesis 
	
 The working hypothesis for this study assumes that the more ethnically inclusive 
a regime is, the more likely it is to be stable. The relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is determined by the difference of their scores. For instance, when 
a case scores low on one variable, it should similarly score low on the other, and vice-
versa.  
 Moreover, the lower or higher difference in the scores between the variables will 
show whether a hypothesis is robust or weak. In other words, a hypothesis would hold 
true in cases with the lowest difference in scores, while it would be false in cases with the 
highest difference in scores. Cases that fall under a difference of 1 are considered robust 
while cases that fall above 1 are considered weak.  
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Case Selection 
The cases under examination in this study include all the political regimes from 1880 
until 2009. This time frame covers fourteen different regimes as identified below in the 
table. 
Table 1. 1: Selected Case 
 
 
 
	
	
No. Case Regime Type Date in 
Power 
1 Abdur Rahman 
Khan 
Monarchy 1880-1901 
2 Habibullah Khan Monarchy 1901-1919 
3 Amanullah Khan Constitutional Monarchy 1919-1929 
4 Habibullah 
Kalakani 
Kingdom 1929- 
5 M. Nadir Shah Monarchy 1929-1933 
6 M. Zahir Shah Constitutional Monarchy 1933-1973 
7 M. Daud Khan Single-party/Presidential Republic 1973-1978 
8 Nur M. Tarakai Communist/People’s Democratic 
Republic Party 
1978-1979 
9 Hafizullah Amin Communist/People’s Democratic 
Republic Party 
1979- 
10 Babrak Karmal Communist/People’s Democratic 
Republic Party 
1979-1986 
11 M. Najibullah 
Ahmadzai 
Communist/People’s Democratic 
Republic Party 
1986-1992 
12 The Mujahedeen 
& B. Rabbani  
Theocracy/Islamic Republic 1992-1996 
13 The Taliban & 
M. M. Omar 
Theocracy/Islamic Emirate 1996-2001 
14 Hamid Karzai Democracy/Presidential Republic 2002-2009 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE REVIEW & ANALYSIS 
 
Abdur Rahman, (ruled) 1880–1901 
 
Abdur Rahman became amir (“ruler”) of Afghanistan at the end of the Second Anglo-
Afghan war in May 1880 after signing a truce treaty with the British (Barfield, 2010). 
Rahman’s next goal was to consolidate power and pacify the country. He easily defeated 
his Pashtun rivals Ayub Khan in 1881 and Muhammad Ishaq in 1888 respectively, 
thereby ending the debate over succession to the throne (Kakar, 1979, p. xxi-xxii). 
Uprisings, however, continuously sprang during the amir’s reign. By 1887, Rahman’s 
army had put down a serious rebellion from the Pashtun Ghilzai tribe while the Hazara 
rebellion had been crushed by 1893 (p. xxiii). Abdur Rahman’s last major military 
campaign ended with the surrender of the Kafiristan region residents, who were later 
coerced into mass conversion to Islam (p. xxiv).  
 After the Ghilzais were defeated, the amir rewarded the Muhammadzai clan of the 
Pashtun Durrani tribe by appointing them to high bureaucratic posts, giving their families 
stipends and allowing their exiles to return (Kakar, 1979, p. 9). The amir also made 
Muhammadzais sharik-i-dawlat (“partners of the state”), hence guaranteeing them 
official political status and economic benefits (p. 9). The amir’s relations with the second 
major Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais were stable until they rebelled against his regime in 
1886. After the Ghilzais were defeated and were no longer a considered a threat to the 
throne, the amir made efforts to reconcile with them (p. 9). However, the Ghilzais did not 
receive any special status or rewards apart from lenient treatment of their tribal leaders.  
 The Tajiks in Kohistan had rebelled only a year after Abdur Rahman had become 
amir in 1881 (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). Rahman was further annoyed with the Tajiks when 
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they refused to help him put down the Ghilzai rebellions. The amir was also suspicious of 
the Persian Qazilbash ethnic group and the Hazaras who had shown a pro-British attitude 
(Kakar, 1979, p. 10). Even though the Hazaras had earlier helped the amir in the fight 
against Ishaq Khan in the succession wars, he was skeptical of the non-Pashtuns as a 
whole when they “showed inclination toward Russia…” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10) 
 Rahman was once quoted, saying, “It was a wrong policy that up until now the 
chiefs of tribes other than Afghans (i.e. Pashtuns) were vested with power” (Kakar, 1979, 
p. 10). A strong supporter of the Sunnis, which most Pashtun groups fall into, the amir 
did not look favorably upon the Shia speaking tribes. The amir later held the view that 
“no reliance can be placed on any other tribe than on the Afghans [i.e. Pashtuns]” (Kakar, 
1979, p. 10).  
 Although Rahman initially pursued a policy of tribal unification after his 
succession to the throne, he reversed this policy later. In the beginning, he reconciled the 
Hazaras with the major Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais, which saved the ethnic minority 
Hazaras from being massacred in tribal wars (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). However, the amir 
later abandoned this policy when ethnic rebellions became more frequent and saw that 
dividing the tribes was the only way to reduce their power and ability to organize 
rebellions (p. 10). Another major shift in tribal policy began in the 1890s. After the amir 
had crushed most domestic rebellions and had established a strong central government 
capable of pacifying the tribes, he now feared a foreign threat. Thus the amir began a new 
campaign of national unity among the tribes by utilizing their sense of nationalism and 
urging them to help him protect Islam from infidels (p. 10). The amir even created the 
jashn-i-mutafiqqiya-i-milli (“the national festival of unanimity”) and ordered its annual 
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observance “throughout the country in hopes that it might ‘beget a feeling of unity among 
Afghans’” (Kakar, 1979, p. 11).   
In general, Rahman utilized all the means to ensure his absolute status as the ruler 
including using his personal relationships (Kakar, 1979, p. 16). He had multiple wives 
most of whom were married for political reasons. The amir had a policy to “unite the 
tribes with the State through marriages” and his own political marriages were mostly 
symbolic (Kakar, 1979, p. 16). Moreover, his two sons, Habibullah and Nasrullah, were 
subject to a formal relationship with the amir, addressing him as amir (p. 16). Rahman 
never appointed any of his sons to positions such as governors, fearing that they would 
revolt against him (p. 16). But as long as his sons didn’t have any political ambitions on 
their father’s throne, they were treated second only to the amir, by being appointed to 
positions in the royal court as well receiving hefty stipends (p. 17). 
 Rahman had assumed the amir al-muminin (“commander of the faithful”) title 
thereby giving him full legal and religious authority (Kakar, 1979, p. 21). Other titles 
such as zia al millat-i-wa aldin (“the light of the nation and religion”) as well as the more 
prestigious shahansha-i-adil (“the just emperor”) gave amir the absolute authority over 
all matters and judicial decisions (p. 21). The extent of his reach over the legal system 
can be seen in the amir’s autobiography, where he claims that all laws are “subject to my 
approval” (Rahman, 1900, p. 66). The amir similarly never liked to delegate authority 
and directly oversaw administrative tasks of the government. He did not have a deputy to 
act on his behalf, except his son Habibullah Khan, who sometimes acted as amir (Kakar, 
1979, p. 22). 
	 24	
 Rahman also established an executive council called darbari aam (“public court”) 
that resembled a kind of parliament, consisting of darbar-i-shahi (“royal court”), 
khwannin-i-mulki (“khans with feudal privileges”); the two chambers that acted as upper 
and lower houses respectively (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). The council was made up of 
khwanin-i-mulki, the ulema (“religious clerics”) and the court members. However, like 
the high court, the amir did not give the council any official authority and used it a 
channel to ‘rubber stamp’ his decisions (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). Only those who were 
chosen to serve on the council had proven their loyalty, did not have political ambition 
and “neither [had] the capacity nor the courage to detect anything wrong in the law or the 
policy of the sovereign” (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). The few khan-i-ulum (“chief justices”), 
qazis (“judges”), muftis (“advisers”) and mullahs (“religious clerics”) simply held 
symbolic seats “in the council for reasons of seniority and service” (Kakar, 1979, p. 24). 
 The amir’s policy for key ministries and governmental departments was also to 
avoid concentration of power in the hands of those who were appointed to these posts. 
Although high-level officials maintained titles like sadr-i-azam (“prime minister”), wazir 
(“minister”), mustaufi (“attorney general”), “they were not used officially or were used 
only a short while” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Abdur Rahman’s “relationship with his 
ministers was not like that of a king with ministers, but like that of a master with his 
servants” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Because there were no official laws or policies that 
defined or gave these officials their responsibilities during the amir’s reign, ministers 
mostly “relied on his good will” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). 
 Even though the bureaucracy greatly expanded during Rahman’s reign, the amir 
did not have a formal cabinet nor made any efforts to form one like his predecessor Sher 
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Ali Khan (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). The amir imprisoned his finance minister shortly after his 
brief tenure for holding ‘sympathies’ for one of the amir’s rivals (p. 27). He also jailed 
his general attorney on corruption charges but in “reality [it was] because of the amir’s 
opposition of authority in one hand” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). The amir had banned all senior 
officials from “getting together, forming friendships among themselves and talking about 
state affairs” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). However, publicly the amir maintained a positive 
image of the high governmental officials by giving them civilian and military titles and 
high salaries. The highest military officials included the amir’s son Habibullah Khan as 
the brigadier and Diwan Naranjan as a colonel. Other high-level officials included a sipah 
salar (“superintendent”) of Kabul and the head of the auditing office (p. 28).  
 Although the amir appointed officials based on prestige, status and loyalty to the 
amir, he openly recruited people to high official bureaucratic positions from various 
ethnic groups including minority tribes like the Qizilbash, the Tajiks, and the Hindus 
(Kakar, 1979, p. 28). In fact, “it was the amir’s policy to give high positions in the 
administration to members of the smaller ethnic groups or those with no basis of power” 
(Kakar, 1979, p. 28). Moreover, “members of the larger ethnic groups were not barred 
from the bureaucracy if it could be proved that they were loyal to the amir” (Kakar, 1979, 
p. 28). However, “no matter what their origin, most senior officials were dismissed, often 
disgracefully, before they became important” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28).  
 Lower level positions as sarishtadar (“head of the financial departments”), 
safdaftari (“head of main bureau”), and munshi (“secretaries”) were predominately run 
by ghulam pachas (“page boys”) and mirzas (“junior secretaries”) (Kakar, 1979, p. 29). 
In his biography, the amir writes that he recruited from all the ethnic groups and that 
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some of his most trusted and loyal members of the government were slaves. Although the 
Qizilbash dominated most of the administrative positions, they were not enough to fill the 
expanding bureaucracy. Therefore, the amir recruited mirzas from other ethnic groups as 
well including the minority Hazaras as well as Uzbeks (Kakar, 1979, p. 29).  
 During Rahman’s reign, governors were not allowed to “wield both military and 
civil powers” as they had traditionally done in the amir’s predecessor’s reign (Kakar, 
1979, p. 48). The governors were also limited to a “small number of armed khassadars 
(“militia”) in the provinces… [And] In emergencies governors relied upon the army 
stations in the provinces” (Kakar, 1979, p. 48). Moreover, the amir only appointed 
governors who were “unambitious and insignificant…who had little or no tribal backing” 
(Kaka, 1979, p. 48). The governors were at the amir’s mercy and were often humiliated 
and disgraced. The more important governors were given titles such as viceroys, 
lieutenants but most had the title of hukumran (“chief”), hakim (“administrator”) or wali 
(“governor”) respectively (p. 49). Most governors did not have formal authority and 
“were warned not to interfere in the affairs of the court or the diwan… Neither were they 
permitted to spend government money liberally” (Kakar, 1979, p. 49).  
 Essentially the local government in Rahman’s reign was “a remote extension of 
the central government” (Kakar, 1979, p. 69). Local government offices were inferior to 
the central offices and “had to send in reports of their work to Kabul regularly” (Kakar, 
1979, p. 69). Policies were channeled down from the center in Kabul and they had little 
discretion beyond what the amir had allowed. In fact, “Heads of all provincial and district 
offices, including governors and hakims, were appointed, dismissed, promoted, or 
demoted by the center” (Kakar, 1979, p. 70). Besides some elders who were technically 
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not government officials, “no official was elected” (Kakar, 1979, p. 70). Even 
“Governors were merely officials who carried out the instructions they received from the 
amir. Once a precedent had been established on a subject governors were not supposed to 
ask for further instructions” (Kakar, 1979, p. 70).  
 The National Army was another important instrument that helped Rahman 
become the amir and establish strong authoritarian regime (Kakar, 1979, p. 92). The amir 
did not “inherit the army of his predecessors but created a large, disciplined army of his 
own, independent of tribal control” (Kakar, 1979, p. 93). He built his own weapon 
factories to arm the army with modern weapons. Rahman used the army for two 
purposes: to consolidate power and eliminate his opposition and to “shield Afghanistan 
against foreign invasion” (Kakar, 1979, p. 96). In his biography, the amir claims that he 
was the first king in Afghanistan to have a well-trained and disciplined force and that 
“Every person is practically a soldier, and Ghaza (to fight for the truth and faith) is every 
citizen’s bounden duty; every true Muslim must fight for his religion” (Rahman, 1900, p. 
51). 
 Conscription was mandatory and recruitment followed a system where, “…the 
people themselves send one man out of every eight, and pay all his necessary expenses 
during the time he is occupied learning drill and military training” (Rahman, 1900, p. 53). 
However, the amir only recruited “men of little significance to military posts” (Kakar, 
1979, p. 96). Sons of elders were recruited as officers while the pehskhidmat (“slave 
soldiers”) were often promoted to the rank of officers to “meet the demand of a growing 
army” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97). The Hazaras and Qizilbash were dismissed from the army 
altogether during the Hazara Rebellion temporarily but the Hindus “who had not rebelled 
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were also recruited to the army…” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97) The amir also recruited from the 
tribal regions of the other side of the Durand Line including Waziris, Afridis, and 
Khattaks.  
 In other words, “…although the army was dominated by the Pashtuns… [it] 
included almost all ethnic groups including Uzbeks and Aimaq” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97). 
Not all soldiers were treated equal, however, and sometimes the soldiers serving in the 
army fought against their own tribes such as the Ghilzai Regiment who fought fellow 
tribesmen during the Ghilzai Revolt (Kakar, 1979, p. 113). The second largest ethnic 
Pashtun group, Ghilzais, were also treated lower in status compared and considered 
unequal to the largest Pashtun ethnic group Durranis soldiers (Kakar, 1979, p. 113). 
 Overall, Rahman had a mixed record on managing minorities, elevating some 
socially and economically while brutally oppressing and often dismissing others (Kakar, 
1979; Omrani, 2014; Barfield, 2010). For example, although the amir was a strong 
advocate of the Sunni sect of Islam, the minority Shia sects were allowed to practice their 
sect openly. Moreover, a small number of other minorities such as Christians, Hindus, 
Sikhs, and Jews also practiced their religions openly (Kakar, 1979, p. 148). Hindus were 
“given high positions in the bureaucracy” and had a special council that would judge 
cases according to Hindu laws (Kakar, 1979, p. 149). Although some Hindus voluntarily 
converted to Islam, they were never forced to do so. Jews, who had historically been 
settled in various parts of Afghanistan, built synagogues during Rahman’s reign and were 
“regulated according to their own customs…” (Kakar, 1979, p. 149) However, other 
minorities such as the residents of the Kafiristan region were not as fortunate since their 
entire population was forced to convert to Islam after their failed rebellion against the 
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amir (Kakar, 1979, p. 151).  
 Abdur Rahman’s transition (0) to power came by means of means of war, tribal 
support, and coming to terms with the British (Barfield, 2010). Rahman ‘raised’ an army, 
recruited the Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais and Tajik ethnic residents of Kohistani tribes 
to help him secure the throne while striking a deal with the British to be recognized as the 
amir in July 1880 in exchange for protecting their ‘interests’ (Barfield, 2010, p. 143). His 
regime’s legitimacy (0) is also debated as Rahman regularly eliminated and killed his 
rivals who challenged him for power (Barfield, 2010, p. 143).  
 Uprisings (0) were common throughout Rahman’s reign and he faced over forty 
rebellions from various ethnic tribes that protested his policies (Barfield, 2010, p. 147). 
However, Rahman had crushed every ‘autonomous’ group and tribe in Afghanistan to 
create a powerful centralized government and kept complete authoritarian control (0) on 
the state and country as a whole (Barfield, 2010, p. 149). Although the amir faced many 
uprisings and revolts against his regime, his regime did not collapse (1) and remained 
intact until his death (Barfield, 2010, p. 151). 
Table 1: A. Rahman Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 0 0 
Regime Transition 0 0 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure  1 1 
Grand Total 1 
 
 Rahman was an absolute head of the regime (0), who maintained total control of 
the state in ‘autocratic’ style bureaucracy (Barfield, 2010, p. 152). He “centralized 
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Afghanistan and destroyed the power of the regional elites” and Afghanistan became a 
‘unitary’ state under rule (Barfield, 2010, p. 160). The amir did not share executive power 
with anyone, including his sons, and had the power to appoint or remove all levels of 
government officials including clerics, ministers, governors, head of the army and others 
at will (Barfield, 2010, p. 160). Rahman had created a state in which no one was allowed 
to dissent (0) politically or otherwise and “no internal actors could challenge him or his 
government” (Barfield, 2010, p. 160).  
 Rahman not only lay down the structure for the modern Afghan state, but in his 
conquest of maintaining complete authority over the country, he built a strong national 
army to pacify the tribes (Kakar, 1979, p. 92). While conscription was mandatory and 
every Afghan was essentially a ‘soldier’, conscription within the army (1) were open to 
all ethnic groups (Rahman, 1900, p. 51). However, the amir only recruited “men of little 
significance to military posts” and often recruited loyal slave soldiers to high-ranking 
positions (Kakar, 1979, p. 97). Recruitment in the army was based purely on whoever 
pleased the amir the most and was loyal to him while some soldiers were treated better 
than others (Kakar, 1979, p. 97).  
Table 2: A. Rahman Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 1 1 
Government Positions 1 1 
Political Representation 0 0 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 2 
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 Moreover, Rahman had created a kind of façade of popular political 
representation (0) in his government, which was in fact a complete autocracy (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 149). Although he had created a ‘Supreme Council’ and a ‘General Assembly’, 
none of the members had real power and were “formed from among the chiefs whom the 
Amir preferred to keep in Kabul; but their function was purely advisory, and their advice 
was infrequently sought” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 149).  
 Ironically, however, Rahman recruited people to high level government positions 
(1) from minority ethnic groups, with the assumption that minority groups had no power 
base and were the least likely to revolt (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Although he appointed 
members in the administration and high posts in the army from Qizilbash, Tajiks, the 
Hindus, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others, the majority of his administration was still made up 
of Pashtun Sardars (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). He only chose people to government positions 
who “showed little ambition” and would routinely shuffle officials if there were the 
“slightest suspicion of dissent” (Omrani, 2014, p. 52). In short, Abdur Rahman had ruled 
by spreading fear and subjugating the population through coercion and oppression.  
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Habibullah Khan, 1901-1919 
 Abdur Rahman had left such a lasting legacy of fear and subjugation after his 
death in 1901 that no one challenged his successor to the throne (Barfield, 2010). Thus, 
the transition of power marked the first time in Afghanistan’s history where one ruler 
succeeded another without a war of succession (Barfield, 2010). The amir had designated 
his eldest son Habibullah Khan to inherit the amirship after his death (Barfield, 2010, p. 
175). The British still had control of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs after Habibullah’s 
succession. Tensions arose in the Anglo-Afghan relations when the British Empire 
wanted to renew an old treaty but Habibullah Khan refused to sign it, arguing for 
Afghanistan’s independence (Fletcher, 1965, p. 173). After several rounds of negotiations 
and threats of war, both sides signed a new treaty on July 21, 1905 that reaffirmed the 
British control of the Afghan foreign affairs, while Habibullah had “obtained the renewal 
of the annual subsidy, 400,000 pounds for the arrears, and tacit agreement that he was 
“Independent King” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 174).  
 Domestically, Habibullah allowed the return of various political, powerful and 
influential families exiled by his father. These included his father’s rivals the Pashtun 
Muhammadzai family (i.e. the five Muhasiban brothers), the ethnically Pashtun Mahmud 
Tarzi from the Ottoman Syria, the various Sufi movement followers such as the Pashtun 
Mujadaddi family among many others (Barfield, 2010, p. 175). Soon the Muhasiban 
brothers re-merged as an influential political family during Habibullah’s reign and the 
amir personally appointed Nadir Shah, the oldest of the five Muhasiban brother, as his 
commander-in-chief of the national army (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 102).  
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Tarzi, an intellectual and modernist, who lived in exile through progressive and 
nationalist movements in India, Central Asia, Turkey, Syria and Europe, was personally 
welcomed by Habibullah Khan. He had worked under prominent reformists such as 
Jamal Al-din Al-Afghani for the pan-Islamic cause (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 
102). Moreover, Tarzi had been influenced by the reformist movements around the world 
and began to apply these principles in Afghanistan (p. 103). He founded the Young 
Afghan movement, which was inspired from the Young Turk movement that had played a 
major role in modernizing Turkey. He also founded the country’s first ever-independent 
newspaper Siraj-ul-Akhbar in 1911, with Habibullah’s permission, which played a major 
role in promoting pan-Islamism and condemning British imperialism and their indirect 
control of Afghanistan (p. 104). Tarzi also personally tutored Habibullah’s two sons 
Amanullah and Inyatullah (p. 104). 
 Habibullah also allowed tribal chiefs to shape state policy (Wahab & 
Youngerman, 2010, p. 101). Thus, “the incipient national bureaucracy established by his 
father…became open to infiltration by traditional, localized power bases” (Wahab & 
Youngerman, 2010, p. 101). The tribal chiefs consisted of local maliks (the village chiefs 
elected by locals to represent them in the government), who often took bribes in 
exchange for passing laws (p. 101). Moreover, provincial governors or district officials 
were now elected from the local khans or landlords, too. The local tribal chiefs now 
maintained a large presence in the bureaucracy and thereby “often used state funds and 
patronage to reinforce traditional power structures” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 
102). Moreover, “Policies laid down by the increasingly Westernized national 
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bureaucracy had to penetrate these insulating layers before they could be put in effect” 
(Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 102). 
 Habibullah Khan’s inner political circle included his brother Nasrullah Khan, and 
his two sons Inayatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan. Outside his political circle, three 
other groups formed an important part of his cabinet including the five brothers of the 
Muhasiban family (Fletcher, 1965, p. 176). Of the five brothers, Nadir Khan was 
promoted as the amir’s commander-in-chief after beating the eastern Pashtun Mangal 
tribe’s revolt in 1913, while Hashim Khan, Shah Wali Khan, Mohammad Aziz and Shah 
Mahmud were all given high political positions in the government (p. 177). The Tarzis 
was the second most important political family in the amir’s reign. The third important 
group outside the amir’s immediate circle was the ethnic Tajik Charkhi family, whose 
two sons Ghulam Hyder Charkhi and Ghulam Siddiq Charkhi were both appointed as 
generals (p. 177). Although Habibullah maintained influence over these families and 
considered them important to his domestic policies of modernization, at the same time, he 
was wary of them (p. 177). 
 Man of the other exiles had also been associated with independence movements in 
India and the Ottoman Empire while others were reformist-nationalists, who were 
influenced by events such as Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 (Barfield, 2010, p.176). 
The exiles were driven by change and brought in new secular and religious ideas into a 
society that had been alienated from much of the outside world (p. 176). Moreover, the 
returnees “Argued that Muslim societies needed to modernize by adopting or adapting 
cultural and economic innovations from the West to compete more effectively with it” 
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(Barfield, 2010, p. 176). Soon the various exile parties clashed among themselves as their 
beliefs and ideologies came at a crossroad and split into separate factions.  
 The Western-influenced reformist exiles argued for a push to modernize the 
Afghan society while the religious clerics argued for unity of the people based on Islamic 
principles and support for a Pan-Islamic movement (p. 176). Although both camps had 
differences, they shared a broader goal of rejecting British influence and stirring anti-
British views (p. 176). The religious ulema was worried that British domination of the 
Afghan society would undermine the Islamic and social order in the long term, while the 
reformist camp—the Young Afghan movement— believed that a continued British 
domination was dangerous to Afghan pride and progress (Barfield, 2010, p. 176). The 
Young Afghan movement followers believed that the religious leaders were primarily 
reactionary and obstructionists and that “structure of religious life and belief needed to be 
reformed or displaced before Afghan society could progress” (p. 176).  
 The Islamic parties countered this argument by claiming that the Afghan society 
did not lack such a void and “that if Muslim societies were weak, it was because they had 
been oppressed by the Western colonial powers, and needed to display stronger religious 
solidarity and stricter applications of the faith in order to become independent again” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 176). Although the religious camp’s position was more popular with 
the Afghan population especially their call against the British in India, the nationalists 
and modernizers had greater support among the elites and those who supported a change 
(p. 176). 
 While Habibullah still concentrated power and maintained full authority over the 
state, he was soon caught between these two influential camps, both of which sought to 
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bring large social and political changes by directly impacting state policies (Barfield, 
2010, p. 177). The religious camp included members of the ulema, leaders of the Sufi 
movement, as well as the amir’s younger brother Nasrullah Khan. The second camp 
included members of the nationalist and modernist factions largely influenced by 
Muhammad Tarzi (p. 177). Other influential members of this second faction included 
students of the progressive Habibia College founded by the amir and his two sons 
Enyatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan (p. 177). 
 Although amir Habibullah was “Initially…content to let both camps flourish 
because while he was fairly devout himself…” he eventually withdrew his support and 
began to crackdown on both movements when they started to criticize his policies, 
especially Afghanistan’s official Policy of Neutrality during World War I (Barfield, 
2010, p. 177). The amir quickly lost support of the ulema and the religious factions after 
he made a call to Jihad against the British but later reversed his decision (p. 177). The 
amir had threatened the British with Jihad after the Anglo-Russian Convention, which 
demarcated their territories of influence on Afghan soil without consulting with the 
Afghans. However, when the call to Jihad proved immensely popular with the public, 
Habibullah feared he would lose control of the war. Moreover, under pressure from the 
British, he not only blocked any efforts to the Jihad but also executed some of the 
organizers (p. 177).  
 The crack down on groups demanding Jihad infuriated the amir’s brother 
Nasrullah, who had armed and organized some of the groups. Thus, the nationalist camp 
also attacked and criticized the amir for allowing the Anglo-Russian Convention without 
Afghan’s participation and for accepting limitations on Afghan sovereignty “by giving 
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into British demands and not pushing for complete independence” (Barfield, 2010, p. 
177). The amir brushed aside the criticisms but was furious when he found out that a 
secret party of constitutionalists (mashruta) had been conspiring without the amir’s 
knowledge to “abolish the monarchy” (p. 177). This secret group was organized by his 
students in his own Habibia College and included high profile members from the 
nationalist camp, liberal ulema, and even his two sons according to rumors. Habibullah 
moved quickly before the constitutionalists could further plot against his regime and in 
1909 the amir arrested and executed many of the members (p. 177). This act created a 
public outcry among the population and alienated many of the Young Afghans, who saw 
themselves as the vanguard of change.  
 The amir’s support further waned when he announced the state policy of 
neutrality during the First World War (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). The amir was caught up 
between the Central powers, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, and the Allied Powers 
(p. 1778). Turkey Sultan’s call for a pan-Islamic Jihad had found considerable support in 
Afghanistan and reached its peak when a joint Turkish-German delegation arrived in 
Kabul in 1915 “seeking permission for Central Power troops to pass through the country 
to attack India” (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). In reality, they had “hoped to use Afghanistan as 
a base from which to inspire jihadist revolts against the British in the NWFP and perhaps 
beyond” (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). Germany had used this Islamic appeal to their full 
benefits by allying with Turkey and providing gold and money in order to make more 
allies in the Middle East and Asia. The Germans secret service similarly used these 
tactics to raise anti-British revolts in India by supporting militant Islam (p. 179). 
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 Although the British countered these efforts and put high clerics on their payroll 
both in Afghanistan and India, it was not enough to sway the growing anti-British 
sentiments, including some from the amir's closet members in his court. Both the amir’s 
brother Nasrullah Khan and his favorite son Amanullah Khan as well as Mahmud Tarzi 
supported the plan to stir up trouble through the border tribes (Fletcher, 1965, p. 180). 
Only the amir himself and a few other advisers were against the war hawks and rejected 
an all-out attack on India (p. 180). Habibullah, who did not wish for war, knew that the 
British were militarily more powerful and also believed that the Allied Powers would 
prevail and “show gratitude to Afghanistan for its neutrality” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 181).  
 Although Habibullah was courteous and welcomed the mission warmly listening 
to the arguments of the Central Powers, the mission eventually left without success. In 
fact, the amir had found the mission plan of making him the King of India outrageous. In 
the end, “…the wisdom of Habibullah’s inaction became evident with the collapse of the 
Central Powers…” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183) After the War, Habibullah wrote a letter to 
the Viceroy of India explaining the benefits of Afghanistan’s neutrality and not siding 
with the Central Powers and asking for a complete sovereignty of Afghanistan in return 
(p. 183). However, the amir lacked an understanding like his father Abdur Rahman 
“namely that gratitude has small place in the dynamics of power politics” (Fletcher, 1965, 
p. 183). The British, who were already facing a new threat of communism “…were in no 
mood to listen to Afghan importunities” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183).  
 The British evaded the question of giving Afghanistan full independence, further 
weakening the amir’s resolve. The British did not realize that the amir had been the 
victim of various attacks after the collapse of the world order in Europe, Middle East and 
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Central Asia and that he was “bearing the brunt of attacks by those unhappy with 
outcome” (Barfield, 2010, p. 179). The conservative religious ulema in Afghanistan 
blamed the amir for the defeat of the last great Islamic empire, the Ottoman Empire. The 
nationalists and other camps blamed Habibullah for failing to regain independence of the 
country from the British as a price of the neutrality policy (p. 179). Therefore, the 
nationalists-modern faction turned to a new ally, the Soviet Union— “a radical socialist 
regime determined to spread its ideology from the ashes of the old czarist empire…” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 179) However, Habibullah’s regime was still strong enough to hold on 
to absolute power and because his father Abdur Rahman’s repressive policies had a left a 
strong legacy of fear, “…dissatisfaction with the amir never resulted in significant 
popular revolts against him” (Barfield, 2010, p. 179). 
 However, personally the amir’s troubles were doubled by a loss of his favorite 
winter capital, Peshawar. In order to escape the harsh winters of Kabul, the amir chose 
Jalalabad as his new winter capital and in December 1918 the amir went on a hunting trip 
with his brother Nasrullah Khan and his oldest son Inyatullah Khan, leaving Amanullah 
Khan “in charge of the treasury and garrison at Kabul” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183). On 
February 19, 1919 the amir was found mysteriously dead after he had camped out at a 
district in Lagham, just outside of Kabul (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183). Although there were 
various theories of his assassination involving the Russians, British and his own cabinet 
members as possible suspects, the assassin was never identified.  
 In mensurating the Habibullah Khan regime, he inherited the throne in 1901 after 
facing minimal resistance from his half-brother (Fletcher, 1965, p. 171). However, his 
brother failed to garner enough support and therefore his claim to kingship never 
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materialized (Dupree, 1973, p. 430). Thus, Habibullah was able to become king without 
any opposition and it marked the first time in Afghanistan’s history that power had been 
transitioned (1) from one amir to another peacefully (Dupree, 1973, p. 430). Habibullah 
had the loyalty of the army but his regime’s legitimacy (1) came from giving positions of 
power and subsidies to religious leaders whose political influence had been suppressed by 
his father (Dupree, 1973, p. 430).  
Table 3: H. Khan Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 1 1 
Regime Transition 1 1 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 1 1 
Grand Total 3 
 
Although Habibullah’s nearly twenty-year reign as king largely remained stable 
domestically and he primarily dealt with foreign policy issues, he did face a few revolts 
(0), most notable from the Pashtun Mangal tribes in the eastern Khost province (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 175). The Mangals, who had protested higher taxes, were promptly defeated and 
were granted a truce by the amir (Fletcher, 1965, p. 176). As king, Habibullah intended to 
consolidate power (0) and was able to maintain one of the most stable periods in 
Afghanistan’s modern history (Fletcher, 1965, p. 184). Although Habibullah was 
assassinated while still king, his regime did not collapse (1) while he was in power 
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 184).  
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Table 4: H. Khan Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Scores 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 1 1 
Government Positions 1 1 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 1 1 
Grand Total 4 
 
 Although Habibullah remained the absolute head of state (0), he reversed many of 
his father’s policies including allowing political exiles to return and giving religious and 
tribal leaders power to influence state policy (Dupree, 1973, p. 431). Moreover, 
Habibullah was the first king to break tradition and officially appointed Nadir Shah as his 
commander in chief for the army (1), instead of taking the position for himself as past 
amirs had done (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177). Political representation increased during 
Habibullah’s time after he opened up government positions (1) to previously exiled 
dissenters including appointing influential political families such as Barakzais, Tarzis 
among others to key ministerial (1) positions (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177). Habibullah was 
also known for allowing a greater degree of free speech and political dissent (1), although 
later he would crackdown on protestors (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177).  
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Amanullah Khan, 1919-1929 
 After Habibullah Khan’s death, his brother Nasrullah Khan declared himself king, 
ruling for nine days before he was arrested. Habibullah Khan’s two older sons, 
Enayatullah and Hayatullah had sworn allegiance to their uncle Nasruallah, but the third 
son, Amanullah Khan, refused to recognize him as king and challenged him for right of 
inheritance (Barfield, 2010, p 180). Serving as Regent and Commander-in-Chief of the 
army in his father’s reign, Amanullah had garnered the support of the army (Dupree, 
1973, p. 441). On his orders, the army captured Nasrullah and brought him in chains to 
Kabul along with his supporters, where he was imprisoned in the Arg dungeon. 
Amanullah became amir by seizing “…The Arg (a combination of royal residence, fort, 
and treasury), the traditional seat of power…” (Dupree, 1973, p. 441) Inyatullah, who 
swore allegiance to the new king, was released while Nasrullah was imprisoned (Dupree, 
1973, p. 441).  
 While the new king Amanullah began consolidating power, his first order of 
business was to gain complete independence from the British, who still controlled 
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs (Barfield, 2010, p. 181). Amanullah declared a Jihad and 
appointed Nadir Khan as the minister of war, who scored some victories by overrunning 
British posts on the border. However, the Afghan campaign was largely unsuccessful 
against the British’s more advanced weaponry and aerial advantage (p. 181). The British, 
who felt that the tribal revolts in their backyard could spill over to India and that they 
could lose the tide in the Great Game to Russian influence, were also keen on a truce 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 181). Hence, by August 1919, both sides had signed the Treaty of 
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Rawalpandi, which recognized Afghanistan as a full sovereign state independent in its 
foreign affairs (p. 181). 
 Gaining independence had made Amanullah extremely popular with the people, 
especially with the conservative Islamic ulema, who “rewarded him with the title of 
Ghazi as a victor of a holy war” (Barfield, 2010, p. 182). The enthusiastic amir embarked 
on his next goal of modernizing Afghanistan by releasing a series of social reforms and 
state regulations (nizamnamas) to push Afghanistan into the early twentieth century 
modernization drive. The most crucial of these was introducing Afghanistan’s first ever 
constitution in 1923, which “laid out the structure of the government, and gave the amir 
supreme executive and legal authority, but also established the Council of Ministers to 
run the government and the State Council to advise it” (Barfiled, 2010, p. 183).  
 However, after decades of conservative rule under his grandfather’s and his 
father’s regimes, the new reforms quickly became controversial and overwhelming for 
the traditional Afghan society. These reforms, which sought to bring in generational 
change in a short period of time, included “…ambitious administrative, legal and 
financial social reforms” (Barfield, 2010, p. 183). The reforms soon drew strong reactions 
from the public in three areas including objections to high taxation, mandatory 
conscription and laws perceived to be middling in family customs (Barfield, 2010, p. 
183).  
Amanullah had increased taxes to make up for exhausting the national treasury (p. 
183). The increase in tax was not simply an issue of paying more, but the new system had 
cut out the traditional middleman in the village and gave government officials 
unprecedented power to collect taxes directly. This not only resulted in disgruntled 
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villagers but also opened way for more corruption especially since cash was easier to 
pocket for collectors (p. 184). Moreover, the central government had failed to 
successfully implement the new tax system and effectively collect taxes (p. 184).   
 The second biggest objection to reforms was the issue of military conscription, 
especially in the rural tribal parts of the country. Previously exempt Pashtun tribes such 
as Barakzais, Mangals, Zadrans, and Ahmadzais were now required to compulsory draft 
in the military. Everyone else “supplied one able-bodied man for every eight eligible ones 
(hasht-nafari)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184). Usually the community would have the 
discretion to choose one able-bodied man to serve in the military and would be 
responsible to take care of his family in his absence (p. 184). For the tribal leaders this 
“power to choose conscripts and negotiate with the state on behalf of the communities 
[was]… one of their most important roles” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184).  
 However, under the new Conscription and Identity Card Act in 1923, conscription 
became universal while “the wealthy could buy an exemption” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184). 
This was reinforced by introducing Tazkira or the national identity card, which were used 
to track conscripts, cutting out the tribal leaders as intermediaries in the drafting process 
(p. 184). The new identity cards were also required for filing a court case, registering for 
marriage, or doing business. The government “hoped to use its identity card system to 
enforce its unpopular new family law by keeping track of what individuals were doing” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 185). Hence, these new state registration and conscription were 
“strongly resented as unwarranted state interference in community life” (Barfield, 2010, 
p. 185). 
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 However, the most controversial of all the reforms were the new marriage laws 
and the general code of conduct towards women. The amir was “keen to discourage 
plural marriages, restrict marriage payments, ban child engagements, and end the custom 
of settling blood feuds by an exchange of women” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185). These new 
laws were directly in conflict with the longstanding Pashtun code of honor, Pashtunwali, 
which emphasized personal autonomy from the state including local community laws that 
interfered with family matters. Most Pashtuns “(and other rural Afghans) felt [marriage] 
was a private matter or already covered by sharia law principles used by local clergy” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 185).  
 Moreover, the Afghan government did not have an overarching authority to 
implement change in rural parts in order to bring a “Cultural Revolution” and change the 
social structure of the society. Although the marriage laws were barely implemented and 
affected a small number of people, they were the most inflammatory and rumors spread 
quickly that the “state would undermine fundamental social relations sanctioned by Islam 
and Pashtunwali…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185) This was partly due to the spread of false 
rumors as the regime had lacked an effective national system to communicate the true 
intentions of the reforms to the population directly (Chua, 2013, p. 55).  
 When false rumors reached rural areas that the government was initiating a ban on 
the veiling of women, Pashtuns were horrified (Chua, 2013). Therefore, “In a society 
concerned with preserving the appearance of honor and autonomy, men often felt 
compelled to act well before such threats became reality” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185). Thus, 
“Within three years of coming to power, Amanullah had squarely pushed two of these hot 
buttons with his taxation (gold) and social laws (women)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).  
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Although “…honor itself was judged in the theoretical realm perception could be more 
important than reality” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).  
Soon the reforms resulted in angry reactions and a revolt in the eastern Pashtun 
Khost province broke out in March 1924 led by Mullah-i-Lang (Dupree, 1973, p. 449). 
The Khost revolt, which lasted for 9 months, was guided by “local clergy who saw the 
new law codes a threat to their authority and livelihood” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185). 
Although the Pashtun Mangal tribes led most of the fighting, the rebellion soon spread to 
other Pashtun areas.   
 To counter the criticisms sprung from the revolt and broaden his political base, 
Amanullah ordered to summon another Loya Jirga (“Grand Assembly”) in July 1924 by 
inviting a thousand delegates representing the tribes, ulema and landowners (Barfield, 
2010, p. 186). The amir had called a similar assembly in 1923 to ‘rubber-stamp’ his new 
Constitution and “expected them to renew their support of his laws to counter rebel 
criticism” (Barfield, 2010, p. 186). However, the parties in attendance “turned on the 
amir and expressed their long-repressed misgivings about his laws” (Barfield, 2010, p. 
186). The ulema demanded that the amir allow them to interpret the laws according to the 
Sunni Hanifi legal system, “restore the legal distinctions between Muslims and non-
Muslims as well as abandon his restrictions on polygamy” (Barfield, 2010, p. 186). The 
delegates, however, did support the amir’s laws on raising taxes, expanding conscription 
and branded the rebels of the Khost rebellions as traitors (p. 186).  
 The rebels however were growing in numbers and had made sweeping victories 
coming within 8 miles of the capital Kabul, and pillaging and looting any villages in their 
way. Although the revolt had begun as a religious response to Amanullah’s 
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modernization reforms, it had now included elements of dynastic struggle for the throne 
too (Dupree, 1973, p. 449). This shift began when Abdul Karim, the son of the former 
amir of Afghanistan Yaqub Khan, offered to lead the rebels against Amanullah Khan and 
remove him from the throne while his actual goal was to win the throne for himself 
(Dupree, 1973, p. 449). However, when the rebels became reluctant to let Karim assume 
leadership, Amanullah used this window of opportunity to shift the tide of war in his 
favor (Dupree, 1973, p. 449).  
 Amanullah spread anti-British propaganda that Abdul Karim was a British plot to 
take Afghanistan back. This move allowed Amanullah to rally the Pashtun tribes and 
change the course of the war from a revolt against the government to a jihad by the 
government against a foreign threat (Barfield, 2020, p. 187). This allowed the amir to 
recruit fighters under the call to Jihad and crush the revolt. Abdul Karim fled to India 
“but sixty leading rebels were taken to Kabul and publicly executed, though at least one 
roundly condemned Amanullah to the crowd as an infidel before he was shot” (Barfield, 
2010, p. 187). 
 The government was “left intact” after the Khost rebellion, mostly because 
“historically Afghan rulers were displaced by popular rebellions only in the context of a 
foreign invasion–and then only when they spread across regional and ethnic lines” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 187). However, what seemed to have been a short nuance confined 
only to the eastern parts of the country, Amanullah’s army suffered “disastrous setbacks” 
and the fighting cost him two years income (p. 187). The conflict had also drained the 
national treasury and the “necessity” to call on the border Pashtun tribes help to put down 
the rebellion showed his government’s weakness to handle a minor conflict. Moreover, 
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“it punctured the aura of military invincibility that the Afghan state had nurtured for more 
than two generations” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187). However, “this was no longer the case 
after the Khost rebellion” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187).  
 In order to “compensate for the losses, Amanullah had reached out for an alliance 
with the conservative clergy, rolling back social reforms but maintaining administrative 
ones” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187). Within his administration, the amir’s response to the 
revolt was a shake-up in his cabinet (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). He removed Nadir Khan as 
the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief and replaced him with Mohammad Ali 
Khan (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). Mahmud Tarzi again returned from Europe and retook his 
old position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Tajik Mohammad Ali Khan in 
1924 (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). Although Amanullah’s army successfully put down the 
revolt, and made wholesale changes in his government, “The end of Mullah-i-Lang revolt 
did not end opposition to Amanullah’s modernization schemes” (Dupree, 1973, p. 499). 
 After the fighting ended, Amanullah went on inspection tours of the eastern 
Jalalabad (1925) and the southern Kandahar (1926) provinces to urge his governors to 
“maintain better order” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). He had found new leverage and used it 
to reverse most of the concessions he had made years ago in his 1924 Jirga, such as 
opening girls’ schools that the ulema had fiercely objected to (p. 188). In this brief period 
of peace, the amir felt “confident enough in the stability of the country to take a world 
tour in the company of his wife, Queen Soraya” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). The trip, which 
began in November 1927 lasting until June 1928, included visits to countries such as 
India, Egypt, Britain, Italy, France, Germany, The Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran. This 
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marked the first time ever for a sovereign Afghan leader traveling abroad on an official 
visit beyond India or “allowed his wife to play a public role” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188).  
 While many of the amir’s advisers warned the king that the trip would be costly 
and the government would be weak in his absence, others “accused him of endangering 
his Islamic faith by visiting wine-drinking infidel lands and allowing the queen to appear 
unveiled” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). The trip was a monumental success for public 
relations and remapping diplomatic ties for Afghanistan. The amir received positive press 
in Europe and the Middle East. However, the trip’s profound impact was on Amanullah 
personally who renewed his old reforms for more radical ones. The amir recalled another 
Loya Jirga in 1928 but this time all of the thousand participants were selected from 
representatives who largely “approved his new laws with little dissent” (Barfield, 2020, 
p. 188).  
 The new reforms “included plans for economic development, education, the 
creation of the National Assembly, and more reforms of the legal system, including 
family law and women’s issues” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189). More controversially, the amir 
ended women’s seclusion in social settings and ordered the abolishing the customary veil. 
These actions alienated the entire clerical establishment including those “who had 
supported the amir in the past” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189). But Amanullah was also ready to 
confront them directly and reduce their power and influence. After his return from the 
tour, the amir had decided to cut all ties with the clergy, refusing to meet even with the 
“most prominent representatives, ending their stipend, and forbidding membership in Sufi 
orders by government officials” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189).).  
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 Although the opposition from the religious faction was expected, the amir faced 
objections from the modernist camps too. For example, the Minister of Defense Nader 
Khan argued that social changes should be made only in selected parts of the country that 
can digest them “rather than through the comprehensive packages favored by the amir” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 189). Although the founder of the modernist camp and amir’s Foreign 
Affairs Minister and adviser Mahmud Tarzi approved of the radical reforms, he too 
argued to implement changes slowly “for the country to absorb” (Barfield, 2010, p. 190). 
But Amanullah rejected Nadir and Tarzi’s advice, both of whom eventually left 
Afghanistan in mid-1920s and migrated to Europe.  
 The impact of reforms on the general populous was more influential on a day-to-
day basis rather than theoretical (Barfield, 2010, p. 190). Corruption had risen during 
Amanullah’s trip, which had also waned his popularity. The Loya Jirga had merely 
‘rubber-stamped’ the amir’s proposal for reforms that had practically doubled taxes on 
everything and increased mandatory military service from two years to three years. 
Within months of passing the reforms, fresh uprisings had begun but because this time 
the amir had upset a large portion of the population, rebellions spread beyond just the 
Pashtun tribes as in the Khost Rebellion (p. 190). Another Pashtun tribe, the Shinwaris in 
eastern Afghanistan, had joined the rebellion in November 1928 attacking Jalalabad and 
burning down the amir’s palace. The unhappy clergy soon gave their blessings to turn the 
uprising into a religious struggle and branded the amir an “infidel” (p. 190).  
 Amanullah decided to use the same strategy used in the 1924 rebellion: promising 
to withdraw radical reforms and seeking to win the ulema’s cooperation. However, it was 
too late and the rebellion had turned violent as the Tajik Kohistanis in the north of the 
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capital Kabul led by the bandit Habibullah Kalakani had also joined the fight (Barfield, 
2010, p. 191). Kalakani, who had won the clergy support, soon arrived at the gates of 
Kabul. In his final attempt to halt the revolt, the amir offered to suspend all reforms but 
even this proposal was rejected. In January of 1929, more government troops started to 
defect to the rebels, which was the final straw for the Amanullah to abdicate in favor of 
his brother Enayatullah and flee to Kandahar to amass a new army (p. 191).  
 Within days, Habibullah Kalakani had marched into Kabul claiming victory and 
forcing the former king’s brother Enayatullah also to abdicate. Although the Tajik 
Kalakani declared himself as the new amir in Kabul, other Pashtun tribes primarily the 
Shinwaris proclaimed Ali Ahmad as the new amir (p. 191). Back in Kandahar, 
Amanullah had already withdrawn his abdication and began recruiting troops in 
Kandahar to take back Kabul from Habibullah Kalakani. The Tajiks did not seek a 
Pashtun Muhammadzai royal to the throne but instead named an ethnically Tajik bandit 
as amir, which “sent shockwaves through the political establishment… [Because] not 
only was he an outsider, he was not even Pashtun” (Barfield, 2010, p. 192). 
 The deposed king Amanullah was received with little cordiality by the people in 
Kandahar. However, the frustration of a Tajik on the throne in Kabul, and the tireless 
efforts of Amanullah’s mother to garn support for her son, encouraged him to showcase 
the cloak of Prophet Mohammad in an Islamic ritual to win over the population (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 219). Eventually, the Pashtun Durrani tribesmen gathered a force of five 
thousands tribal fighters, who together with Amanullah’s royal army, marched north to 
take back Kabul (p. 219). This attempt had the potential to be successful, as more groups 
including the Hazaras and the Pashtun Wardak ethnic group had joined the fight against 
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Kalakani. Moreover, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, Amanullah’s former commander in chief, 
had also raised an army in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, ready to attack Kabul (p. 
219).  
 Then, in a surprise move, Amanullah abandoned his march on Kabul and retreated 
back to Kandahar. Some argue Amanullah had received rumors of his assassination by 
his own supporters, while the other notion was that the powerful Ghilzai tribe, through 
whose land Amanullah’s army was passing, were ready to join Kalakani’s forces in the 
fight (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). Regardless of the reason, Amanullah arrived back at the 
gates of Kandahar, where his Durrani kinsmen were waiting, thoroughly disgusted with 
the king. However, Amanullah did not enter the city and left for Italy along with his 
family and the royal treasury (p. 219).  
 In mensurating Habibullah Khan regime, dynastic tensions quickly arose over 
regime transition (0) after Habibullah’s sudden death, because the king had not named a 
successor (Barfield, 2010, p. 180). Nasrullah, the former king’s eldest brother, seized the 
opportunity and proclaimed himself as the new king (180). His nephews, Habibullah 
Khan’s eldest sons, Inayatullah Khan and Hayatullah Khan both swore their allegiance to 
his uncle as the new king (p. 180). Habibullah Khan’s third son, Amanullah Khan on the 
other hand, rejected his uncle’s claims to kingship, and accused him of being a traitor for 
assassinating his father (p. 180).  
 Amanullah, who had immediately seized the national treasury and had secured the 
loyalty of the national army, ordered the arrest of his uncle and his brothers for being 
complicit (Barfield, 2010, p. 180). Nasrullah, who had been king for only ten days, 
realized he could not attain his position and immediately abdicated in favor of 
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Amanullah, but it was too late as Amanullah threw his brothers along with his uncle in 
jail. While Inayatullah and Hayatullah were soon released and restored to royal status, his 
uncle later died in prison (p. 180).  
Table 5: A. Khan Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total  
Regime Legitimacy 1 1 
Regime Transition 0 0 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 0 0 
Grand Total 1 
 
 Thus, in accordance with the tradition of royal inheritance, Amanullah claimed 
the kingship as the legitimate (1) heir to the throne (Fletcher, 1965, p. 186). Having 
gained Afghanistan’s independence, Amanullah had become extremely popular with the 
public. The enthusiastic amir soon began pushing his domestic goal of modernizing 
Afghanistan by launching various domestic socio-economic, political and religious 
reforms (p. 195). The reforms became controversial and were perceived as radical in a 
traditionally tribal country and backfired as various Pashtun tribes across eastern 
Afghanistan began uprisings (0) in response to them (p. 195). Although Amanullah had 
intended to be king for life (0), the uprisings through his rule eventually drove him to 
exile and his regime was collapsed (0) by a Tajik rebel on January 14, 1929 (Barfield, 
2010, p. 218). 
 Moreover, Amanullah was the absolute head (0) of the state and maintained the 
title of Padsha (king) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 109). However, the constitution 
he had adopted brought new administrative changes to the system ensuring equal political 
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representation (1) of all groups (p. 109). It created a cabinet, a partially elected 
consultative body, gave women’s equal rights, created an independent judicial system, 
and greatly reduced the previous power of tribal chiefs and religious ulema (p. 110). 
Table 6: A. Khan Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total  
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 1 1 
Government Positions 1 1 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 1 1 
Grand Total 4 
  
 Amanullah also allowed government positions (1) to be open to all allowing the 
intellectual and his adviser Mahmud Tarzi to form a cabinet of ministers, with a Prime 
Minister position (Dupree, 1973, p. 442). Moreover, Amanullah’s regime appointed 
Mohammad Nadir Khan as his commander-in-chief of the national army (1), which was 
filled on merit (p. 445). In addition, he had appointed an ethnic Tajik Mohammad Wali 
Khan as his top diplomatic adviser (p. 445). And lastly, political dissent was allowed to a 
greater degree (1) during Amanullah’s regime, from holding various Loya Jirgas to 
establishing the first independent newspaper, the Seraj-ul-Akhabr (p. 439). 
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Habibullah Kalakani, 1929 
 Habibullah Kalakani, known as Bacha-i-Saqao (“child of the water carrier,”) after 
his father’s occupation, was an ethnically Tajik bandit infamous for his illegal activities 
and trouble with the law (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). He had been sentenced to jail for 
attacking an officer in Kabul, where he later escaped to Peshawar and opened a shadow 
teahouse for smuggling. Saqao returned to Afghanistan in 1928 and began recruiting a 
band of robbers, attacking caravans along the Hindu Kush routes (p. 217). For a brief 
period, Saqao enlisted in the army during Amanullah’s public call for tribal aid and free 
pardon, and “was given rifles and a general’s admission in the Afghan army” (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 217 fletcher).  
 After seeing the weak and defenseless state of the capital Kabul firsthand, he 
abandoned his position and went to Kohistan, where he gathered a band of 300 robbers 
and launched a surprise attack on the city. Although this was a relatively small attack, 
“the audacity of the move was such that only a swift action by Abdul Aziz, the minister 
of war, and a determined stand by the cadets of the military school, kept it from 
succeeding” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). Saqao, however, was forced to retreat back to 
Kohistan after twelve days of fighting in this initial attack. Amanullah’s forces followed 
him into the snowy mountainous region of Kohistan, where thousands of Kohistanis 
flocked to join their local hero in the fighting (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). Outnumbered, the 
army was forced to surrender, leaving Kabul undefended. On January 14, 1929, Saqao 
launched a second attack on Kabul, where Amanullah had barricaded himself in the royal 
palace (p. 218). After a few days of fighting, Saqao entered the royal palace on January 
27 and captured Arg.  
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 Declaring himself amir, Saqao began forming a government, which was a difficult 
task to do since Amanullah Khan had taken the entire royal treasury with him (Barfield, 
2010, p. 218). Hence, Saqao began extracting a large sum from citizens and merchants of 
Kabul through the use of threats and torture (p. 218). Aside from facing problems funding 
the national treasury, Saqao had to sort out the transfer of authority as the new amir. 
Although it is difficult to comprehend how a bandit could control the entire country and 
establish a bureaucracy, Afghanistan at the time was virtually an agricultural pastoral 
country (Fletcher, 1965, p. 218). Therefore, the local governments at the provincial level 
were least impacted by a change in central government in Kabul and “…simply 
continued to carry out instructions from Kabul, without regard to who issued them” 
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 218). 
 Moreover, “Some of Amanullah’s aids, especially those in what remained of the 
Afghan army, agreed to serve Saqao in return for lavish financial rewards and the 
promise of future favors. But the civil government was so depleted that only two of the 
Saqao’s cabinet were able to read; the bandit Amir himself was totally illiterate” 
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 218). Saqao also began raising an army of ten thousand men in Kabul, 
mostly recruited from his hometown Kohistan by paying them “with money extorted 
from Kabul merchants and equipped with the stores in the government arsenal” (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 219). He was quick to eliminate all other Pashtun royal rivals to the throne by 
executing Amanullah Khan’s half-brothers Hayatullah Khan, Abdul Majid Khan as well 
as Amanullah’s cousin Ali Ahmed Jan, who was captured when organizing a resistance 
movement in Kandahar (p. 219).  
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 Moreover, “The authority of the bandit amir was mostly an illusion” (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 219). His becoming amir was only possible “…because the region was so 
decentralized, and the cities were so few and scattered, that an individual even with the 
Saqao’s drive and courage was able to seize control of Kabul and Kandahar, and by the 
use of extorted funds recruited an army of assorted malefactors eager for loot and 
excitement” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). But in reality, “There was little to enable Saqao to 
consolidate his rule. He had no standing whatsoever among the Pushtoon tribes, which up 
to this time had taken no part in the fighting but waited aloof for the inevitable agents of 
the Saqao’s downfall to do their work” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 220) 
 Saqao’s regime was mostly reactionary, as he immediately eliminated all of 
Amanullah Khan’s reforms. Although Saqao was a skilled fighter, he proved to be a 
“poor ruler leaving Kabul in chaos during his nine month reign” (Barfield, 2010, p. 192). 
The Tajik born amir was successful staying in power briefly because of his monopoly on 
dividing “the Pashtun tribes for a surprisingly long time, keeping them at odds with one 
another by appealing to their local mullahs (who approved of his reactionary policies) as 
well as playing on a traditional animosities between Ghilzais and Durranis” (Barfield, 
2010, p. 192). In Afghanistan’s history, the emperors and kings had come from the 
Pashtun Durrani Empire “for so long that even the most powerful regional and tribal 
leaders could not conceive of it being otherwise” (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Although 
many had resented Amanullah’s progressive policies, recognizing a Tajik amir from the 
bottom of the Afghan ethnic groups was such a ‘radical break’ from the past regimes that 
the sight of unveiled women walking in public in Kabul was less controversial by 
comparison (p. 193). 
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 In fact, Saqao was able to become amir easily because the rebels around the 
country were mostly concerned with toppling Amanullah at any cost and had not 
“agreed” on who should become the new ruler (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Considering an 
amir from any other group than a Pashtun ethnicity had never been an issue in Afghan 
politics. Thus a Tajik amir’s presence in Kabul briefly altered the ethnic dynamic of the 
Afghan political culture. In the past, “regional faction leaders invariably aligned 
themselves with some member of the royal line who used their support to establish his 
own authority” (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). For example, Dost Muhammad’s son Akbar was 
able to assume leadership of the resistance against the British in the Anglo-Afghan wars 
and helped his father to the amirship. Abdur Rahman Khan had similarly been recognized 
by both the British government and the Afghan resistance movements allowing him to 
become amir. Although Amanullah Khan had many tribal critics, none of them saw 
themselves as rulers, and he too was able to become amir (p. 193). 
 Saqao’s support, however, primarily came from his own Tajik clan, the 
Kohistanis, who were alienated by Amanullah. The Pashtun tribes, including the Pashtun 
Shinwaris, rejected a Tajik ruler and threw their support behind Ali Ahmad as the new 
amir. Ali Ahmad had been the same “general that Amanullah Khan had sent to suppress 
the Shinwari’s when they had rebelled against Amanullah’s reforms. Ali Ahmad, who 
came from the Pashtun Qandahari Loinab sardars, was a member of the old elite and 
therefore an outsider himself (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Soon Ali Ahmad and the 
Shinwari's launched an attack on Saqao’s forces to remove him from the throne in Kabul 
but this attack failed, and hence Ali Ahmad had squandered his chance of becoming amir 
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(p. 193). Ali Ahmad escaped to Qandahar but was captured and returned to Saqao who 
brutally executed him by blowing him out of a cannon (p. 193). 
 After this failed attempt to oust Saqao and the collapse of Ali Ahmad’s army, the 
eastern Pashtun tribes began reconsidering their opposition to Amanullah Khan (Barfield, 
2010, p. 193). Amanullah Khan too was ready to drop all previous reforms and negotiate 
a new deal with the tribal and religious leaders (p. 193). Many of the eastern Pashtun 
tribes, who feared that Saqao could consolidate and strengthen his hold on power in the 
long term, joined with their ‘brothers’ in the south to expand their support base and 
remove Saqao. In other words, “They pledged to restore to the throne the very amir that 
they had only a few months earlier declared an infidel and driven from office” (Barfield, 
2010, p. 194). Afghan politics are known for side switching, hence both parties ignored 
their past rivalries so they could collectively face a common enemy.  
 Back in Qandahar, Amanullah had been rallying the influential Pashtun Durrani 
group to win back his throne. Amanullah had been running a shadow political campaign 
against Saqao by appealing to the Pashtun chauvinism “insisting that such a proud people 
could never accept a Tajik bandit as their amir” (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). Moreover, the 
former amir also spread rumors that the British had installed Saqao as their agent but “as 
much as the British disliked Amanullah, the uprising against him was of his own making 
and none of their doing” (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). However, they also did not support him 
in taking back power either. Declaring a ‘policy of neutrality’ the British neither 
acknowledged Saqao’s regime nor allowed Amanullah Khan access to ship weapons held 
in India (p. 194). 
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 Despite this setback, Amanullah’s position improved when his former minister of 
defense Nadir Khan and his brothers returned from France in February of 1929. Nadir, 
who had “strong ties with the tribes,” soon took the lead in organizing the tribes to 
overthrow Saqao (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). Although some were worried that Nadir Khan 
intended to make himself as the new amir, he did not give this impression and played his 
hand subtly by positioning “himself as an enemy of [Saqao] allied with Amanullah 
without ever making it clear whether or not he supported Amanullah’s restoration” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 194). However, in May of 1929, Amanullah’s effort to restore himself 
as the amir failed after his army was attacked on their march from Qandahar to Kabul by 
the Pashtun Ghilzai’s near Ghazni province (p. 194). Meanwhile Saqao had made an 
alliance with the Pashtun Mujadaddi family, a rival of Amanullah Khan, and began 
attacking their traditional enemy the Pashtun Durrani rivals (p. 194).  
 The leader of the Mujadaddi family, Omar Fazl had gained the support of the 
Pashtun Ghilzai’s under the notion that Nadir Khan, who was closely communicating 
with Fazl, would become amir. Hence, “Faced with continued attacks by both Saqao’s 
troops and the Ghilzai’s, and having received word that Herat had fallen to Saqao’s 
forces too, Amanullah soon took Nadir’s advice that he should leave Afghanistan for 
exile in Europe” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). Nadir Khan now became the sole leader of the 
fighting and a Pashtun champion to remove a Tajik ruler (p. 195). In order to legitimize 
his position as amir further, Nadir Khan called for a Loya Jirga of tribal elders to 
challenge his Tajik counterpart to be legitimate ruler of the country, a “contest the Tajik 
would surely lose” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195)  
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 Although Nadir along with his brothers attacked Kabul four times in the summer 
of 1929, they failed to remove Saqao. Moreover, the Pashtun tribes had become 
fragmented either because of the absence of Amanullah Khan or perhaps because of it 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 195). On the other hand, Nadir was running out of money to support 
the army’s campaigns and in the absence of an amir, the tribes were enjoying the power 
vacuum left by a central government (p. 195). Finally, the tide turned in favor of Nadir 
when his brother Shah Wali Khan amassed a “tribal lashkar of twelve thousand Wazir 
[i.e. Pashtun] tribesmen from the British side of the frontier…who took Kabul on October 
13 [1929]” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). The Waziri fighters, “In the absence of pay…looted 
the city before returning home” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). And as was expected at the end 
of the conflict, Saqao “was hanged, along with around a dozen of his followers” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 195). 
 Saqao’s defeat raised the question of who should become Afghanistan’s next 
amir. Nadir Khan withheld from automatically claiming the throne and recommended 
that a Loya Jirga pick the new amir (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). According to his brother, 
Nadir Khan’s “position was that once the evil had ended, Afghans should choose their 
monarch in the time-honored way,” and “he disclaimed any interest in the job himself” 
(Barfield, 2010, 195). However, the Jirga “rejected Amanullah’s restoration and 
enthusiastically chose Nadir to replace him–a decision particularly welcomed by the 
armed tribesmen still on the streets of Kabul who refused to leave until he took the 
kingship” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). And the new amir accepted the position saying, “Since 
the people so designate me so, I accept. I will not be the king but the servant of the tribes 
and the country” (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). 
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 In mensurating Bacha Saqao’s regime, he came to power in one of the most 
violent transition (0) of powers in Afghanistan’s history by overthrowing Amanullah 
Khan’s regime in a bloody civil war (Dupree, 1973, p. 452). The bandit, who wanted to 
take the throne, had recruited fighters in his homeland Kohistan and had launched various 
attacks on Kabul during the final few months of Amanullah’s regime (Dupree, 1973, p. 
452). Saqao was also able to draw support around the country from the conservative 
religious ulema to fight against Amanullah, who had angered the clergy with his 
controversial social reforms (Dupree, 1973, p. 454).  
 After assuming the throne in Kabul, Saqao soon assumed the titles of Ghazi 
(“holy warrior”) as well Khadim-i-din-i-rasululah (“Servant of the Prophet’s Religious”) 
(Dupree, 1973, p. 458). Saqqao’s regime lacked legitimacy (0) because he was a self-
declared amir who had taken power by overthrowing the sitting king and killing all his 
challengers (Barfield, 2010, p. 191).  
Table 7: H. Kalakani Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 0 0 
Regime Transition 0 0 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 0 0 
Grand Total 0 
 
Moreover, the throne was up for debate as the Pashtun Shinwaris, who had also been 
fighting against Amanullah, had proclaimed Ali Ahmad as their amir (Barfield, 2010, p. 
191). Saqao was ‘only’ able to become amir because those who were fighting to against 
Amanullah’s regime had not decided on who should replace him as the new king 
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(Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Ali Ahmad’s claim to the throne however ended when he was 
captured by Saqao’s men and “executed by being blown out of a cannon” (Barfield, 2010, 
p. 193). 
 Although Saqao’s rule was short, he continuously faced uprisings (0) against his 
regime. The Pashtuns, who had become united against a Tajik ruler, branded the bandit-
amir as an agent of the British and vowed to overthrow him (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). 
Saqao had intended to rule Afghanistan as the new amir (0) but his regime’s only lasted 9 
months before Nadir Khan and his brothers overthrow it (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). His 
downfall (0), however, was inevitable because all odds were against him as a Tajik ruler. 
Before Saqao, there had never been a Tajik ruler as all kings had come from the Pashtun 
tribes (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). When Nadir Khan gathered a Loya Jirga of prominent 
Pashtun tribal leaders after taking the lead role in fighting against the Tajik ruler, the 
Jirga quickly branded Saqao a “tyrant”, thereby delegitimizing him as a ruler (Barfield, 
2010, p. 195). 
Table 8: H. Kalakani Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 0 0 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representation 0 0 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 0 
 
Saqao was an absolute head of the state (0) whose regime’s was dominated (0) by only 
his ‘friends’ and ‘relatives’ (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 113). His colleagues 
considered the capital Kabul as an “enemy” city where they killed off those loyal to 
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Amanullah Khan and extorted money from residents to fund the government (p. 113). 
Saqao’s regime was mostly ‘reactionary,’ canceling all of Amanullah Khan’s reforms 
gave the clergy power back (p. 113). He did not have an organized army (0) but irregular 
forces who were primarily recruited from his hometown Kohistan (Rasanayagam, 2003, 
p. 22).  
 Political representation (0) was not something Saqao was concerned with since 
most of his administration was made of former bandits who ruled Kabul in chaos during 
his nine months in power (Barfield, 2010, p. 192). Moreover, he had divided the Pashtun 
tribes by playing on their animosities and keeping them at odds with each other (Barfield, 
2010, p. 192). Saqao similarly did not allow any opposition (0) to his rule and would 
either buy ‘influence’ or simply eliminate anyone that opposed him, including all his 
rivals such Ali Ahmad and Amanullah Khan’s two eldest brothers (Barfield, 2010, p. 
192). 
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Nadir Khan, 1929-1933 
 Nadir Khan’s appointment as king was the beginning of a dynastic change that 
brought the Muhasiban family to power. Nadir Khan soon assumed the title of shah 
(“king”) as a symbolic move to distant himself from Amanullah Khan (Barfield, 2010, p. 
195). Although Nadir Shah was elected by a Loya Jirga representing the people, 
Amanullah’s followers claimed that Nadir had no right to be the legitimate king and that 
the Loya Jirga was too small to elect the new amir (p. 197). However, the succession 
debate ended when the British recognized Nadir’s regime in November 1929 and 
provided him with money to “stabilize his government” while the new king reiterated his 
support for all the existing treaties between the two nations (Barfield, 2010, p. 197).  
 However, Amanullah’s followers were not ready to quit the fight for the amirship 
and in 1930, the Pashtun Shinwaris and the Tajik Kohistanis led separate revolts against 
the new king in the eastern tribal belt and northern regions. Nadir was quick to react and 
called on his border Pashtun tribes to help put down the revolt and “executed and 
imprisoned” many Amanullah supporters (Barfield, 2010, p. 197). By September 1931, 
Nadir had successfully put down any revolts or uprising against his regime and had called 
another larger Loya Jirga consisting of 510 members, “who approved an official 
declaration of deposition (khal) that formally abrogated the rights of Amanullah and his 
heirs on the grounds that he had violated sharia law” (Barfield, 2010, p. 197). Although a 
last major revolt led by Saqao’s uncle in the Kohistan region broke out in July 1931, it 
was easily put down with the help of the tribes (p. 228). 
 The new king Nadir Shah was a cautious ruler who put the country’s progress and 
stability as his top policies (Fletcher, 1965, p. 222). Nadir sought a middle ground policy 
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when dealing with sensitive religious laws and traditions. For instance, although he 
ordered that the purdah (“seclusion of women”) to be reinstated, he simultaneously 
reopened girls’ schools that Saqao had closed (p. 226). Moreover, in order to satisfy the 
religious zealots, he restored big government pensions to various influential mullahs 
including Mohammad Siddiq, the Hazrat of Shor-Bazaar, who had played a major role in 
bringing down Amanullah Khan’s regime earlier (p. 227). Nadir Shah began his rule in 
close consultation with his four brothers, and while there were differences among the 
royals when arriving at government decisions, they usually presented a united front 
publically (Fletcher, 1965, p. 228).  
 Nadir continued forming a permanent government by announcing a new 
constitution on October 31, 1931 largely based on Amanullah Khan’s 1923 constitution 
framework (Fletcher, 1965, p. 228). According to the new constitution, the throne 
became hereditary in Nadir Shah’s family and a new cabinet, senate and house were 
established (p. 228). The cabinet, which consisted of eighteen departments, included the 
position of prime minister, presidents for the house and senate, the directors of mines and 
agriculture, ministers of war, state, foreign affairs, interior, justice, education, health, 
finance, commerce and post (p. 228). The constitution however gave the king the power 
of the “head of the executive, legislative and judicial departments, made him commander 
in chief of the armed forces, and proclaimed the inviolability of his person” (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 229).  
 In fact, “The major contradiction in the 1931 Constitution was that, although the 
government was declared to be responsible to the Parliament, members of the Parliament 
had to swear loyalty to the government” (Dupree, 1973, p. 463). Moreover, Nadir had the 
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power to declare war, appoint the prime minister, approve all officials and make 
emergency laws. The constitution, based on various sources such as Turkish, Iranian and 
French constitutions, was a ‘hodgepodge’ of contradictions (Dupree, 1973, p. 464). It 
tried to combine western thoughts with local Afghan traditions and customs along with 
Sharia Law (p. 464). Although the constitution did prescribe authority to the institutions 
it created, in reality, real power stayed with the royal family. The government was never 
fully able to implement its constitutional duties and even though Nadir’s reign is often 
described as a constitutional monarchy, it was merely an oligarchy (p. 464).  
 In short, the 1931 Constitution had “…created a façade of parliamentary 
government while leaving control in the hands of the royal family, kept the judiciary 
primarily under the religious leaders, created a semi-socialist economic framework with 
the principle of free enterprise accepted and guaranteed theoretical individual equality” 
(Dupree, 1973, p. 471). These powers effectively crippled the legislature body and 
therefore the government was merely an oligarchy where power was concentrated with 
the elite Pashtun Mohammadzai family (Fetcher, 1965, p. 229). Local governments also 
did not change during Nadir’s reign. The country was divided into five major provinces 
(Wilayats) and four smaller provinces (Hakumat-i-Ala). Governors or Walis (also referred 
to as Hakumat Naibs) were head of the provincial governments appointed by the central 
government (p. 229). However, power was shared between police chiefs and civilian 
heads of the government and in some parts such as the southern and eastern provinces, 
police only had basic authority.  
 Although Nadir implemented various economic development plans to modernize 
Afghanistan, many Afghans still resented him. The king launched various plans to 
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modernize the largely pastoral and agricultural Afghan economy by building the first 
National Bank and introducing a new currency (Fletcher, 1965, p. 230). Moreover, 
Nadir’s most significant act was establishing proper transportation and communication 
channels by building highways and connecting large provinces (p. 230). Even though 
these were monumental steps towards progress, Nadir’s reign remained unpopular with 
Afghans, many of whom believed that Nadir and his family’s claim to the throne were 
not valid. Moreover, Nadir was less popular with the younger generation who had 
preferred the progressive Amanullah Khan (Fletcher, 1965, p. 230). And although Nadir 
was publicly accused of being a British agent, he was in fact an ‘Anglophobe,’ a member 
of the “war party” that launched the third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 and became the 
hero of that war (p. 232). 
 Tribal turbulences also increased during Nadir’s reign from 1930 to 1933 as the 
border Pashtun Mohmand and Afridi tribes began launching more raids in the eastern 
parts of the country. In 1931, a tribe was able to capture a city in Peshawar on the border 
briefly before the Indian Army was able to oust them. While the tensions between the 
British and the border tribes increased, tribal leaders pleaded to Nadir to intervene but 
they were uncharacteristically advised to “make their peace with the British” (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 232). This was a major break away from previous Afghan amirs who would 
negotiate with the British on behalf of all the Pashtun border tribes. While many Afghans 
saw this as more evidence that Nadir was a British client, the king was simply being 
careful of provoking the British who he feared could arrange to overthrow his monarchy 
(p. 232). Nevertheless, Nadir’s neglect of the eastern tribes had caused great resentment 
among Afghans.  
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 The resentment took physical form when in June 1933 Mohammed Aziz Khan, 
the oldest of the Pashtun Mohammadzai brothers serving as the Afghan ambassador in 
the Afghan embassy in Berlin, Germany was shot dead by a graduate Afghan student. 
The student assassin, Kemal Syed, who had come to Germany for advanced studies, 
“gave his reason [as] the betrayal of the eastern [i.e. Pashtun] tribes by the 
Mohammedzais” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 233). Not long after, another similar incident 
occurred when a student entered the British Embassy in Kabul to assassinate the British 
ambassador but was stopped after killing two high level clerks. The increase in these 
incidents was a sign of public frustration and resentment towards the government. 
Eventually on November 8, 1933 another student by the name of Mohammad Khaliq 
approached king Nadir himself during a royal soccer game celebration in the palace, and 
shot him dead (p. 233).  
 All three student assassins were coincidently from the same German-staffed Nijat 
College, which led to rumors that the murders were plotted at the school; however, in 
reality assassinating the king was more likely motivated by a personal grievance 
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 233). Just prior to his assassination, Nadir had accused General 
Ghulam Nabi Charkhi of being complicit in aiding a brief revolt by the Pashtun Dari 
Khel Ghilzai tribes. Ghulam Nabi, who was the son of Ghulam Hyder Charkhi Abdur 
Rahman’s commander in chief and an Amanullah Khan supporter, had rejected the 
accusations and verbally abused the king in his palace. Nadir, who also had a short 
temper, had ordered the execution of Ghulam Nabi on the spot (p. 234). The student 
assassin Mohammad Khaliq, who had shot down Nadir was the adopted son of Ghulam 
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Nabi, and was therefore, likely motivated by revenge for the killing of his adoptive father 
(p. 234).  
 Despite the resentment, Nadir’s reign was relatively stable because the main goal 
of the Pashtun Muhasiban family was domestic stability for the country (Barfield, 2010, 
p. 198). A highly powerful family, the Muhasiban would rule Afghanistan for the next 50 
years with Nadir’s son Zahir Shah succeeding him immediately after his death (p. 198). 
Unlike Amanullah Khan’s attempts, the Muhasiban’s long-term vision was to introduce 
social change and modernize gradually, implementing it in Kabul first and then 
expanding it to the rural areas. The Muhasiban however were not able to create a strong, 
centralized government like the Iron Amir and realized that the greatest threat to their 
rule was a perceived alliance between the “disaffected rural population and the 
conservative Islamic establishment, but over time its own policies made these groups 
ever more marginal and less politically significant” (Barfield, 2010, p. 198).  
 Essentially, the Muhasiban family’s journey to becoming a powerful royal family 
began with Nadir and his four brothers, who had accompanied him on his return from 
France and were detrimental in appointing him as king. Nadir had repaid by appointing 
all of them to high and powerful government posts, naming “Hashim Khan as premier, 
Shah Wali Khan as the minister of war and commander-in-chief, and Shah Mahmud as 
the minister of interior” (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). Although Nadir’s son Zahir Shah 
became king at 19 after his father’s death, real power rested with his uncle Hashim Khan 
from 1933 until 1946 (p. 199).  
 In mensurating Nadir Shah’s regime, his accession to power and his subsequent 
transition (0) were violent and bloody. Nadir had raised an army of tribal fighters along 
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with his brothers and fought for several months before they recaptured Kabul from Bacha 
Saqao on October 10, 1929 (Dupree, 1973, p. 459). After successfully overthrowing 
Bacha Saqao and recapturing Kabul, Nadir initially refused to proclaim himself as the 
new king but later accepted on the insistence of the tribal army and the jirga (Dupree, 
1973, p. 459). Nadir’s ascendance to the throne, however, had infuriated Amanullah 
Khan’s supporters, who hoped to put the deposed king back on the throne (Dupree, 1973, 
p. 460). However, the dispute over the right to kingship ended when Nadir called a Loya 
Jirga that legitimized him (1) as the new king in September 1930 (Dupree, 1973, p. 460).  
 In his five-year reign as king, Nadir faced a few major uprisings (0) early on from 
the Pashtun tribes such as Shinwaris, Ghilzais and the Tajiks in the Kohistan region 
(Dupree, 1973, p. 460). The Shinwaris revolt began with the quest to restore Amanullah 
Khan to the throne and protest tax increases, but Nadir cleverly bought off their khans 
ending their revolts (Dupree, 1973, p. 460). The fight against the Tajiks in Kohistan was 
brutal however, and Nadir had to call on his ally border Pashtun tribes once again to help 
put down that revolt (p. 460).  
Table 9: N. Khan Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total  
Regime Legitimacy 1 1 
Regime Transition 0 0 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 1 1 
Grand Total 2 
  
 Nadir Shah made an early example by brutally putting down the Tajik Kohistani 
revolt and killing the leader, and from then on, did not face any other revolt until his 
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death in 1933 (p. 460). Nadir and his brothers had intended to stay in power for years to 
come (0) as they began pacifying Afghanistan and subjugating the tribes (p. 461). 
Although a student assassinated king Nadir on November 8, 1933 in a public ceremony, 
his regime, however, did not collapse (1) and his son immediately inherited kingship (p. 
475). 
  Moreover, Nadir was the absolute head of state (0) who made sure executive 
power stayed within the royal family by appointing his brothers to key government 
positions (0) in his cabinet (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). Hashim Khan was appointed as the 
Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud as Minister of Interior, and Shah Wali Khan as the 
Commander-in-Chief (1) of the army (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). However, popular political 
representation (1) increased under Nadir’s reign after allowing the adoption of a new 
constitution (Dupree, 1973, p. 463). 
Table 10: N. Khan Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion 
Indicators 
Scores Total  
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 1 1 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 2 
 
The same Loya Jirga that had proclaimed him king, adopted a new Constitution in 
1931, which created a bicameral Parliament, albeit with the king’s approval, and a 105-
body National Council to advise the king (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 115). 
However, there was no indication in the constitution that would prevent the royal family 
from “ruling at its own discretion” (Wahab & Youngerman, p. 115). The members to the 
new Parliament were partly elected and partially appointed by the king (p. 115). 
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 Although in theory the government was responsible to the Parliament, in reality 
the latter simply ‘rubber-stamped’ the king’s decisions and its members had to swear 
loyalty to the king (Dupree, 1973, p. 463). Moreover, Nadir Shah had also greatly 
restricted liberal free speech and political dissent (0), which resulted in “thousands of 
Afghan intellectuals were imprisoned or killed” (Runion, 2007, p. 93). Despite the 1931 
constitution giving various institutions and government administrations authority in 
Nadir’s regime, real power stayed with the king and his royal family, who had essentially 
created an ‘oligarchy’ (Dupree, 1973, p. 464). 
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Zahir Shah, 1933—1973 
 After Nadir Shah’s death, the three remaining Muhasiban brothers shared power 
among each other. Mohammad Hashim Khan, who had the highest authority, became the 
Prime Minister from 1933 until 1946 (Fletcher, 1965, p. 234). Shah Wali Khan, who was 
known as the Fateh-i-Kabul (“Conqueror of Kabul”) after capturing the capital from 
Bacha Saqao, accepted a much lesser role as the ambassador to England and France from 
1930 until 1947 (Dupree, 1973, p. 447). Contrary to previous dynastic regime changes, 
none of Nadir’s three brothers made a ‘personal bid’ for the throne and instead promptly 
proclaimed the designated heir Nadir Shah’s 19-year old son Zahir Shah as the new king 
(Fletcher, 1965, p. 234). This internal unity among the Pashtun Muhasiban family, who 
were considered an outsider clan when Nadir Shah became king, was fundamental in 
helping maintain the royal throne in the family as well as ensuring a peaceful transition of 
power in the country (p. 234).  
 The new king Zahir Shah had been groomed for kingship from an early age. After 
graduating from the military school in Kabul, he was appointed as the minister of war and 
education at the age of 18 (Fletcher, 1965, p.  235). However, because of his inexperience 
in politics and young age, he remained only in the background for twenty-two years 
while his uncle Hashim Khan run the government until 1946 (p. 235). During his tenure 
Hashim was largely able to maintain the internal stability Nadir Shah had brought to 
Afghanistan, but his regime was tested with a few major revolts (p. 235). However, most 
political challenges during this time were related to foreign policy. 
 Internally, the Afghan government’s most persistent problem during Hashim’s 
tenure was putting down a border Pashtun Afridi tribe’s rebellion against the British 
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(Fletcher, 1965, p. 238). The Afghan government had been caught in the middle of the 
Pashtun border tribes Madda Khel and Tori Khel deadly fight against the British, but it 
eventually ended in a truce (p. 238). In 1939, other fresh fighting began when a Syrian 
relative of former Queen Soriya called Shami Pir (“Syrian saint”) vowed to restore ex-
king Amanullah Khan back to the throne (p. 239). However, the British soon convinced 
him to abandon his conquest in exchange for twenty thousand pounds. Some argue that 
Shami Pir was a British plot to put pressure on the Afghan government as a response to 
German presence in Afghanistan, but there is no evidence to support this theory (p. 239). 
 Eventually Hashim, who had steered Afghanistan into stability for 13 years, 
stepped down as prime minister in 1946 due to poor health, with the youngest Muhasiban 
brother, Shah Mahmud, replacing him (Fletcher, 1965, p. 242). Shah Mahmud, who 
quickly gained popularity for being a progressive and liberal-minded Prime Minister, 
opened up the political system and brought democratic changes. However, Zahir, who 
was now 32 and had been mostly a ceremonial king until now, began taking an active 
role in the Afghan politics.  
 His first official state policy was to release many political prisoners including 
members of the Ghulam Charkhi family as well as the students imprisoned for the attacks 
on the British embassy in 1933 (Fletcher, 1965, p. 244). Other significant changes during 
Shah Mahmud’s tenure as Prime Minister was allowing relatively free elections and the 
creation of a new democratic Parliament 1949 (Dupree, 1973, p. 495). This liberal 
experiment grew rapidly and the new Parliament began holding the government 
accountable by regularly calling ministers to the chamber for questioning. The “Duties 
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and Rights of Ministers” clause gave the cabinet ministers unlimited power while 
relieving the king of any ministerial duties (p. 495).  
 Soon the new liberal parliament passed laws to allow freedom of the press, which 
led to the creation of several newspapers. The three major ones, Watan (“Homeland”), 
Angar (“Burning Embers”), and Nida-ye-Khalq (“Voice of the People”) were all opposed 
to the monarchy and began criticizing its policies openly (Dupree, 1973, p. 495). The 
public soon caught up and letters to the editors began pouring while “religious leaders 
and their supporters received the brunt of the attacks in the free press” (p. 495). The 
editors consistently called on the government to hold ‘genuinely free elections’ and that 
the “government should be responsible to Parliament” (p. 495). Moreover, a new 
National Democratic Party was founded whose members were also staunchly against 
Zahir’s monarchy. The government responded quickly to these developments by arresting 
protesters and banning the three newspapers that published from 1951 until 1952 (p. 
495). 
 However, the monarchy could not totally cease the rise of the new democratic 
movement. The new Parliament had inspired a group of 30 students in Kabul University 
to form a student union that continued the criticism against the government (Dupree, 
1973, p. 296). While they were ignored initially, the group grew in size and influence 
quickly, and fearing that it would hurt the status quo, the government formed a pro-
government political party in response. But this failed and even government employees, 
who were encouraged to join the party, showed little to no interest (p. 496). The 
government crackdown on liberal groups also forced another prominent ‘political 
brotherhood’ the Wikh-i-Zulmaiyan (“Awakened Youth”) movement. But opposition and 
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attacks in the press continued against the government and “More and more pieces pointed 
to religious fanaticism as the major institution holding back Afghan progress” (Dupree, 
1973, p. 496).  
 Eventually the government grew desperate and ordered the army to dissolve the 
student union, forcing its members to escape to Pakistan (Dupree, 1973, p. 497). 
Moreover, it began cracking down on all “liberal” movements by closing down all non-
government newspapers and arresting over twenty-five political liberal leaders including 
the leaders of the Wikh-i-Zulmaiyan political organization. While jails began filling with 
liberal dissidents, only those who agreed to stop taking part in anti-government 
movements were later released. In short, the experiment in the so-called ‘liberal 
parliament’, which had begun in 1949, had failed by 1952 (Dupree, 1973, p. 497) 
 In September 1953, there was another internal change of leadership in the 
Muhasiban family. A radio announcement declared that Prime Minister Shah Mahmud, 
who had held the position for ten years, had resigned due to health reasons and Daud 
Khan had replaced him as the new Prime Minister (Fletcher, 1965, p. 259). Shah 
Mahmud, who was the last of the Muhasiban brothers, had restored the long-term 
stability in his time as prime minister. Although Shah Mahmud was liberal and in favor 
of progress, he had been cautious and pursued thinly veiled conservative policies. And 
even though Shah Mahmud’s tenure had been one of stability and peace, economic 
progress was slow and people had become increasingly frustrated with the government 
(p. 259). 
 When Daud Khan took over his new position, he had the support of the foreign 
minister, his brother Mohammad Naim as well as his cousin and the king, Zahir Shah. 
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Although the transition of power had been peaceful, the shift in leadership went from 
Mahmud Shah’s semi liberal policies to Daud’s aggressively progressive ones (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 259). Shah Mahmud’s supporters were not convinced of his health as the reason 
for his resignation since he had been in good health at the time of his stepping down (p. 
259). And even though the concerned supporters were few in numbers, they resented the 
new administraton and a quiet revolution had begun to take place (p. 260).  
 Daud however was fully committed to his new position. He had been successful 
as the acting defense minister in helping put down the 1949 Pashtun Safi tribe revolt 
(Dupree, 1973, p. 260). Having the support of the king and his brother, this new royal trio 
now controlled Afghan political affairs. For much of the 1950s, Daud was at the helm of 
Afghan political scene. He had become extremely popular with people, especially the 
progressive elites. However, Zahir was becoming wary of his cousin’s popularity and 
consolidation of power. Moreover, Zahir had been intending to take a serious role in 
running the country with the resignation of Shah Mahmud in 1953 (p. 277).  
 Although Daud was appointed as prime minister, most Afghans knew that the 
government “was in reality an oligarchy with power at the hands of the royal family” (p. 
278). Hence, it lacked a broad power base and many Afghans continued to resent it and 
its Western mentality. Daud was suddenly coerced into resigning as prime minister in 
March 1963 (p. 278). Daud had accomplished a great deal in a short period of time, from 
giving women freedoms to bringing stability and progress. However, the conservative 
clergy fiercely disliked him for his policies and for being a member of the royal family. 
His personal goal for an independent Pushtonistan had ended with the break-off of 
diplomatic relations with Pakistan, one that almost brought both countries to the brink of 
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war. In his farewell speech, he lobbied for a more open and democratic government 
suggesting the “separation of its executive, legislative and judicial power” (Fletcher, 
1965, p. 279).  
 Zahir welcomed these suggestions and appointed a committee to prepare a new 
constitution. Daud Khan’s resignation had brought enthusiasm for more openness and a 
new constitutional period. Zahir had seen peoples’ drive for full democracy and was 
determined to begin implementing a transition to a full constitutional monarchy by 
separating the executive branch of government from the royal family (Dupree, 1973, p. 
561). The newly appointed Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Yusuf was given full 
authority to appoint a new interim cabinet. No one with royal background was eligible to 
be elected in the Cabinet of Ministers while only four of the total twelve members were 
appointed from the Pashtun Durrani tribe. Moreover, for the first in decades, two non-
Pashtun members were also elected to high-level government positions (p. 561). 
However, these changes in the government fell short of a complete regime change as 
Zahir still maintained the power to confirm the new cabinet.  
 Nonetheless, Prime Minister Dr. Yusuf delivered his first speech emphasizing on 
more constitutional reforms “and a more representative government” (Dupree, 1973, p. 
562). The atmosphere around the country was positive and people expected many 
changes overnight but the centuries of stagnation in the country soon led to frustrations 
(p. 563). Realizing this discontent, the new government soon put together a committee to 
draft a new liberal constitution by February 1964. A 29-member advisory committee 
comprising of all major ethnic groups, liberals and conservative clerics as well as royal 
family members reviewed the draft constitution before it went to a vote for adoption in a 
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Loya Jirga (p. 566). The government, however, still maintained tight control over the 
process as well as all the media that reported on the proceedings of the new constitution. 
Because only around 25 percent Afghans were literate at the time, radio broadcasts were 
“more important than newspapers and magazine in reaching the masses” (Dupree, 1973, 
p. 567). 
 Zahir convened a Loya Jirga consisting of 452 members that would ratify the new 
Constitution, which included members of the National Assembly, the Senate, the Cabinet, 
the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Committee, and members selected from all 
provinces to participate. However, the government did maintain strong influence over 
elections in the provincial elections and conveniently screened out any ‘anti-government’ 
candidates (Dupree, 1973, p. 568). Essentially only 176 of the total 452 members of the 
Loya Jirga were elected in free elections while the remaining came from the above 
governmental bodies (p. 569). The Jirga began its session and opened the debate on the 
128-articles of the new constitution. The Jirga hall was full of all the ethnicities that had 
come from all corners of Afghanistan including Pashtuns, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, 
Baluch, and Nuristanis among others (p. 569). After 11 days of intense arguing and 
deliberations, the Jirga eventually passed the new Constitution on September 19, 1964 (p. 
574).  
 The new constitution declared Afghanistan as an independent, unitary 
constitutional monarchy with Islam as the official state religion. Although it gave non-
Muslim minorities the right to practice their religion, it attached within the law clause 
that drew criticism from the Hindus of Afghanistan. The constitution did however put 
secular law before Hanafi Sharia law to the discontentment of many mullahs. Moreover, 
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criticism centered around the article that banned anyone from competing for the royal 
throne which stated that kingship would remain in the house of Mohammad Nadir Khan, 
Zahir’s father, and in the event of the king’s death, the throne would be passed on to his 
son, and so on (Dupree, 1973, p. 575). The constitution did mention that the Royal 
Family couldn’t form political parties, or hold the positions of Prime Minister, Member 
of Parliament or Justices to the Supreme Court (576). However, the article giving the 
king the right to dissolve Parliament whenever he wished also raised debates in the Jirga 
(p. 578). Regardless, Zahir finally adopted it on October 1, 1964 to a cheering Loya Jirga 
crowd (p. 586). 
 The first general elections in the ‘New Democracy’ were held after the adoption 
of the new constitution for the bicameral Parliament consisting of a 216-elected Wolesi 
Jirga (Lower house) and an 84-member semi-elected and semi-appointed Mesharano 
Jirga (Upper House) (Dupree, 1973, p. 587). The king appointed 28 members to the 
Mesharano Jirga, while the rest were elected in provincial elections per 28 provinces (p. 
587). The first elections were heavily influenced by the government, which still 
controlled the media and run a heavily pro-government campaign through state press (p. 
588). The concept of free elections, however, was new to Afghans especially in the rural 
parts of the country (Dupree, 1973, p. 589). 
 The Parliament soon became a place of disagreements and the Wolesi Jirga split 
into various groups, each driven by a certain ideology including the conservative 
religious leaders, a laissez-faire economy group, a group favoring the King’s progressive 
policies, a small group of liberals, and a far left Marxist group led by Babrak Karmal 
(Dupree, 1973, p. 591). Intense tension broke out during the confidence vote ceremony of 
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the Prime-Minister designate Dr. Mohammad Yusuf when Kabul University students 
who had been attending the session in the spectators’ gallery began shouting anti-
government slogans (p. 591). Babrak Karmal, who had invited the students to disrupt the 
confidence-vote hearing, invited more students to the next session a few days later when 
the Wolesi Jirga was approving Dr. Yusuf’s cabinet. This time, the students chanted 
phrases like ‘gaining freedom’, ‘exercising our constitutional right’ and “…sat in the 
deputies’ seats and refused to leave until “the dishonest rascal have been driven from 
government” (p. 592). The Parliament session was forced into adjournment. 
 For the next session on October 25, 1965, the Wolesi Jirga exercised its behind-
closed-doors meeting clause but students poured in again with demonstrations beginning 
early in the morning and lasting until the evening that day. In a sudden change of events, 
Afghan troops opened fire on the slogan-yelling students killing three and wounding 
others (Dupree, 1973, p. 592). This drew nationwide criticism against Zahir’s 
government who promptly replaced Dr. Yusuf with Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal as 
the new Prime Minister (p. 595). Schools in Kabul had been closed due to the protests but 
reopened a month later and Mainwandwal went to personally offer sympathies and hear 
students’ demands. Student protests against the government continued in spring 1965, 
however.   
 The regime responded by promulgating freedom press laws in July 1965, which 
immediately led to the creation of various private journals including the highly influential 
Khalq (The Masses or The people). The Khalq journal, run by its liberal publisher Nur 
Muhammad Tarakai, published only six issues before it was shut down by the 
government in May 1966. But it had made its mark on the people by claiming “it was the 
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democratic voice of the people” (Dupree, 1973, p. 601). Moreover, it declared that its 
“policy would be to alleviate ‘the boundless agonies of the oppressed peoples of 
Afghanistan’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 608). Khalq quickly gained large audience both among 
the intelligent circles as well as the people. 
 The private journal, influenced by the Marxist ideology politically, had argued to 
put all power in the hands of the people and economically “favored the public over the 
private sector, and demanded land reform to release the Afghan peasant from ‘the feudal 
system, which dominates Afghan society’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 608). The Khalq was soon 
accused of being anti-monarchy, anti-Islam and anti-constitution, but the editors denied 
all these allegations (p. 608). Regardless, it was shut down by the attorney’s office citing 
its inflammatory rhetoric against the government. The shutting down of other major 
newspaper and journals followed and by 1968, the government had effectively banned or 
closed down all major print press such as Afghan Mellat, Masawat (“Equality”), Parcham 
(“The Flag”) and Shula-ye-Jawed (“the Eternal Flame”) (p. 611). 
 However, from 1965 until 1968, students had held a peaceful day every year in 
mourning for those who were killed in the 1965 student protests. In fact the rising student 
and workers strikes eventually forced Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal 
to resign in November 1967. A new Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi was sworn in by 
the Parliament on June 11, 1968 (Dupree, 1973, p. 649). Parliament, however, had 
become merely a ‘rubber-stamping’ service organ for the government. Intensely divided, 
it failed to pass meaningful legislation and was often dysfunctional (p. 651).  
 Young, liberal and leftist candidates had predominantly contested the general 
elections in the New Democracy period in 1965. However, even more minorities groups 
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such as the Uzbeks, Tajik and Turkmens contested the 1969 elections (Dupree, 1973, p. 
652). The newly elected assembly’s first meeting was in January 1970 where they 
approved the new cabinet of the Prime Minister. Zahir, against some discontentment, 
reappointed Ahmad Etemadi as the prime minister and because he held a large influence 
and ‘political astuteness’ in the Parliament still, the lawmakers eventually swore-in 
Etemadi in an overwhelming vote of confidence (186-to-16) (p. 654). 
 The monarchy progressively became unstable during the late 1960s and in early 
1970s during the ‘New Democracy’ period. Frequent changes and resignations in the 
prime minister posts, a divided parliament, a weaker monarchy, and continuous 
demonstrations by students demanding more freedoms had all resulted in slow progress 
towards a full democratic experience. In the span of less than a decade of the new 
democratic constitutional monarchy, there had been four changes in the prime minister 
position (Dupree, 1973, p. 662). Eventually, Prime Minister Etamadi’s government had 
failed and he was forced to resign over differences with the Parliament on May 16, 1971 
(p. 664). A few weeks later Zahir nominated Dr. Abdul Zahir as the fifth Prime Minister 
in the past ten years. However, a sixth change prime minister followed quickly when the 
king accepted Zahir’s resignation and appointed Mohammad Moosa Shafiq as the new 
Prime Minister on December 12, 1972 (p. 666). 
 In mensurating the Zahir Shah regime, after the death of the first Muhasiban King 
Nadir Shah, the remaining brothers quickly united and reasserted their control on the 
monarchy. Although Nadir had been king only for five years, the Muhasibans had set a 
strong precedent by maintaining internal stability. The legitimacy (1) of the monarchy, 
therefore, was never in question as the Muhasiban family “reasserted their control, 
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perhaps stronger than before” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 117). Hundreds were 
arrested on the conspiracy charges for the death of the deceased king and 18 were 
executed (p. 117). Although the Muhasibans faced some resistance initially from the 
Charkhi family, the transition of power (1) was stable and Afghanistan remained peaceful 
for a decade after Nadir Shah’s death in 1933 (p. 117).  
 In King Zahir Shah’ forty-year long rule, the Muhasibans only faced a single low-
resistance rebellion early on in 1939 in the eastern Khost region led by Pir Shami (the 
“Syrian Siant”) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 117). The saint, a far relative of former 
Queen Soriya, had vowed to restore the deposed king Amanullah Khan back on the 
throne, but it promptly failed when it did not gain enough followers and the British 
convinced their leader to return to Syria in exchange for a large sum of money (p. 117). 
Otherwise, the monarchy remained without any major uprisings (1) throughout the four 
decades of Zahir Shah’s rule (p. 118).  
Table 11: Z. Shah Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Scores 
Regime Legitimacy 1 1 
Regime Transition 1 1 
Uprising Frequency 1 1 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 0 0 
Grand Total 3 
  
 The Muhasibans had effectively controlled the state by “organizing the state’s 
relatively small bureaucracy and military as ‘servants of the palace,’ patrimonial 
institutions with little political influence and no autonomy” (Barfield, 2010, p. 210). 
Hence, they had intended to stay (0) in power for the long term. However, even though 
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Zahir Shah along with his uncles ruled for nearly four decades, the monarchy eventually 
became weak and its downfall (0) came when Daud Khan carried out a coup against 
Zahir on July 1973 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 133). 
 Although Zahir established a quasi-liberal parliament during the constitutional 
period and held partially free elections, he reigned as the supreme head of state (0) 
throughout his rule, having the authority over the state (Dupree, 1973, p. 477). For much 
of Zahir’s regime, key government positions (1) were filled by the royal family members 
including Zahir’s eldest uncle Mohammad Hashim Khan as the prime minister from 1933 
to 1946 and his younger brother Shah Mahmud from 1946 to 1948. However, the king 
did appoint non-royal family members to the prime minister position and cabinet in his 
last two decades in power (p. 477). Moreover, administrative positions were clearly 
established throughout the king’s reign including the Defense Minister (1) who was in 
charge of the national army (p. 477). 
 Political representation (1) increased rapidly during Zahir’s reign, especially 
during the last two decades (Dupree, 1973, p. 494). Zahir tried to change the regime to a 
constitutional monarchy and tried to establish a liberal Parliament twice during his forty-
year rule. The first Liberal Parliament was established in 1949 when Western-educated-
reform-minded Afghans pushed for free elections (p. 494). The new 120-member 
Parliament soon allowed freedom of press and held ministers accountable by calling them 
in for questioning to the Parliament (p. 495). Moreover, dozens of newspaper 
subsequently sprung up and began publishing articles critical of the monarchy. Numerous 
political parties, some organized by university students, were established but the 
monarchy initially ignored them as having little influence (p. 496).  
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Table 12: Z. Shah Regime Scores    
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 1 1 
Government Positions 1 1 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 3 
 
However, when criticism peaked against the monarchy, the regime struck back by 
arresting the leaders of the free movement and shutting down anti-government 
newspapers (Dupree, 1973, p. 497). Political opposition (0) and dissent were further 
suppressed when Daud Khan became Prime Minister in 1953. Although initially there 
was hope that Daud would release political prisoners and bring back the Liberal 
Parliament, the opposite turned out to be true. The new Prime Minister “crushed 
opposition as it rose, and made no pretense of returning to the days of ‘Liberal 
Parliament’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 499).  
Daud adopted a more autocratic style rule as Prime Minister by suppressing any 
anti-government opposition (p. 500). Daud served as the Prime Minister for nearly ten 
years and during this time broadened his political base and consolidated power (pp. 500-
555). When Zahir feared Daud’s grip on power and the military, he was forced to resign 
on March 9, 1963 (p. 555). After forcing out Daud, Zahir Shah had realized the demand 
for more freedom and in order to calm the public over the prime minister’s resignation, 
the king announced a second experiment in democracy by switching to a full 
constitutional monarchy (Dupree, 1973, p. 559).  
Afghans rejoiced the ‘New Democracy’ movement and for the first time royal 
family members were not allowed to hold executive cabinet positions in the Prime 
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Minister’s office. In fact, when the new Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, himself 
an outsider, announced his cabinet, only four were from the Durrani Pashtun tribe while 
two non-Durrani Pashtuns were appointed as well (p. 561). However, even during the 
Constitutional Monarchy, the king held absolute power, and the government was not 
stable. In fact, from 1965 until 1971, King Zahir Shah had shuffled the government five 
times and re-appointed four different Prime Ministers and their respective cabinets (p. 
692). 
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Daud Khan, 1973-1978 
 Although Daud Khan’s overthrow of Zahir Shah’s monarchy was nonviolent, his 
subsequent rule was dominated by violence amid the rise of various ideological political 
movements. These new political movements had emerged as result of the failed 
democratic experiment of the 1960’s (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47). In order to avoid 
cracking down on anti-government movements, such political groups began meeting 
secretly (p. 47). The leftist-Marxist group, for instance, would regularly meet in private 
homes led by a close circle of four Marxist leaders: Babrak Karmal (Pashtun Ghilzai with 
Tajik origins), Nur Muhammad Tarakai (Ghilzai Pashtun), Mir Akbar Kheyber (leader of 
the Hazara and Tajik members) and Badakhshi (Tajik Panjsheri who recruited Tajiks and 
Uzbeks to the cause) (p. 48). It is important to note “how these small groups of left-wing 
activists were already dividing along the tribal and ethnic lines of Afghanistan, 
eventhough they were a powerless minority on the political scene at the time” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 48).  
 By early 1970s, the Marxists and Islamists factions had emerged as the two 
leading political forces during Daud’s regime. The Marxist-Communist Afghan faction 
was led by Babrak Karmal and Nur Muhammad Tarakai (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47). 
Karmal, who had founded the Student Union in the early 1950s, had been imprisoned for 
his part in organizing protests that led to the death of multiple university students in 1954 
(p. 47). It was during his time behind bars when he became a committed Marxist and 
adopted the name Karmal (‘Comrade of the Worker’s in Pashtu) in order to “dissociate 
himself from his elitist bourgeois background” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47). His 
compatriot Nur Muhammad Tarakai had also been politically active during the 1950s as 
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the editor of an influential weekly newspaper, where he wrote short Marxist stories 
highlighting “the exploitation of the Afghan peasantry by landlords” (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 47).  
 This small political group eventually turned into a full-scale political party known 
as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) formed by Karmal and Tarakai 
in one of their secret meetings at the former’s house in January 1965 (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 48). The objective of the party, which emerged in secret documents later in 1966 
was, to “…‘resolve the fundamental contradictions of Afghan society’ which could only 
be accomplished through socialism, and by the constitution of a ‘national government’” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 48). However, soon after its founding, the PDPA had split into 
two factions in 1967 due to ideological differences between Karmal and Tarakai. Karmal, 
who believed in a democratic road to socialism, became the leader of the Parcham 
(“Banner”) faction while Tarakai, who tended to be a supporter of a more ‘doctrinaire’ 
route to socialism, became the leader of the Khalq (“People”) faction (p. 49). The split in 
the PDPA was also based on ethnic lines since Karmal had the support of the Tajiks and 
Tarakai drew most of his support from the Pashtun populous. 
 The second main political faction, and the PDPA’s main opposition, in Daud’s 
rule was the emergence of the inter-ethnic Islamist camp. This group founded in 1965 as 
well, consisted of ustads (professors, teachers) including the Tajik Burhanuddin Rabani 
and Pashtun Abdul Rasul Sayyaf of Kabul University’s Theology Department. The 
movement had been organized as an Islamic political party under the Jamiat-i-Islami 
(“Society of Islam”) led by Gholam Mohmmad Nyazi (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 50). 
Highly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamists argued for a Sharia 
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Law based government but had little impact during the ‘New Democracy’ period in early 
1960s (p. 52). This new Afghan Jamiat Party “served as a clandestine ideological 
umbrella for its student wing, the Organization of Youth Movement, which operated 
openly, organizing demonstrations and fighting communists” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 
53). In fact, “Islamists won the student elections at Kabul University in 1970” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53). 
 Just as there was a split in the communist PDPA party, the Islamists similarly 
broke into various factions. Burhanuddin Rabani along with his Tajik compatriot Ahmad 
Shah Massud were firm believers of establishing a long-term Islamic state “including the 
infiltration of the army and the bureaucracy, as they felt the Afghan people were not 
ready to overthrow the establishment” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53). A more radical 
faction led by Pashtun Gulbuddin Hektmatyar preferred ‘direct’ confrontation’ by ‘means 
of popular uprisings’ (p. 53). The “Islamists as a whole were not only critical of the royal 
establishment, but also despised the tradition-bound ulema and opposed Pashtun 
nationalism and the idea of a Pashtunistan. There was also a latent fragmentation along 
ethno-linguistic lines in the Jamiat as in the PDPA” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53). 
 By the time Daud had overthrown Zahir Shah’s monarchy in July 1973, these 
parties were operating in full force (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 60). However, Daud initially 
largely ignored both camps, as he was busy forming a new government after the success 
of the coup. He changed the state into a Republic and then condemned the monarchy as 
‘despotic regime,’ which was “founded on private and class interests’ (p. 61). Daud 
declared himself the first president and prime minister of the new republic while also 
holding the position of foreign affairs and defense (p. 61). Although Daud created a 50-
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member Central Committee to advise him, its full members were never revealed but it 
included the leading Parcham leader Karmal, and other communist leaders such as Dr. 
Anita Ratebzad and Noor Mohammad Noor (p. 61).  
 Daud shared Karmal's view that “the road to socialist revolution lay in the politics 
of the ‘united front’: the participation of progressive social forces in a ‘national 
democratic phase’” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). Hence, Karmal downplayed his own 
party’s agenda and believed that Daud’s revolution was already implementing the shared 
goals of the PDPA and any independent party action was believed to be 
counterproductive. In other words, Karmal “hoped to use the ageing Daud to advance the 
cause of his own revolution but without linking Parchamis too close to the regime” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). Although six Marxist-Parchamis were appointed to Daud’s 
cabinet, they never revealed their party affiliations and did not take any official position. 
Karmal, however, had turned down the Daud’s offer of the deputy prime minister 
position.  
 However, other notable Parchamis had adopted a more aggressive and blunt 
approach to infiltrating Daud’s government. Many Parchamis were placed in high-level 
ministries as well as lower level bureaucratic position for the purpose of pursuing 
Parchami political agenda. Noor Mohammad, for example, headed a ‘military wing’ in 
the government in order to stay connected to the progressive-minded army officers. 
Moreover, Karmal and PDPA’s long term goal was to “weaken the Khalq faction of the 
PDPA, with which he had been engaged in a bitter feud since the 1967 break-up” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). However, Karmal’s political honeymoon with Daud did not 
last long when Daud began purging PDPA sympathizers from the regime. After the 1973 
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coup, Daud’s regime had rapidly grown into a one-man autocratic rule. Hence, a paranoid 
Daud began a witch-hunt to eliminate all his rivals and “sought to manipulate, and when 
[he] failed, he struck” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 62).  
 The PDPA’s response to the government crackdown was to set aside their 
differences and rejoin the Pashtun Khalq and the Tajik Parcham factions (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 65). In July 1977, both factions had merged to form a single party headed by a 
30-member central committee (p. 65). However, “It was in reality a tenuous alliance, not 
a reunification, so great was the rift in the PDPA as was shown up a year later after it 
took power” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). Daud’s continued purge of the Parchamis had a 
zero-sum effect in that as the Parchami’s presence in the army was reduced, the Khalq’s 
presence and influence grew. Hafizullah Amin, one of the leaders of the Khalq faction, 
had now replaced Karmal by taking control of the military wing and further infiltrating 
the army (p. 65).  
 Daud had eventually lost a power base by distancing himself from his Soviet ally, 
the Parchami faction, and had been “resorting to the age-old practices of nepotism and 
buying allies where he could” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). Moreover, he was also 
moving “towards a one-party dictatorship by banning all political activities and 
opposition newspaper and by setting up his National Revolutionary Party” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). PDPA’s infiltration of Daud’s army, however, continued, 
and by 1976, Hafizullah Amin had prepared his military wing to a point “where the 
Khalqis believed that they could ‘with a certain number of casualties on the part of the 
armed forces topple the Daud government and wrest political control’” (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 66). Moreover, Soviet trained government employees, who fully sympathized 
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with the communist agenda, also filled hundreds of technical and professional posts in 
Daud’s government.  
 Daud continued transferring many PDPA officials within the government to the 
countryside to keep them off the capital (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Most Parchamis either 
quit their jobs or simply changed their avatar “making themselves indistinguishable from 
the officials that they had replaced” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Feeling secure after driving 
out all the Parchimis, Daud turned to decimating the Islamist camp, forcing many of their 
leaders into exile after a plan to overthrow his government was uncovered. Although this 
led to “A series of small-scale insurrections by Islamists in 1975, including one by 
Ahmad Shah Massud in Panjshir Valley, [they] failed to generate any local support and 
were easily crushed” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Daud used the uprising as an excuse to 
arrest more Islamist leaders (p. 215). 
 After his coup against Zahir Shah, Daud had demonstrated “how easily a 
government might be replaced by a military coup” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Thus, both 
the Khalqis and the Islamists were continuously attempting to replicate Daud’s successful 
coup and “In the absence of a mass political base [of these two] such a strike from within 
was seen as a shortcut to power” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). The Khalqis especially 
preferred this route declaring, “Previously the army was considered a tool of the 
dictatorship and despotism of the ruling class… [However], this too should be wrested in 
order to topple the ruling class” (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). 
 In the end, Daud had filled his government with people loyal to him while forcing 
out both Islamists and Communists from power, but his regime was largely unable to 
“implement policies that challenged entrenched local interests” (Barfield, 2010, p. 224). 
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For instance, “Provincial officials had a limited agenda: to keep the peace, suppress 
banditry, see that conscription went smoothly, and collect what small amounts of taxes 
the government still demanded” (Barfield, 2010, p. 224). Daud’s strategy was to abandon 
building a rural political base and the “need to maintain political, financial, or ideological 
support from the provincial population in order to carry out its policies” (Barfield, 2010, 
p. 225). In other words, “National policies and programs were thus largely divorced from 
rural areas…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 225)  
 In mensurating Daud Khan’s regime, he overthrew his cousin Zahir Shah’s 
monarchy in July 1937 in a nonviolent coup and therefore, the transition (1) to power was 
peaceful (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 133). Daud, who had been masterminding the 
coup for over a year along with support of the leftist groups, revolted when king Zahir 
Shah was on vacation in Italy (p. 133). The coup was possible because Daud had the 
support of many generals in the National Army, and it took only a few hundred troops to 
take over key governmental buildings in the capital Kabul without firing a shot (p. 133). 
Although Daud did not concern himself with other’s opinions, he had justified the coup 
by pointing out the slow economic progress under Zahir Shah and promising to bring new 
economic development (p. 134).  
Moreover, no one could question his regime’s legitimacy (1) especially since he 
had received a warm welcome by many Afghans (p. 134). Although Daud maintained a 
tight control over the state, he faced periodic uprisings (0) and ‘resistance movements’ (p. 
135). Moreover, Daud had intended to extend (0) his ‘one-man’ autocratic rule as long as 
he could, but his regime would eventually collapse (0) in a violent coup five years late in 
1978 (p. 138). 
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Table 13: D. Khan Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 1 1 
Regime Transition 1 1 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 0 0 
Grand Total 2 
 
Daud was the absolute head of the state (0) of a one-party autocratic rule despite claims 
his regime was a ‘Democratic’ Republic (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 135). He 
simultaneously held several key government positions (0) including the presidency, 
serving as his own prime minister as well as holding the positions of interior and defense 
ministries (0), the latter effectively giving him total control over the national army (p. 
135). Although Daud convened a Loya Jirga in 1977 to adopt a new constitution, “it 
provided for a one-party state with a strongman president and a mixed economy with 
state ownership…” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 135).  
Table 14: D. Khan Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 0 0 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 1 
 
Moreover, Daud maintained tight control over the rising political movements and 
completely banned any political opposition (0) against the state (Wahab & Youngerman, 
2010, p. 135). His regime not only regularly executed leaders of political movements, but 
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also arrested hundreds others (p. 135). Political representation (1), however, grew rapidly 
during Daud Khan’s regime as the rise of political parties had continued from Zahir 
Shah’s liberal parliament movement (p. 136). The two prominent parties were the PDPA 
and the Islamists, both of whom had been anti-Daud, the former eventually overthrewing 
his regime in military coup (p. 138). 
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Nur Muhammad Tarakai, 1978-1979 
The communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) rose to power 
rapidly. The regime seized power after overthrowing Daud Khan’s republic in April 1978 
after the ‘Saur Revolution’ (named after the second month of the Persian calendar)  
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 67). The ‘revolution,’ however, was a full military coup d’état in 
disguise, planned and executed by the leftist PDPA leaders and carried out by rogue 
officers in the national army (p. 67).  
 The coup was precipitated by the assassination of a prominent PDPA leader Mir 
Akbar Khyber, which spread fears among the other PDPA leaders (Rasanayagam, 2003, 
p. 67). Just two days before the coup began, Daud Khan had finally arrested and taken all 
of the PDPA leaders to prison including Tarakai and Karmal on the eve of April 25 (p. 
68). The third highest PDPA leader, Hafizullah Amin, was able to distribute the secret 
documents with instructions on how to carry out the coup before he was arrested the next 
day, on the 26th of April (p. 68). These rash arrests soon spread panic throughout both the 
Khalqi and Parchami camps of the PDPA amid rumors that Daud was planning to 
eliminate them all (p. 68).  
 On the morning of April 27, Major Aslam Watanjar, a Khalqi officer of the 
Fourth Corps was instructed to take over the Arg presidential palace. The plan was that an 
air squadron would fly over the palace to signal the attack, and Abdul Qadir, a Parchami 
leader of the rebel officers, would move in while other officers in position would take 
over the Bagram Airforce simultaneously (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 69). Although the 
coup was planned intricately, most of it occurred ‘fortuitously’ since not all went 
according to plan. Regardless, officers charged the palace where Daud Khan was 
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attending a meeting with his cabinet members and heavy shooting began (p. 69). The 
bloodiest fighting took place between the rebel officers and a 2000-man presidential 
guard protecting Daud and his family in the fortress-like palace. However, by the 
morning of April 28, the royal guards had fought to the last man before rebel officers 
broke in killing Daud and his family in his Arg home (p. 69). Because most fighting 
occurred inside the Arg and Kabul, there was no military resistance in other parts of the 
country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 70).  
 A few days after the coup, the PDPA formed a 30-member Revolutionary Council 
and shared the seats evenly among the Khalqi and Parchami members. In its first meeting 
on May 1, the Council elected Tarakai as the prime minister, while Karmal, Amin and 
Watanjar were all given deputy-prime minister positions (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 70). 
Abdul Qadir and Mohammad Rafi, the other two Parchami leaders who had played a key 
part in the coup, were rewarded with positions of Defense and Public Works ministries. 
However, this “…power structure reflected in reality the outline of an incipient struggle 
between Karmal and Amin, with the ineffectual and indecisive Tarakai in the background 
as a figurehead” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71). In other words, the PDPA had sat up not 
one but three different governments for the sake of keeping a political balance. In fact, 
“What appeared on the surface as an equitable political balance was in fact a fearful 
symmetry, with the ‘tiger’ Amin, the actual architect of the revolution, waiting to pounce 
when the opportunity arose” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71).  
 However, a Soviet-style Politburo soon replaced the Revolutionary Council with 
Tarakai making decisions at the top. In the May 24 meeting of the Buro, Amin 
announced that ‘Khalq’ would be the victors of the revolution “without reference to the 
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Parchami role...” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71) The Buro also issued orders to print 
pamphlets with new titles for Tarakai as the ‘Great Teacher’ and ‘Great Leader’ (p. 72). 
These were attempts targeted to push away Karmal and his Parchami followers from 
power. The main orchestrator of these maneuvers was Amin, who had been orchestrating 
with Tarakai to sideline Parchamis from the government, and eventually in a real 
Machiaviallian-style, take power for himself by taking down Tarakai (p. 72). Amin’s plan 
to ‘outmaneuver’ the Parchamis continued and in the next meeting on June 27, the Buro 
announced that “state policy would be decided exclusively by Khalq” while “Amin was 
inducted to the Politburo and appointed to key post of general secretary” (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 73). Amin’s last step in ousting the Parchamis was transferring them all abroad 
as ambassadors (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 73). 
 However, a party veteran like Karmal could not be ousted from the government 
easily. Before he moved to Prague to assume the ambassadorial role, he tried to plot a 
coup against Amin and Tarakai to overthrow them. The coup was to be executed on the 
national holiday of Eid, where most officers in the army would be on leave and hence 
less resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 73). Tarakai’s Defense Minister Qadir and the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Shahpur Ahamdzai, both closeted Parchamis, would 
organize and carry out the coup planned for September 4. But this plot failed when the 
Afghan ambassador in Delhi ‘tipped off’ Tarakai. Qadir, Shahpur and others involved 
were promptly arrested, tortured and jailed. The plot gave Amin another excuse to 
eliminate the Parchamis and their sympathizers completely by killing and imprisoning 
them (p. 73). 
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 After ousting their rival Parchamis from the government, Tarakai and Amin went 
on an official visit to the Soviet Union in December 1978 to sign a Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation, which included a crucial clause requesting military assistance when 
needed (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 79). The Soviet Union would later utilize this same treaty 
as ‘legal ground’ for sending military troops to Afghanistan in February 1979 (p. 79). 
While Tarakai and Amin were desperately asking for Soviet military help, the 
Mujahideen and other guerrilla elements had intensified their attacks against the PDPA 
around the country. Ismail Khan, a Mujahideen commander in Herat, led an attack on a 
government regiment all the way to Kandahar but was crushed by paratroopers, which 
took 25000 lives (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 80). Other major violent attacks broke out in 
Jalalabad in April 1979 and Paktia provinces. In June, the regime faced large violent anti-
government demonstrations in the capital Kabul. Amid the growing violence and 
instability around the country, Tarakai and Amin began blaming each other.  
 In the 28 July Politburo meeting, Amin openly held Tarakai responsible for 
government’s failure due to his unilateral decision-making and suggested a ‘collective 
leadership and collective decisions’. Key posts were redistributed and Tarakai was 
reduced to a mere figurehead while Amin was able to take majority in the Politburo. 
Although Tarakai was still the Defense Minister and Amin his deputy, the Foreign 
Ministry and Interior ministries were both passed on to Amin’s loyalists. Moreover, 
Amin gained control of the army as well as appointing one of his loyalists as the head of 
the presidential guard (p. 80) 
 When Tarakai left for a summit in Havana on September 7, reports reached him 
that Amin had begun conspiring to take over power and kill the ‘Great Leader’. Tarakai 
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arranged for a secret meeting with the Soviet leader Brezhnev in Moscow on his way 
back, where presumably Karmal was present too (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 81). It was 
decided that Amin would be removed from the government and transferred as an 
ambassador while a new government would be formed with Karmal as the prime 
minister. But Amin, with his vast spy network, was a step ahead of Tarakai, and after his 
return on September 15, he immediately put Tarakai under house arrest while notifying 
the Central Committee that the ‘Great Leader’ had resigned (p. 81). A few weeks later, 
Tarakai was presumed dead but both the exact date and cause are unknown and it is 
therefore presumed that he died either on 8 or 9 of October 1979 by being suffocated by a 
pillow in the Arg palace or being hanged in the prison (p. 81). 
 In mensurating Nur Muhammad Tarakai’s regime, both the PDPA and Tarakai’s 
claims to legitimacy (0) were overshadowed by their violent takeover of power after 
overthrowing Daud Khan’s regime. Most Afghans saw the coup as ‘orchestrated’ with 
Soviet Union’s help (Maley, 2009, p. 23).  
Table 15: N. M. Tarakai Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 0 0 
Regime Transition 0 0 
Uprising Frequency  0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 0 0 
Grand Total 0 
 
The transition (0) to power from Daud Khan to PDPA was one of the most violent 
periods in Afghanistan’s history (p. 23). The Khalqi and Parchami officers who carried 
out the coup killed and massacred hundreds including president Daud Khan and his 
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family (p. 23). Internal disputes in the party over executive power had weakened the 
PDPA from the beginning. Only a few months after the PDPA took power, several 
uprisings (0) led by various Mujahideen leaders had broken out against the regime (p. 
26). 
 The first mass uprising began in March 1979 in Herat, which was actually a “… 
‘mutiny’ by the 17th Division of the Afghan Army… in response to the brutality of the 
Khalq activists” (Maley, 2009, p. 26). The uprisings had served as warning to the PDPA 
and their sponsor Soviet Union, which had cautioned, “under no circumstance may we 
lose Afghanistan” (Maley, 2009, p. 27). Not only the Soviet Union, but the PDPA had 
also made it clear that they were intending to stay in power (0) for the long run to 
implement their ambitious socialist agenda (p. 25). By September 1979, Hafizullah Amin 
had effectively ousted Tarakai from power and had taken over the prime minister position 
in the Politburo (p. 27). Tarakai was eventually sidelined from power but his rule ended 
(0) completely after he was ‘murdered’ mysteriously in his home (p. 28). 
Table 16: N. M. Tarakai Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 0 0 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 1 
 
For over a year, the PDPA Khalq and Parcham factions struggled over sharing political 
positions in the government and military (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 154). After 
the new regime was announced, Nur Muhammad Tarakai was appointed as the president 
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and prime minister, therefore giving him supreme authority in the Politburo-style party 
(Maley, 2009, p. 24). Other key government positions (0) were shared among the other 
PDPA leaders who had helped organize and carry out the coup (p. 24). Hafizullah Amin 
was appointed as the Foreign Minister, while Abdul Qadir took the position of Defense 
Minister (0) and Babrak Karmal was made the deputy prime minister (Maley, 2009, p. 
24).  
 Although the PDPA shared high government positions among themselves and 
their friends, political representation (1) was surprisingly high. While Pashtuns still 
dominated the government, the old Persian-speaking Muhammadzai elites were replaced 
by the eastern tribal-background Ghilzai Pashtuns (Barfield, 2010, p. 226). Hence the 
PDPA had ended the centuries old monarchic rule by overthrowing the last royal Durrani 
monarchs, opening way for various minority ethnic groups, in particular the Ghilzai, who 
had been marginalized from politics for centuries (p. 226). However, the PDPA lacked 
internal support from the majority of Afghans, and therefore used brutal tactics and the 
military as a tool to crack down on any (0) opposition (p. 228). Such brutality was 
evident in the elimination of Daud Khan and the subsequent murders of PDPA’s own 
political leaders (p. 228). 
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Hafizullah Amin, 1979 
 Amid the internal PDPA rivalries and struggles for power, Hafizullah Amin 
eventually rose to power, replacing Tarakai as president of the party in April 1979 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 228). However, the internal rivalries had become so destructive that of 
half of the PDPA’s original eighteen thousand members, and the twenty eight thousand 
who later joined the Party after the revolution, were either killed, ousted or left the Party 
in a year (p. 228). A month later after assuming power, Amin had Tarakai assassinated 
after discovering a Soviet-planned coup to overthrow him from power (p. 228). Amin 
began his Khalqi rule by launching a series of new radical socialist reforms including 
“land reform, equality for women, the abolition of marriage payments, and the 
cancellation of many types of rural debts…”  (Barfield, 2010, p. 229)  
 Although some of these reforms such as women’s rights and marriage dowry were 
dated back to Amanullah Khan’s regime, the “land redistribution and rural debt were 
new” (Barfield, 2010, p. 229). The Parchami camp and the Soviet Union advisors had 
warned against sweeping reforms in a “country as socially conservative and economically 
underdeveloped as Afghanistan” (Barfield, 2010, p. 229). However, Amin and his Khalqi 
faction considered themselves ‘visionaries’ and called it a “revolutionary duty” to 
transform Afghanistan into a communist state and crush anyone who opposed them (p. 
229). The rationale was that the modern military was far stronger than any tribal militia 
force and therefore, no one would be able to stop them. However, while previous regimes 
such as the Muhasiban rulers were largely successful in employing military to stay in 
power and keeping rebellions in check, the PDPA faced far more rebellions that were 
almost always more violent (p. 229). 
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 The rebellions against Amin’s regime intensified due to the radical economic and 
land redistribution policies based on socialist-Marxist principles of the Soviet Union (p. 
230). The traditionally tribal Afghan society starkly opposed the implementation of such 
polices and compared them to the Soviet Union collectivization scheme. But Amin 
committed and pushed for the PDPA’s goals “…to break down the qawm-based political 
structure by which rural communities had insulated themselves from the central 
government and its officials for generations” (Barfield, 2010, p. 231). The rural people, 
however, did not share the government’s vision and had traditionally favored the “live 
and let live” principle when dealing with the central government. Moreover, the PDPA 
was also “…not equipped to implement radical policies that struck at the core of the rural 
economy and society” (Barfield, 2010, p. 231). 
 Facing insurmountable resistance from the villages, the Khalqis were forced to 
abandon their ‘Cultural Revolution’ and shifted focus entirely to the urban areas such as 
the capital Kabul, where the authority of the central government was strong. The 
resistance, however, was gaining momentum and continued fighting the infidel regime. 
Through kinship, ethnic ties and using common rhetoric, the tribal chiefs reached out to 
their followers “…to defend their property, the faith of Islam, and the honor of their 
families against outsiders” (Barfield, 2010, p. 232). The rural people “…objections to the 
PDPA’s economic policies were combined with objections to its social policies, 
especially those relating to marriage customs and women” (Barfield, 2010, p. 232). 
Therefore, the opposition was almost paradoxical because it “...was pervasive but non-
centralized… without having an easily identifiable enemy at the national or international 
level” (Barfield, 2010, p. 232).  
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 In mensurating Hafizullah Amin’s regime, his transition (0) and his subsequent 
first 100 days in power were unstable (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 81). Uprisings (0) against 
his regime had intensified and virtually 75% of the country had rebelled against him (p. 
81). The PDPA army had been reduced to less than a third due to constant desertions 
from the 100,000 soldiers it maintained when it had come to power only a few months 
earlier (p. 81). By autumn 1979, Amin had realized that his position was ‘vulnerable’ and 
his relationship with the Soviet Union had progressively become worse, he began looking 
for support elsewhere to prolong (0) his rule including reaching out to Pakistan and the 
U.S. for support (p. 81). Amin even offered to recognize the Durand Line as the 
international boundary between the two countries if Pakistani Prime Minister Zia Ulhaq 
would stop supporting his enemies, the Peshawar based Islamic parties, but this never 
materialized. Amin also desperately tried to repair relations with the U.S., which had cut 
off aid programs after the death of its Ambassador Dubs in Kabul.   
Table 17: H. Amin Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 0 0 
Regime Transition 0 0 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 0 0 
Grand Total 0 
 
 Despite these efforts, Amin’s downfall (0) was imminent as he was at odds with 
the Soviet Union, the biggest supplier of aid and weapons to the PDPA (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 82). In fact, in July 1979, the East German ambassador had told a U.S. charge’ 
d’affairs that Moscow considered Amin’s departure from the PDPA as the political 
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solution to the problems of the regime (p. 82). By late 1979, Amin’s regime had become 
weak, had lost legitimacy (0) and was near total collapse (Rasanayagam, 2003). In March 
1979, Herat had fallen to the Mujahideen and Tarakai had summoned the chief Soviet 
Military adviser General Gorelov and the charge d’affairs to ask for help (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 84). The General had interpreted this meeting to mean that Afghanistan was 
asking for military help. However, there were disagreements over deploying troops in the 
Soviet Politburo, with some arguing that there was no legal justification under 
international law to send troops (p. 85). 
 Brezhnev agreed with the Politburo decision to not send troops but did allow 
delivering six MI-24s between June-Jul 1979. In the May 24 meeting, the Politburo again 
approved military equipment but denied Tarakai’s request for helicopters and tanks. In 
fact, “Contrary to what was bruited about in the international media at the time, and later 
in the extensive literature… the Soviet leadership was not at all eager to send their armed 
forces into Afghanistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 87). Tarakai and Amin, however, 
persistently asked for an active Soviet military role including creating a legal scenario at 
the request of Afghanistan, but the Soviet denied the request.  
Table 18: H. Amin Regime Scores 
	
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 0 0 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representation 0 0 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 0 
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 However, it wasn’t until June 18 when Soviet Union appointed four-member 
Commission on Afghanistan published an official report that led the Soviet leadership to 
consider removing Amin from power. The report presented to the Soviet Union’s Central 
Committee had concluded that the army (0) was the PDPA’s main weakness 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 88). Moreover, the transcript had cited reasons that Amin had 
become a ‘dictator’, had been running ‘smear’ campaigns against the Soviet Union and 
had been ‘mending’ relations with the U.S. as the ground for launching a Soviet Union 
military intervention (p. 90). Hence, by November 1979, the Soviet leadership had come 
to consensus that change in PDPA party leadership (0) was needed, and Amin was too 
dangerous to be left in power (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 90). 
 Although other options such as poisoning Amin’s food through his Russian cooks 
were considered, but these plans went ‘awry’ and in the end, on December 31, 1979, 
Russian KGB commandos launched a surprise attack on Amin’s residence by infiltrating 
his presidential home in Arg, killing the guards, and assassinating him in the operation 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 91). In the end, Hafizullah Amin had ruled for less than five 
months after his rise to power by ousting his opposition (0) Khalq, and his regime was 
known to be one of the ‘worst in Afghanistan’s modern history” (Maley, 2009, p. 28). 
Political representation (0) was nonexistent, as Amin had filled top government positions 
(0) with his Parchami ‘loyalists, family and friends’ (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 
154).  
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Babrak Karmal, 1979-1986 
After Hafizullah Amin’s assassination, Babrak Karmal was appointed as the head of the 
PDPA on December 28, 1979. He paid lip service to Nur Muhammad Tarakai and 
blamed ‘the rogue’ Amin for his death (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). Karmal soon 
embarked on his mission to set up a ‘national democratic government’ “…that would 
mobilize all sectors of society before a socialist transformation could be affected” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). The new PDPA had also opened the party to outsiders by 
appointing 78 new non-party members out of the total 191 by May 1980 (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 94). Karmal’s approach was to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people 
through rolling back controversial reforms, releasing prisoners and allowing exiles to 
return through amnesty (p. 94).  
 Karmal also reached out to the Islamic elements by establishing a Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs, although this was merely a political move to keep the clergy in check by 
making them government employees. Moreover, Karmal ordered building new mosques, 
34 new ones in Kabul alone, while renovating the ones that had been damaged in the war 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). However, all of these strategies fell short of rallying the 
Afghan population to his side. The cry for a jihad, a holy war for the liberation of 
Afghanistan from the infidels, was echoed all over the country. Karmal was accused of 
inviting the infidel Red Army, and protests against his regime multiplied (p. 95). By 
summer 1981, Karmal’s regime had grown so desperate that he rolled back PDPA’s core 
land reforms and eased national military service. Although these changes were 
appreciated in the urban areas, they did not have an effect on the rural population.  
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 Furthermore, the Karmal regime was weakened by internal disagreements in the 
PDPA ranks. Some nationalist Khalqis had accused him of ousting Amin and bringing 
the occupying Red Army to the country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 95). In one instance, 
Karmal was left red faced when he had ordered a new flag to be marched in a military 
parade only to find out that the Khalqis still carried their traditional red banner (p. 96). 
Karmal was powerless to take action against the Khalqis fearing they would revolt. These 
pro-Khalqi elements, which were also loyal to Tarakai’s memory, began rallying around 
the nationalist Sarwari, who had sought the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Karmal, 
however, soon sent Sarwari away by appointing him as the ambassador to Mangolia. 
 Next, he began filling the Puli-i-Charkhi prison with disobeying Khalqis officers, 
cadres and three ministers (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 96). Around 600 officers were 
imprisoned on conspiracy charges in January 1980 alone, although some managed to flee 
and joined the resistance. Essentially, Karmal’s regime was effectively divided within. 
Karmal, a Parchami leader, for example could not remove the Khalqi Interior Minister 
Syed Gulabzoi and instead set up a separate Intelligence Department independent from 
the ministry’s jurisdiction (p. 96). This new department called by its Persian acronym 
KHAD was led by Karmal loyalist Dr. Mohammad Najibullah, who was a brigadier by 
rank (p. 97). KHAD was soon given a complete military division with helicopters, tanks 
and armored vehicles, and was taken under the KGB wing. The department besides its 
main task of gathering intelligence had other responsibilities such as making arrests, 
suppressing border tribes, carrying out assassinations, and covert operations (p. 97). 
 The PDPA army, however, was becoming weaker and dwindling in size through 
defections and desertions of officers. A year after the Soviet invasion, the army had been 
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reduced to 30,000 men, only a third of the original size (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 99). The 
membership in the PDPA was similarly decreasing and by 1982, despite Karmal’s 
exaggerated claims that the PDPA had 70,000 members, the true membership was closer 
to 20,000 (p. 98). Seeing that Karmal’s regime was unstable, the Soviet Union began a 
long-term strategy of indoctrination in order to continue pursuing Soviet national 
interests. A new nationwide program called Young Pioneers recruited some 40,000 
school children some as young as ten, both through volunteering and coercion, to be 
admitted to the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan, a shadow organization 
run by KHAD to spread communist propaganda (p. 98). The Russian language had 
become compulsory in schools, and students in Kabul University were required to take 
political courses in Marxist-Leninist theories. Moreover, thousands of Afghan students 
were sent to the Soviet Union for “advanced political indoctrination” (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 99). 
 In effect, the Soviet Union had begun implementing a full ‘Sovietization’ and the 
‘divide and rule’ policies in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union began utilizing its old 
strategy of “Nationalities Policy” in Afghanistan, which aimed at giving ‘autonomy’ to 
Soviet republics based on ethnic and linguistic lines. The PDPA raised some regional 
minority languages such as Uzbek, Turcoman, Baluchi and Nuristani to national status. 
Moreover, the PDPA began promoting the cultures of different ethnic minority groups 
through media and began educating children in their mother tongues (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 99). Nationalist Afghans saw these policies as “an attempt to isolate ethnic 
groups from each other and from the wider Muslim world, as the Soviets had done in 
Central Asia, and to drive a wedge between these groups and Pashtuns who had 
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traditionally dominated Afghan politics” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 99). In the southern and 
eastern Pashtun regions, the divide and rule policy would pit tribal maliks against one 
another, and whoever would support the communist regime, would be rewarded with 
weapons and cash (p. 100). 
 Despite the active exploitation of the ethnic groups, Karmal was cautious with the 
Pashtun tribes and exercised “a flexible and conciliatory policy… in effort to choke off 
the Mujahideen supply lines from Pakistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 100). For instance, 
the eastern Pashtun Mohmand tribe was “won over by offers of food, fuel, weapons and 
cash subsidies” (p. 100). Karmal’s attempts to lure other tribes to his side had reached its 
peak when in September 1985, 4,000 members from various tribes gathered to make the 
regime more ‘palatable’ to the eastern Pashtun tribes. In order to make his government 
appear credible, Karmal himself had to attend to fend off claims that he had been brought 
to power by Soviet tanks. However, new rumors about his mistress and his ‘drunken 
bouts had further crippled Karmal’s reputation and had reduced him to a Soviet puppet. 
Moreover, by mid-1985, there had also been an important shift in power when Mikhail 
Gorbachev came to power as the new general secretary of the CPSU. From early on, 
Gorbachev had intentions of withdrawing the Red Army and indicated that a regime 
under Karmal was not plausible (p. 101). 
 The Afghan Mujahideen resistance against the PDPA meanwhile continued in full 
force. Hundreds of thousands Afghan refugees had been displaced by the civil war and 
settled in the neighboring Pakistan. The United States and Saudi Arabia channeled aid, 
weapons and money, while Pakistan’s ISI had created sanctuaries, recruited fighters and 
ran training camps for the resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 103). The number of 
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Afghan refugees who settled on the other side of the border in Pakistan grew rapidly from 
80,000 in 1978 to 400,000 by 1980 (p. 103). Pakistan had the monopoly on the 
distribution of aid and required that the refugees had to join one of the seven Islamic 
Peshawar-based parties in order to be eligible to receive aid, food rations as well as 
weapons and money for the Mujahideen (p. 103). These parties, which were operating in 
Afghanistan as early as 1980 against the PDPA, included Jamiat-i-Islami led by the Tajik 
Burhanuddin Rabbani; Hizbi-i-Islami led by the Ghilzai Pashtun Gulbuddin Hektmatyar; 
a small faction led by Pashtun Mullah Omar who would later become the leader of the 
Taliban; Ittehad-i-Islami led by the Pashtun Wahabi Abdul Rasul Sayyaf; and two 
additional parties that were recognized by the Pakistani government were headed by the 
Pashtun Sufi leaders Sibghatullah Mujadaddi and Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailaini (p. 104). 
 By 1986, it had become clear that forces were against Karmal. The opinion in 
Moscow was that his government was not popular with the Afghans anymore and that a 
change was necessary. An article in the Pravda had specifically singled out Karmal’s 
regime for losing popularity (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119). Even though Karmal had 
called nation-wide elections to a long-awaited Jirga, his regime had lost credibility and he 
had to go. Eventually, on the eve of the anniversary of the Saur Revolution in April 1986, 
Karmal was called up to Moscow, and was promptly replaced by Dr. Najibullah to take 
“the salute at the celebratory military parade” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119). After a 
month, the PDPA ‘unanimously’ elected Najibullah as the new general secretary of the 
Committee Central (p. 119). 
 In mensurating Babrak Karmal’s regime, his transition (0) to power came at the 
expense of Hafizullah Amin’s life, who was assassinated in a KGB operation by the 
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Soviet Union (Maley, 2009, p. 71). After Karmal was appointed as the new head of the 
PDPA, Afghanistan had descended into a civil war and resistance movements (0) had 
been fighting the regime on all fronts (p. 72). In August 1982, Karmal’s government 
suffered a ‘setback’ when the rebels attacked Bagram Airbase destroying dozens of 
aircraft (p. 72). However, the regime’s fighting against the Mujahideen went on until late 
1986 (p. 73). Karmal also struggled to gain legitimacy (0) for his regime because its 
survival relied on foreign military protection (p. 77). Karmal had intended to stay (0) in 
power for as long as possible but his regime eventually lost support within the party and 
the Soviet Union (p. 78). Although his regime did not collapse (1) because of the Soviet 
Union military assistance, its influence and control was limited to the urban cities under 
its control (p. 79).  
Table 19: B. Karmal Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 0 0 
Regime Transition 0 0 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 1 1 
Grand Total 1 
  
 The Soviet Union installed Karmal as the new supreme head of the PDPA (0) 
after removing Hafizullah Amin era from power (Barfield, 2010, p. 237). In 1980, 
political representation (1) briefly surged after Karmal released political prisoners, 
“rescinded the signature Khalqi decrees on land reform, rural debt, and women’s rights, 
and abandoned the revolutionary red flag for a version of Afghanistan’s old tricolor one” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 237). Moreover, having Moscow’s support Karmal had intended to 
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keep the PDPA’s monopoly (0) on power in Kabul and would not let the socialist 
revolution falter (p. 237). In fact, Karmal was so close to the Soviet Union initially that 
he had become another symbolic leader similar to the British’s ally Shah Shuja (p. 237). 
Table 20: B. Karmal Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 0 0 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representations 1 1 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 1 
 
 Furthermore, during Karmal’s regime, the Soviet Union deployed overwhelming 
force to fight the political opposition (0) hoping that the resistance would eventually tire 
out from fighting (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). This strategy included heavy bombardment, 
planting widespread landmines, depopulation of villages as well as controlling the urban 
centers and cutting supply chains to resistance controlled areas (p. 238). However, none 
of these tactics were successful in ending the resistance and the rebels were not willing to 
make peace as long as there was Soviet military presence in the country (p. 238).  
 The Soviet Union also invested to build up the PDPA army (0) to 90,000 hoping 
that they would do much of the fighting; however the commanders refused to go on 
missions and had secret truce zones with the Mujahideen (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). The 
Mujahedeen’s momentum grew stronger as they acquired more experience on the 
battlefield and more sophisticated weapons such as the American supplied anti-aircraft 
Stinger missiles in 1986, which “thereby greatly reducing Soviet air superiority on the 
battlefield” (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). Eventually, the PDPA and the 11,000 Soviet soldiers 
	 117	
were not able to “pacify” the country and were in a stalemate against the Mujahideen 
except from holding them off to overthrow the PDPA regime in Kabul (p. 238). 
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M. Najibullah Ahmadzai, 1986-1992 
 Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai, also known as Najib or Dr. Najib, succeeded 
as the new head of the PDPA party in 1986 (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 199). Belonging to 
the Ghilzai Pashtun tribe, Najib had been active in Afghan politics since he was a high 
school student, organizing and participating in protests. Moreover, he was loyal to 
Moscow and was considered as “Gorbachev’s chosen instrument to carry out his game 
plan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 199). A few months after taking power, Najib announced a 
national reconciliation program to the Mujahideen making three promises: declaring ‘a 
six-month unilateral cease-fire, offering to form a coalition government of ‘national 
unity’ with the Mujahideen and accommodating the return of over 5 million refugees 
from Pakistan and Iran (p. 199).  
 However, both the Mujahideen leaders in Pakistan as well as the radical Khalqis 
were equally opposed to these offers, as the former sought to topple Najib’s regime and 
latter felt betrayed by him for abandoning the socialist revolution (Barfield, 2010, p. 
239). Regardless, Najib established the ‘Extraordinary Supreme Commission for National 
Reconciliation’ with branches all around the country, urging relatives and friends of those 
fighting in the resistance to accept peace in return for tax concessions and confiscated 
property as well as ‘deferment of military service’ (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119).  
There was broad support and excitement among the Afghan refugee camps that 
had shown eagerness to return home, but the seven-party Peshawar alliance had rejected 
Najib’s program. The parties had their own agendas for ruling Afghanistan and rejected 
sharing power. However, a survey conducted among the Afghan refugees had shown that 
	 119	
less than one percent of refugees “would choose one of the seven Peshawar leader to rule 
a free Afghanistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 120). 
 Najib continued with the reconciliation program by extending the ceasefire for 
another six months in June 1987. In July of the same year, he ordered a new constitution 
to be drafted and again invited the Peshawar based oppositions to build a coalition 
government and end their resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). A Loya Jirga 
officially adopted the new constitution in November 1987 establishing Islam as the state 
religion and in theory, making Afghanistan a ‘multi-party parliamentary democracy’ (p. 
121). In April 1988, new elections were held under the new constitution and a quarter of 
the seats in the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) were left vacant for the opposition. Although 
the PDPA allocated seats in the parliament to non-PDPA, most of the non-PDPA 
members came from the National Fatherland Front, a sub-faction of the PDPA 
communist party (p. 121). 
 Meanwhile, the efforts to withdraw Soviet troops finally paid off when all parties 
reached an agreement in the Geneva Accords. With Deigo Cordovez as the mediator, 
“The agreement [which] concluded on 14 April 1988 by the foreign ministers of 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States…called for the withdrawal 
of all Soviet troops within nine months, non-interference in each other’s affairs by 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the voluntary repatriation of the Afghan refugees” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). Although these accords received universal acclaim for 
ending the war, they are in fact seen as a factor for continuation. Some observers noticed 
that Cordovez had viewed the conflict in terms of a Cold War proxy between the 
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superpowers Moscow and Washington, rather than focusing on its political and social 
origins in Afghanistan.  
 Moreover, Cordovez included as few parties to the negotiation as possible and 
had left out the leaders of the Mujahideen resistance in the negotiations as well as other 
regional players such as Iran (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). Although later Cordovez did 
try to start a negotiation process between PDPA and the Seven-Party Alliance in 
Peshawar by sending out a memorandum to the U.S., Soviet Union, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, his proposal was not adopted officially. The failure was due to two factors, 
internal disagreements between the Seven-Parties and Zia Ulhaq’s agenda, which was to 
“establish in Kabul a government amenable to Pakistani interests and dominated by his 
fundamentalist Pashtun clients in Peshawar” (p. 122). 
 Gorbachev officially announced that Soviet troops would begin their withdrawal 
on February 8, 1988 and complete it within the next ten months. The Geneva Accords 
were officially signed on April 14 1988 in the UN branch at Geneva, Switzerland. 
However, the U.S. had informed the UN secretary-general that the U.S. reserved the right 
to supply aid to Mujahideen, as did the Soviet Union. In essence, the war went on as both 
side continued to send weapons covertly meeting ‘restraint with restraint’ (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 124). On February 15, 1989 the Soviet Union completed their withdrawal when 
its last convoy left Afghanistan, leaving Najib’s government in charge. It was expected 
that Mujahideen would swarm Kabul and Najib’s regime would fall within weeks after 
Soviet troops left but because they were unorganized, ill-equipped and lacked a concrete 
strategy, but Najib was able to hold on to power. 
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 However, the Mujahideen continued their attacks on Najib’s government while 
receiving support from the Pakistani Secret Service ISI, which mobilized fighters on the 
Peshawar side to capture the eastern Jalalabad city (Barfield, 2010, p. 241). ISI’s plan 
initially was to take Jalalabad and move in on the capital Kabul but Najib’s army was 
able to hold off the attack and prevent the fall of the capital in March 1989 (p. 241). ISI’s 
failed attempt to bring down the regime gave Najib a much-needed dose of confidence. 
Moreover, the rebels had proved to be incapable of maintaining momentum and lacked a 
common command structure (p. 241). The internal disorganization and rivalries among 
the Mujahideen seemed to affect their goal of reaching political leadership.  
 In a country where winners and losers are determined by whoever “turns a 
perception into reality,” Najib seemed like a winner who could stand on his own in the 
absence of Soviet Union (Barfield, 2010, p. 241). Moreover, the perception that 
Mujahideen would easily take Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal was now waning. 
Although the Mujahideen dismantled many PDPA outposts elsewhere in the country 
especially in eastern Khost province, the number of Mujahideen commanders “willing to 
cut deals” with Najib increased after the failed Jalalabad offensive. Najib’s regime now 
appeared to “have more life left in it” but the important question remained whether with 
Russians out if Najib could “frame the ongoing conflict as an internal Afghan affair, a 
dispute among fellow Muslims that could not be justified as a jihad” (Barfield, 2010, p. 
241). 
 Meanwhile the PDPA continued to receive money and arms from the Soviet 
Union while the Mujahideen were funded and received weapons largely from the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia. Defections and switching sides for personal gain and better pay rather 
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than ideology were common. Similarly “At the national level, the philosophical 
differences between the resistance and the Kabul regime, which seemed so sharp when 
the war began, blurred with time” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). Najib capitalized on the 
Soviet withdrawal portraying himself as a nationalist and a Muslim who “could protect 
Afghanistan’s interests better than the Peshawar-based party leaders” (Barfield, 2010, p. 
244).  
 Najib offered the Mujahideen cease-fires and autonomy to run their own militias, 
which attracted about 20 percent of the Mujahideen fighters into joining his government. 
Of the estimated 85,000-man army between 1988–89, the number of Mujahideen had 
been decreased to 55,000 by 1990 (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). Najib’s strategy was to use 
the Soviet Union financial support to offer resistance money and weapons while 
simultaneously consolidate power “through networks of patronage and by maintaining a 
powerful military” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). In 1988, around seven hundred thousand 
militias were on Najib’s payroll while the Soviet Union was willing to “provide [Najib] 
with food, fuel, cash, and (covertly) weapons)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244).  
 However, Najib’s government also faced “devolution of power” after the Soviet 
withdrawal in 1989. This shift in the structure and dynamics of the contemporary Afghan 
politics gave way for regional players to play a direct role in the country. For the first 
time in the recent history, the central government in Kabul lacked the traditional 
dominance it had exerted over the country for decades (Barfield, 2010, p. 246). The 
Mujahideen aligned with regional players out of “necessity” as they depended on the 
support of outside players and had to expand their power base beyond the local-level 
commanders to fight the war (p. 246). Although the PDPA continued to implement a 
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Kabul-central government to better control the territories, the country was eventually 
divided into seven military zones with their own autonomy. As the resistance gained 
momentum, Najib primarily focused on safe guarding the northern territory on the border 
with the Soviet Union that allowed the essential aid and supply line for the government 
(p. 246). 
 Najib’s regime came to the brink of collapse, however, when Soviet aid was 
briefly cut during the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 leaving Afghanistan 
“without enough fuel and food for the winter” (Barfield, 2010, p. 248). However, things 
became worse when all Russian support and aid suddenly stopped in December 1991 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving Najib’s regime in a critical condition (p. 
248). The army had shrunk facing heavy desertions while corruption in the regime had 
“absorbed 85 to 90 percent of the Soviet aid intended for the population as a whole” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 248). And because Najib’s regime survival entirely depended on 
“distribution” of Soviet aid to the factions that made up his government’s backbone, “the 
sudden end of such outside assistance was a fatal blow to his regime” (Barfield, 2010, p. 
248). Eventually, in March 1992 Najib resigned and agreed to an UN-brokered 
transitional agreement, which would create a new government. 
 The end of Najib’s regime alarmed all the parties as different factions began 
attempts to dominate the new government. However, none were powerful or big enough 
on their own to form a central government, which soon led to a process of political 
compromises and alliances based on region and ethnicity (Barfield, 2010, p. 248). The 
radical Khalqis that had opposed Najib joined Hekmatyar’s Pashtun based Islamist party. 
The Uzbek Dostum joined with the influential northern Tajik Massud’s party in the north. 
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This ensued a power struggle to take over the capital between Hekmatyar and Massud, 
with the latter beating the former by arriving a day earlier to occupy Kabul in April 1992 
(p. 248). Meanwhile, Najib sought political asylum at the United Nations headquarters in 
Kabul and “disappeared from view” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). 
 In mensurating M. Najibullah Ahmadzai’s regime, Mikhail Gorbachev had 
replaced Karmal with Najib as the new General Secretary of the PDPA Central 
Committee on May 4, 1986 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 172). Although this 
transition (1) of power within the PDPA was peaceful, the civil war continued to rage on 
in virtually all parts of Afghanistan and hence, Najib struggled to legitimize (0) his 
regime (Maley, 2009, p. 90). Resistance continued (0) as Najib’s regime faced attacks in 
the northern Panjsheer Valley from Ahmad Shah Massud, in the central Hazarajat region 
from Shura-i-Ettefaq and in the eastern and southeastern regions from various 
Mujahideen commanders including Hekmatyar (p. 95). Regardless, Najib had continued 
to consolidate his power (0) to maintain his grip on the regime (p. 97). However, after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, Najib’s regime collapsed (0) in April 1992 (p. 
140). 
Table 21: M. N. Ahmadzai Regime 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 0 0 
Regime Transition 1 1 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 1 1 
Grand Total 2 
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 When Najib became the supreme head (0) of the PDPA, he began a complete 
purge of the party by routing out his political opposition (0) in order to take total control 
of the party (Maley, 2009, p. 98). He took over the Chairman of the Revolutionary 
Council in 1987 and ‘demoted’ many of Karmal’s supporters while “promoting persons 
loyal to him” (Maley, 2009, p. 98). Moreover, he ‘systematically’ removed all prominent 
influential elite within the PDPA who would stand in his way to gain complete authority 
(p. 98).  
Table 22: M. N. Ahmadzai Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 1 1 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 2 
  
By 1986, Najib had replaced all key figures from top positions within the party including 
the regional head of the party in Herat, the Secretary of the Revolutionary Council and 
head of the secret police (Maley, 2009, p. 98). He did, however, appoint the Minister of 
Defense (1) and allowed him to exercise full authority (p. 98). 
 Najib did make attempts to increase popular political representation (1) in his 
regime (Maley, 2009). He began a ‘National Reconciliation’ program to invite the 
Mujahideen to end the fight and join his government (Maley, 2009, p. 100). He also 
assembled a Loya Jirga, which adopted the ‘Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan’, 
although the document did not limit Najib’s own power in any meaningful way (p. 101). 
It was merely used to “create an image of a constitutionalist order” (Maley, 2009, p. 101).  
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 Najib also made efforts to appeal to the conservative mullahs through various 
strategies such as putting many mullahs on the government’s pay roll and rebuilding 
damaged mosques (Maley, 2009, p. 102). However, the ‘National Reconciliation’ 
program had failed to draw significant opposition since it could not be held in rebel 
controlled areas (p. 103). The Mujahideen also rejected his offer of a Coalition 
Government since the power-sharing arrangement offered by Najib would still keep him 
in a “dominant position, with the Mujahideen offered only crumbs from the PDPA’s 
dining table” (Maley, 2009, p. 103). 
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The Mujahideen & Burhanuddin Rabbani, 1992-1996 
The Mujahideen, who ran resistance movements against the PDPA and Soviet Union, 
comprised of various ethnic factions within and outside Afghanistan, each based on the 
region they represented in the country, as well as having a foreign sponsor 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 133). The Tajik Ismail Khan was operating in the western in 
Herat province where he had various battalions under his command. The Tajik Ahmad 
Shah Massud was operating from the northern Panjshir Valley, where by 1983 he had 
thousands of fighters under his command (p. 133). Pashtun Gulbuddin Hektmatyar had 
stationed just outside Kabul and had his base in the eastern part of the country. 
Essentially, “Each functioned as a sponsor of fighting militias within the specific regions 
or localities from which they drew their support, substantially on the basis of ethno-
linguistic or tribal identification…” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 135)  
 After Najib’s fall, the Mujahideen leaders formed an interim coalition government 
through the Peshawar Agreement brokered by the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
on April 24, 1992 (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 141). The agreement provided “the framework 
for an interim government to be implemented in stages: the dispatch to Kabul of 
Mujaddadi, the leader of a small Pashtun party, as a compromise choice to head a two-
month transitional government, to be followed by a four-month interim government 
headed by Rabbani, the leader of the Jamiat, as a prelude to the formation of a council 
that would act as an interim government for 18 months before the holding of a 
nationwide elections” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 141). The agreement, however, soon 
became dysfunctional because Hekmatyar refused to sign it as he was opposed to the 
	 128	
position of the defense minister (which was held by Ahmad Shah Massud) and also 
protested the inclusion of Uzbek General Dostum in the government (p. 142). 
 However, Hekmatyar’s real anger stemmed from the fact that he was not offered 
the prime minister position in the coalition agreement. By August 1992, Hekmatyar had 
begun attacking Rabbani’s government in Kabul by firing hundreds of rockets from the 
outskirts of Kabul killing over a thousand civilians and forcing hundreds of others to 
escape the capital (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 142). In March 1993, he was offered the 
position of prime minister in another agreement in Islamabad, but Hektmatyar refused 
again, choosing to remain in his posts and continued barraging Kabul with rockets. In 
January 1994, Dostum, who had defected from the coalition government, and Mujadaddi, 
who had failed to extend his two-month presidency, joined in an alliance with 
Hekmatyar. Together, these three “unleashed the most ferocious artillery and rocket 
attacks Kabul had ever experienced” destroying half the city and killing an estimated 
25,000 civilians (p. 142).  
 Hektmayar’s objective was “to ensure that the Rabbani government did not 
consolidate power by building a credible administration and expanding its territorial 
control, and that it did not acquire the capacity, with lavish international support, for the 
reconstruction of the country, and to dispense patronage, and thus attract loyalty of the 
population” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 142). However, in this process, Hekmatyar had 
caused more harm to himself, the Mujahideen and the Islamic parties. He had destroyed 
most of the city but was still unable to take Kabul. Moreover, the chaos he had released 
on the city ‘paved’ the way for other actors to make grounds including the Taliban.  
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 In the end, Hekmatyar had lost his own ‘credibility’ in the eyes of his prominent 
supporter, Pakistan, which had hope to use him “as a vehicle for their regional ambitions 
of achieving ‘strategic depth’ by installing an amenable client government in Kabul” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143). In fact, even the Mujahideen began despising Hekmatyar 
and claimed that he had killed more Mujahideen than the communists in the jihad. In the 
end, Hektmayar’s failed quest to take Kabul had left the country in chaos, which 
presented opportunities for other actors to rise to power and fill in the void. 
 In order to compete with the Peshawar-based parties, Afghan leaders such as 
Ahmad Shah Massud formed the National Commanders Shura (NCS) in October of 1990. 
In the aftermath of Najib’s fall, Massud’s supporters also urged him to take charge of the 
transitional government. Most of the NCS members were actual commanders who had 
“fought against the Soviets” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). Massud, who proved to be one of 
the most successful military commanders during the Soviet occupation, did not prove to 
be an expert politician. An ethnic Tajik, he feared “provoking ethnic conflict…[leaving] 
the formation of the new government to the Peshawar leaders with the expectation that 
they would do what was best for the country and arrange for future elections” (p. 249). 
However, the Peshawar parties had “no intention of seeking a consensus or presenting 
themselves for any electoral approval. This was their chance to seize power and they 
snapped at the opportunity…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249) 
 The Mujahideen had no shared goals after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, 
which had forced them into a “marriage of convenience”. Their “…unity was based on 
resistance against the Soviet Union and its client Afghan government, not on any political 
platform” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). Hence, the new “Islamic State of Afghanistan” created 
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by the Mujahideen after Najib’s regime was a “mere shell” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). The 
leaders of the Peshawar parties that formed the new government did not have a national 
political base in Afghanistan and were opposed to any proposition that “might expose 
their unpopularity or narrow base of support” (Barfield, 2010, p. 250). The parties 
similarly did not want former king Zahir Shah to play any role in the new government 
including a symbolic one because “Royal legitimacy through recognized tribal lineage 
held enough sway to undermine the Pakistani Mujahideen parties” (Barfield, 2010, p. 
250). Therefore, even the strongest factions under the leadership of Rabbani and 
Hekmatyar, the two leaders of their respective Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami and Pashtun Hizb-i-
Islami parties, “lacked prestigious social origins or a strong tribal following of their 
own…” (Barfield, 2010, p. 250) 
 The struggle for power among the Mujahideen was “inevitable” once the PDPA 
collapsed. In other words, “It was not the result of some Afghan penchant for blood feud 
of tribal rivalries (although these did play a part) but rather the predictable consequence 
of having armed and funded political-military factions in Pakistan that had long waited 
for such an opportunity to arise” (Barfield, 2010, p. 250). And because “…each faction 
leader realized that if he did not obtain power now, he never would” (Barfield, 2010, p. 
250). Compromise to make a coalition was also difficult because most of these parties 
were formed based on personalities rather than ideologies. There were efforts by Saudi 
Arabia to bring everyone to the table to form a government, however, these attempts 
failed “immediately after the Peshawar parties arrived in Kabul” (Barfield, 2010, p. 250).  
 In the end, “All the sides committed atrocities, and what prestige the Mujahideen 
had gained by expelling the Soviets was lost as they fought each other in the ruins of 
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Kabul” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). In the past political crises, Afghan leaders would rise to 
the moment “…in order to establish political order in the country by combining some 
recognized claim of political legitimacy with substantial aid from the outside 
world…[But] both of these conditions were now lacking” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). 
Because the Soviet Union had brought to power Afghan leaders from the marginalized 
ethnic groups, each had to “legitimize their right” to rule. However, none of the 
Mujahideen leaders were able to “permanently” eliminate their rivals and become the 
sole rulers (p. 251). 
 As Soviet Union had dissolved and the U.S. did not consider Afghanistan 
strategically important anymore, foreign resources were becoming scarce. Even Saudi 
Arabia was left in an awkward position of aiding one Sunni Muslim group to kill another. 
While the UN sent emergency humanitarian aid, it was not successful in finding a 
political solution for the crisis nor did it have the means to do so (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). 
Pakistan’s ambition of installing a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul had also 
faltered. The country was in a civil war fueled by political crisis because factions did not 
have the ability to “…find any common agreement about what a future government 
should look like, let alone who should run it... [making] it impossible to unify the country 
politically” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). A military unification was also not viable because 
“…each faction was strong enough to defend its own home region but too weak to extend 
its power beyond it” (Barfield, 2010, p. 252). 
 However, unlike Yugoslavia that was splitting into smaller states along ethnic 
lines, “Kabul was never challenged by regional or ethnic separatist movements. No 
Afghan leader saw the collapse of central power in Kabul as an opportunity to seek 
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independence. Instead, the regions backed one of the two major contenders for national 
power: Rabbani and Massud’s Shura Nazar (Supervisory Council), or Hekmatyar’s 
Shura-i-Hamahangi (Coordination Council)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 252). Although this 
division is often seen along regional and ethnic lines, it was not. For example, the 
Pashtun camp led by Hektmatyar made alliances with the Uzbek Dostum and Hazara 
Mazari to gain leverage against Massud and Rabbani (p. 252). Pakistan threw its support 
behind Hekmatyar while Russia backed Rabbani and Massud (p. 253). However, Kabul 
had effectively become a failed state “with its national institutions bankrupt and 
powerless” (Barfield, 2010, p. 253).  
 The Mujahideen reign had descended the country into chaos, civil war and 
political instability. The division in the country run on the local district and village level, 
as commanders would set up posts and “abuse the local population, engaging in rape and 
pillage without fear of punishment” (Barfield, 2010, p. 253). Although Rabbani was the 
president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, “…his writ did not run beyond the palace” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 254). The country did not have a national army, as the fighters were 
bands organized by each faction. The rival Hekmatyar had become obsessed with taking 
over Kabul and seizing national government that he had never left the outskirts of Kabul 
and continued shelling the city. Surprisingly both camps faced the same difference, 
lacking a strong regional base in Afghanistan since both Rabbani and Hektmatyar were 
“party political leaders who had sat out the war in Pakistan” (Barfield, 2010, p. 254). 
 In mensurating the Mujahideen & Burhanuddin Rabbani regimes, after the 
collapse of the last communist PDPA regime in 1992, Afghanistan lacked viable political 
institutions (Maley, 2009, p. 163). The Mujahideen leaders had succeeded in achieving 
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their shared common goal of ousting the Soviet Union and bringing down their client 
government (p. 163). However, because they no longer had a shared objective, the 
Mujahideen leaders immediately split into different factions (p. 163). This division 
among the elite led to the gradual fragmentation of the political system and internal 
disagreements on who should lead the country (p. 164). Although after the collapse of the 
PDPA, the transition (1) of power was brokered peacefully through the Peshawar 
Agreement, civil war soon resumed amid disagreements over power sharing (p. 165).  
 The Peshawar Agreement distributed top government positions among the 
prominent Mujahideen leaders. Hekmatyar was offered the position of Prime Minister, 
Jamiat-i-Islami the Ministry of Defense and Gailani the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Maley, 
2009, p. 165). Hekmatyar, who had hoped to be the president, rejected the prime minister 
position as an unsatisfactory offer and began a rebellion (0) against Rabbani’s 
government (p. 165).  
Table 23: B. Rabbani Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 0 0 
Regime Transition 1 1 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 0 0 
Grand Total 1 
 
 In August 1992, he had abandoned any attempts to be a part of the new 
government and began bombarding Kabul in protest killing over a 1,000 civilians (Maley, 
2009, p. 165). Meanwhile the Council of Supreme Popular Settlement had met in 
December 1993 to unilaterally extend (0) Rabbani’s term for another 18 months (Maley, 
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2009, p. 166). Rabbani’s opposition, however, had ‘boycotted’ the Council’s meeting and 
accused Rabbani of ‘manipulating’ it to ‘his advantage’ (p. 166). The Council, which was 
an unelected body, further ruined Rabbani government’s (0) legitimacy (p. 166). 
 Pakistan and Saudi Arabia pressured Rabbani to find a solution to the Hekmatyar 
situation and sign the new Islamabad Accords in March 1993, which would appoint 
Hekmatyar as the prime minister and form a new Cabinet (Maley, 2009, p. 166). 
However, the ‘distrust’ among the Mujahideen, especially between Hekmatyar and 
Massud, had been a major factor in the failure of a joint Mujahideen government (p. 167). 
Eventually Rabbani had effectively ousted Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami from the capital 
and the government. But it was under Rabbani’s government that Afghanistan had 
disintegrated into factionalism and descended into chaos. His Defense Minister Massud 
could not protect the citizens in the capital Kabul (p. 168).  
Table 24: B. Rabbani Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 0 0 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 1 
 
 By mid 1994, complete civil war had broken out between Rabbani-Massud and 
Hekmatyar-Dostum-Hezbi-i-Wahdat parties (p. 169). However, the Rabbani 
government’s total collapse (0) did not occur until September 1996 by a new emerging 
force calling itself the Taliban (p. 177).  
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 The national army (0) under the Mujahideen had disintegrated completely and 
country was under the control of armed militia force, each loyal to their Mujahideen 
warlords (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 201). Each faction had thousands of armed 
militia and controlled a portion of the country where they drew support. Political 
representation (0), similarly, did not exist as the country was effectively ruled along 
ethnic lines and strongmen exercised authority (p. 206).  
 Although Rabbani and Massud had set up a ‘national’ government (0), most top 
government positions (0) were distributed among their own Jamiat Party, with Rabbani 
appointed as the President and Massud as the Minister of Defense (Wahab & 
Youngerman, 2010, p. 207). Moreover, the government’s authority extended only beyond 
the capital Kabul to a few northern provinces under Massoud’s authority (p. 207). 
Political opposition (0) was violent and bloody as all prominent Mujahideen leaders 
continued to battle for the ultimate supremacy to extended their authority over the entire 
country, but none succeeded, and the war for Kabul left hundreds of thousands dead and 
forcing millions to leave the country (p. 208).  
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The Taliban & Mullah M. Omar, 1996-2001 
 The Taliban rose to power as a military force during the Afghan civil war in the 
1990s. The Taliban, the Arabic plural for Talib (“religious student”), was a Sharia 
movement based on “purely religious inspiration that was able to transform itself into a 
motivated and effective military force…” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143) The Taliban 
predominantly recruited members from the madrassas in rural Afghanistan and in 
Pakistan. Most of the fighters that joined them were young Afghans born in refugee-
camps and had never seen war before (p. 143). These new ‘children of jihad’ were 
“therefore rootless and receptive to the ideological influences to which they were exposed 
in the madrassas of Pakistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143). The Taliban rose to power at 
a time when the inter-fighting among the Mujahideen parties had created total anarchy 
and chaos throughout the country, which had effectively been divided into territories 
controlled by different factions. Hence, the Taliban’s initial objectives were to put “an 
end to the activities of petty ex-Mujahideen warlords who were preying on the local 
population, and of establishing order and security by disarming their militia” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 145).  
 The group secured their first major victory when a force of 200 Taliban fighters 
seized a large weapons convoy from Hekmatyar in October 1994. Providing a safe 
passage to a commercial 30-truck Pakistani convoy further strengthened their position 
with their new master Pakistan (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 145). By November 1994, the 
Taliban had grown into a well-organized 2,500 force and had captured their first major 
city, Kandahar (p. 145). While Pakistan’s ISI was providing them with brand new 
weapons, in Kandahar they had seized Mujahideen tanks, helicopters and planes (p. 145). 
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Other nearby cities of Zabul and Uruzgan were taken without ‘a shot being fired’ while 
Helmand fell to their control after some heavy fighting. By 1995, The Taliban had taken 
western Herat and most southern Afghanistan. And by September 1996, the group had 
completely defeated Hekmatyar’s forces in eastern Paktia, with Ahmad Shah Massud left 
as their main rival (p. 151). Moreover, by September 26, the Taliban had reached and 
captured Kabul, forcing Massud to complete retreat from the capital. With Kabul’s 
capture, the Taliban had essentially captured over 70 percent of the country by mid-1996 
(p. 152). 
 In May 1997, a force of 2,500 Taliban captured the northern city of Mazar-i-
Sharif after heavy fighting. Taliban leaders were flown in by Pakistan to Mazar, where in 
a press conference, Pakistan officially recognized them as the ‘government of 
Afghanistan,’ convincing Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to ‘follow suit’ 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 153). In Mazar, the Taliban faced strong resistance from the 
Hazaras who had pushed back. When the Hazara forces took back Mazar in September 
1997 forcing the Taliban to retreat to Kunduz, the latter cut off all roads leading to 
Hazarajat from the south and north to force the Hazaras into surrender. By winter 1997, 
300,000 Hazaras in Bamiyan, Wardak and Ghor provinces were starving (p. 155). The 
Taliban were especially anti-Hazara, branding them munafiqun (‘hypocrites 
masquerading as Muslims’). By September 1998, the Taliban had made a comeback and 
defeated the Hazaras, taking back Mazar in fierce fighting (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 157).  
 Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of the Taliban had come from a poor 
Ghilzai Pashtun family in southern Helmand province. He was a commander in the 
Hizibi-i-Islami faction fighting against Najib’s regime from 1989 until 1992 
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(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 191). The Taliban officially declared Omar as their leader in 
March 1996 days before they sacked Kabul and toppled Rabbani’s government (p. 191). 
A 1200 member shura (“Grand Assembly”) gathered in Kandahar and gave Omar the 
title of Amir al-Muminin (“Commander of the Believers”) (p. 191). It is important to 
notice that the shura that chose Omar, was unlike a traditional Afghan Loya Jirga, and 
was based on the Islamic Arab shura practiced by the previous Islamic caliphs centuries 
ago (p. 191). In other words, the political legitimacy of Omar’s appointment came only 
from the ulema and religious scholars as opposed to other elements that usually played a 
role in electing leaders such tribal chiefs, the elite, the educated middle class, royal 
family, and so on. 
 After the Taliban ousted Rabbani’s government in September 1996, they installed 
new power structures and eliminated the traditional bureaucracy in Kabul, which they 
had considered corrupt. First, Omar set up a 10-member Supreme Shura in Kandahar that 
oversaw all government decisions and reported directly to him. In Kabul, another lower 
level 14-member ministerial shura was set up where the ‘ministers’ were held 
accountable to the Kandahar shura and carried out nominal ‘ministerial’ functions 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 192). Omar often overruled the Kabul minister shura’s decisions 
and “There was thus a confusing dichotomy of power that did not make life easy for 
those who had to deal with them. The Taliban had unified but not monolithic power 
structure” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 192).  
 Moreover, the Taliban had replaced all Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek bureaucrats in 
Kabul with less experienced Pashtuns. Women were entirely ousted from government 
positions as well as other civilian fields such as education (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193). 
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Omar’s friends and colleagues who primarily consisted of Kandahari Pashtuns had 
dominated membership in the Kandahar Shura. Most important government decisions 
were made in the Kandahar Shura, where provincial governors, military commanders and 
tribal leaders were also invited, but the council in practice was a ‘loose and amorphous 
body’ (p. 193).  
 Most higher-level government officials including mayors, governors, police chiefs 
were appointed from the Kandahari Pashtuns, including in majority Persian speaking 
cities such as Mazar, Herat and Kabul. The Kabul council of ministers did not include 
Dari speaking Kabulis, the ‘lingua franca’, which made day-to-day government business 
difficult. The few non-Kandaharis that existed in the provincial government positions 
were often transferred around to prevent them from amassing political power. In short, 
“… Political power was centralized at the level of the Kandaharis under Omar, to whom 
all revenues were also remitted” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193). 
 Mullah Omar was also the commander-in-chief of the military shura, which 
included a chief general staff and ‘chief of staffs’ but there was no ‘discernable 
hierarchical structure in the officers and commanders ranks. This was also true of the 
entire regime since “The Taliban movement began and largely remained a military 
organization…” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193) The Taliban army numbered between 
25,000 to 30,000 fighters throughout their rule while around 30% of their manpower 
came from Pakistani madras (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 194). Effectively a military rule, the 
Taliban had controlled over 90% of the country by late 1998 except in the north where 
Massud’s Northern Alliance had held on (p. 197). They rejected any UN mediation for 
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peace negotiation because their ultimate goal was to impose their will through a military 
rule without sharing power.  
 However, the regime was incapable of providing even basic services to the people 
and by 1990, over 70 international NGOs had been operating in Afghanistan, providing 
aid and food to a poverty-stricken country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 197). During the 
1990s, millions of Afghans had left their homes and settled in as refugees in the 
neighboring countries, with 3,722,000 in Pakistan and 2,940,000 in Iran (p. 197). Women 
were confined to their homes and girls were banned from going to schools, which also 
affected boys’ education since most teachers in general were women (198). The Taliban 
had imposed bizarre interpretation of the sharia law that included mandatory rules such as 
dictating how to dress in public, banning all music and traditional festivals like the 
Nawroz (p. 198). 
 But even though the Taliban were not interested in government responsibilities, 
they exercised an effective monopoly of using force until they had achieved their 
objective. Because they were a military organization, and refused to share power, their 
tactics mainly included ‘military option until last pockets of resistance’ (Rasanayagam, 
2003, p. 203). In fact, Mullah Omar was not even a head of the state since he had 
assumed the more religious title of ‘Commander of the Believers’ by symbolically 
wrapping himself in the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad in Kandahar (p. 203). 
Therefore, he was the “amir of an Islamic emirate that was more religious than statist in 
its connotations, and Kandahar, not Kabul, was the ‘capital’ of the Taliban Afghanistan” 
(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 204). In short, “Theirs was a ‘theocratic’ regime, legitimized by 
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religious and not by a nationalist ideology nor by tribal genealogies, which had no 
equivalent in the contemporary Muslim world” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 205). 
 The Taliban movement was historically different because it had exclusively relied 
on a clergy leadership as well as recruiting primarily from the displaced Afghan refugees 
in Pakistan. Refugee camps made an easy recruiting base because they tended to be 
generally poor, with no opportunities for the youth and were usually manipulated by 
political factions (Barfield, 2010, p. 256). In the case of Afghan refugees, much of the 
propaganda revolved around regaining control of a ‘lost’ homeland. However, this ideal 
recruiting rhetoric shifted when a new generation of Afghan refugees had been born, who 
had never seen the country. In this sense, “The past is idealized because the present is so 
miserable and the future so uncertain” (Barfield, 2010, p. 256). In other words, “Groups 
with extreme messages, whether their ideologies are political, ethnic, or religious, 
galvanize their followers not only with visions of reclaiming a lost homeland but also of 
then transforming it” (Barfield, 2010, p. 256).  
 Afghan refugees, who had tasted victory by defeating the Soviet Union, were also 
ready to return to their homeland. However, the Mujahideen, who descended the country 
into chaos, disorder and instability, had slashed this hope for many refugees. Although 
initially hailed as the liberators of the Soviet occupation, the Mujahideen had lost all 
respect after their pity fights and a bloody civil war (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). Such a 
discontent gave the Taliban an opportunity to capitalize in two ways: to recruit young 
refugee boys and give them a new kind of jihad, one that would bring “a truer version” of 
Afghanistan. Second, the Taliban drew on the discontent in areas where the population 
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faced chaos and were ready to promise their allegiance to any group or ideology that 
brought stability in their daily lives (p. 257) 
 Furthermore, the Taliban movement initially became extremely popular with the 
people in the south because it promised “security of life and property to a region that 
lacked both” (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). The Taliban’s style of “law and order” strategy 
initially “overshadowed the movement’s radical Islamist ideology, which the Taliban did 
not implement in full until they were better established” (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). Calling 
themselves God’s servants, most of the Taliban’s leadership was low-level religious 
clergy who relied on tribal military forces that were poorly organized. The Taliban’s 
initial attacks were primarily on weapon depots to arm their foot soldiers as no central 
government or army could challenge them.  
 The movement grew steadily replacing Mujahideen outposts while also recruiting 
former Soviet trained fighters ex-Khalqis who now adhered to an entirely conflicting 
ideology of Islam. Moreover, Pakistan directly supplied weapons and aid to the group, 
without which, it would have not survived (Barfield, 2010, p. 258). The Taliban were 
welcomed for bringing security and stability but their radical social and political policies 
especially in the urban areas proved extremely controversial. It was a regime that 
combined Salafi Islam with the Pashtun code of Honor, Pashtunwali. Moreover, “Their 
religious interpretations were often idiosyncratic and tended to dress local custom in the 
guise of religion” (Barfield, 2010, p. 261).  
 The movement largely faced two oppositions: on an intellectual level and an 
ethnocentric level. The former was voiced by Muslim clerics from the al Azhar in Egypt 
who denounced the group for lack of knowledge of true Islami after meeting with the 
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Taliban leadership. The second opposition came from ordinary Afghans who believed 
that the Islam practiced in the country for centuries did not need any change because 
“Afghans were victors of a successful jihad and inhabitants of the only country in the 
region that had never come under colonial rule” (Barfield, 2010, p. 263). The Taliban 
argued, however, that they were best fit to rule the country because they united Pashtun 
ethnic groups and diminished their existing rivalries by “appealing to a broader 
commonality that rose above ordinary tribal divisions” (Barfield, 2010, p. 263). In fact, 
“…one of the reasons for their particular success among Pashtuns was their ability to 
sidestep existing tribal leaders hamstrung by local rivalries” (p. 263). However, this 
rhetoric failed to go beyond a Pashtun base and for non-Pashtun and minorities, the 
Taliban were an evil force that was establishing a Pashtun political hegemony they had 
overthrown during the Soviet invasion. 
 Moreover, the Taliban regime also struggled to win any significant international 
recognition and support. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
recognized and established diplomatic ties with the regime (Barfield, 2010, p. 264). Little 
international recognition was a blow for a regime that heavily dependent on foreign aid, 
which had decreased significantly. Pakistan, a poor country itself, could not meet the 
deficit so Taliban relied heavily on United Nations aid, especially food. Although the 
regime had violated the UN principles in every way possible such as killing Najib in 
UN’s Kabul compound, and losing its seat in the headquarters in New York, the United 
Nations could not cut humanitarian aid to the completely isolated country. Tensions were 
high between Taliban and the international community in early 1998 after Taliban had 
allowed Osama Bin Laden to set up camp in Afghanistan.  
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 The U.S. had launched missiles on Afghanistan after the attacks by Bin Laden on 
U.S. embassies in East Africa demanding that he be returned. Saudi Arabia withdrew 
their diplomatic mission urging Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden but Omar rejected 
the request and abused Saudi for cutting ties (Barfield, 2010, p. 266). Both Saudi and the 
U.S. wanted to try bin Laden for terrorist attacks but Omar was unwilling to expel bin 
Laden citing the code of honor Pashtunwali, according to which, hospitality (melmastia) 
requires to protect a guest with your life. However, because “by the same code a guest 
must accept the authority of his host, Mullah Omar assured the world that he had 
forbidden bin Laden from engaging in any improper activities on Afghan soil…” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 268) 
 After the September 11 attacks, however, the equation changed completely as 
Afghanistan was now in the center of attention. The U.S. gave an ultimatum to the 
Taliban to expel Bin Laden or face annihilation. Omar refused these calls including from 
its patron Pakistan, which also eventually abandoned the regime and sided with the U.S. 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 269). The Taliban, who had assassinated Massud two days prior to the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, had miscalculated that perhaps this would “derail an 
expected US counterattack” (Barfield, 2010, p. 269). After failing to meet the deadline, 
by October 2001 the U.S. launched airstrikes against the Taliban while the Northern 
Alliance began mobilizing forces on the ground. Mullah Omar had threatened that the 
U.S. would fall like previous occupying empires such as the British and the Soviet Union 
but his regime was overthrown in two weeks. Taliban abandoned the capital Kabul in 
order to regroup in their stronghold Kandahar but tribal leaders saw the Taliban regime 
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was faltering and regained power. In the end, both Mullah Omar and Bin Laden had fled 
the country and took shelter in Pakistan (p. 270). 
 In mensurating the Taliban and Mullah Omar regimes, they were a ‘militarized 
force’ whose rise to power began as a movement called Da Afghanistan da Talibano 
Islami Tahrik (“The Islamic Movement of Taliban”) in 1994 (Maley, 2009, p. 182). 
Taliban drew their financial and military support from Pakistan, who had abandoned their 
long-time client Hekmatyar in favor of the new sudden rise of the Taliban (p. 183). 
Although majority of the Taliban were Afghans, Pakistan had directly trained around 
80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1994 to 
1999 (p. 185). By 1996, Taliban had become a formidable force that drove out most of 
the Mujahideen warlords and had captured the capital Kabul.  
 The Taliban’s transition (0) to power came at the expense of ousting the Rabbani 
government and years of civil war (Maley, 2009, p. 180). From early 1994 until late 
1996, uprisings continued (0) as the Taliban and the Mujahideen government fought 
against each other to establish dominance over Afghanistan (p. 181). The Taliban, who 
made sweeping military victories against the Mujahideen across Afghanistan, had grown 
from a small force of a few hundred to thousands (p. 180). By September 1996, the 
Taliban had captured Kabul after months of heavy fighting and forced out the Tajik 
Rabbani-Massoud government to abandon the capital (p. 180).  
 The Taliban had appointed a Ghilzai Pashtun Mullah Mohammad Omar as their 
leader (Maley, 2009, p. 186). Although the Taliban attempted to legitimize (0) their 
government through several Islamic acts, they never received formal recognition either 
internally or internationally with a few exceptions. Domestically, Mullah Omar took the 
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religious title of Amir al-Momineen (“Commander of the Faithful”) bestowed on him by a 
group of ulema (p. 186). Omar subsequently appeared in public to lift the Cloak of the 
Prophet Muhammad (Khirqa-I mubarak), one of the most sacred symbols in Islam as a 
sign to further increase his authority (p. 187).  
Table 25: M. M. Omar Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 0 0 
Regime Transition 0 0 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 0 0 
Regime Failure 0 0 
Grand Total 0 
 
 Soon, the new regime renamed the government as “The Islamic Emirates of 
Afghanistan”, a symbolically significant title that stamped their absolute authority and 
ended any debate of sharing power (Maley, 2009, p. 187). The Taliban’s ambitions were 
to stay in power (0) for the long run as they began imposing their rule and established 
power bases in various parts of Afghanistan (p. 191). However, the regime’s inevitable 
fall (0) would come after the September 11 attacks when the Taliban government was 
brought down in a U.S. military invasion in December 2001 (p. 222). Although the 
regime ran “through motions of ‘state-like activity’,” Mullah Omar maintained 
‘superordinate authority’ (0) and was the supreme the head of the regime (Maley, 2009, 
p. 196).  
 Mullah Omar was appointed by a shura of 1,200 ulemas and mullahs in Kandahar 
but the Taliban, however, did not bother to convene a Loya Jirga from around the 
country to appoint their leader (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 221). Omar had the 
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authority over all legal and civil matters through his title and Sharia Law was the de facto 
state religion (p. 222). Moreover, the Taliban established two shuras, a 10-member 
Supreme Shura in Kandahar, and a 14-member Shura in Kabul, both of which were 
dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns and the Kabul shura did not include any native Kabulis 
(p. 222). Although the Kabul Shura did establish government ministerial positions (0) and 
was responsible to run the administrative government duties, the ministers’ decisions 
were often overruled by Mullah Omar’s Shura in Kandahar (p. 222). 
Table 26: M. M. Omar Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 0 0 
Army Head 0 0 
Government Positions 0 0 
Political Representation 0 0 
Political Opposition 0 0 
Grand Total 0 
 
 The Taliban’s army (0) did not have formal hierarchies but local commanders 
were provided with lump of cash to equip and feed their fighters (Wahab & Youngerman, 
2010, p. 222). Political representation (0) was also one-sided or overwhelmingly biased 
in favor of Pashtuns as the Taliban replaced all Non-Pashtun bureaucrats in high 
government positions with Kandaharis (p. 222). And lastly, the Taliban did not allow any 
form of political opposition (0) and relied on strategies of suppression and brutal 
practices (p. 224). They implemented a form of exclusive Sharia Law and had established 
the ‘Department for the Propagation of Virtue and Suppression of Vice’, a body of 
religious police who enforced religious codes corporal punishment (p. 225). 
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Hamid Karzai, 2002-2009 
 Afghans, especially non-Pashtun groups, initially welcomed the U.S. invasion and 
ousting of Taliban. Twenty years of civil war had destroyed much of the country’s 
infrastructure and institutions so the U.S. had to create a new state to bring stability and 
order (Barfield, 2010, p. 272). Millions of refugees returned enthusiastically from the 
neighboring countries. Although Afghanistan was a failed state in 2001, it was a unified 
nation. The lack of a central government was “counterbalanced by a strong sense of 
national unity forged during the Soviet war as well as the refugee experiences in 
neighboring Pakistan and Iran” (Barfield, 2010, p. 278). Moreover, “Toppling one 
Afghan regime required replacing it with another” (Barfield, 2010, p. 283). However, the 
U.S. did not have such candidate and gave the United Nations the task to choose the new 
Afghan leader after Taliban’s fall.  
 In November 2001, The UN convened an international conference in Bonn, 
Germany to create “a provisional government and apportion leadership roles…” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 283) The conference was attended by representatives from the 
Northern Front that had helped overthrow the Taliban; former king Zahir Shah’s royal 
family members; and the Mujahideen that were based off Peshawar in Pakistan (p. 283). 
However, “The Taliban were excluded from the talks, and because of their previous ties 
to the Taliban, the Pashtuns had poorer representation than they would have normally 
expected” (Barfield, 2010, p. 283). However, “Despite this disadvantage, the conference 
elected Hamid Karzai, an ethnically Pashtun from the Popalzai tribe in Qandahar, to head 
the provisional administration, while the United Front took over most of the key 
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ministries. The whole government was “…subject to a vote of approval by a national 
Loya Jirga, to be held in Kabul within a year” (Barfield, 2010, p. 284). 
 The conference was seen as a remarkable success showing how quickly the 
parties came together and put aside their past differences. The United Front, who had just 
ousted a Pashtun-dominant Taliban regime, agreed to elect a Pashtun head of state. 
Hamid Karzai’s appointment also marked the return of the Pashtun Durranis to power 
since most recent leaders had come from their rival Pashtun ethnic group the Ghilzais 
such as the PDPA leaders Amin, Tarakai, Najib as well as Jihadi factions such as 
Hekmatyar, Khalis, Sayyaf and the Taliban leader Omar (Barfield, 2010, p. 284). The rise 
of the Pashtun Durranis back in power and how they had outdone the Ghilzais could be 
explained by the traditional template of power according to which “the Durranis held 
substantial advantages over their Ghilzai rivals because they were more skilled in the arts 
of peace than they were in that of war” (Barfield, 2010, p. 284). 
 Karzai, was not a well-known figure in Afghan politics. He had tried to organize 
revolts against the Taliban after they had killed his father and quickly assumed leadership 
of his Sadozai tribe of the Pashtun Durrani group according to custom. The Populazais 
had also approached him to return to Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks to “lead them 
against the Taliban” (Barfield, 2010, p. 289). The question that arose was why the non-
Pashtun tribes and the leaders of the United Front ceded powers to a Pashtun leader 
instead of taking the leadership themselves. The answer lay in the notion that “…after a 
quarter century of war in Afghanistan, no faction was keen to engage in more fighting if a 
political compromise was possible. Nor did any faction wish to dismember the country–
another alternative” (Barfield, 2010, p. 291). Former king Zahir Shah’s return to power 
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was also unlikely because he had been living in exile and was considered a weak leader 
even though he still had a huge following base in Afghanistan. The U.S. had also strongly 
opposed the return of the monarchy. 
 Hamid Karzai was ratified as the interim president in the 2002 Loya Jirga until a 
new constitution could be drawn and new elections could be held. Held in the capital 
Kabul, it was attended by one thousand elected representatives and five hundred 
delegates picked by the organizers representing virtually all ethnic groups and regions as 
well as including a high number of women members (Barfield, 2010, p. 296). The Jirga 
succeeded in its goal of appointing an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai and 
his cabinet but was subject to harsh verbal exchanges and walkouts over filling the 
executive head of the state (p. 296). Zahir Shah’s supporters especially from Southern 
Pashtun parts of the country staged a confrontation and demanded that the former king be 
elected as the head of the state. This was resolved after the U.S. special envoy, Zalmay 
Khalilzad convinced the king to withdraw in favor of Karzai thereby ending the stand off 
(p. 297). 
 The next Jirga that followed was the 2003 constitutional Loya Jirga of five 
hundred representatives from all ethnic groups and political parties except the Taliban. 
The objective of the Jirga was to ratify a new constitution and answer the question 
whether the new government should be a strong, centralized, presidential system or a 
decentralized, parliamentarian, federal system with regional autonomy (Barfield, 2010, p. 
298). The minority groups, who demanded a parliamentary system with the prime 
minister post, argued for more regional autonomy from the capital while the supporters of 
the centralized government countered that decentralization of power would strengthen 
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local conservative elements (p. 298). Pashtuns favored a strong central government under 
Karzai in hopes of restoring the Pashtun dominance again. The international community, 
including the U.S. also favored a strong presidential system as a better way to deal with 
Kabul.  
 The Jirga eventually ratified the constitution, which gave the parliament the 
power to confirm cabinet members as well as hold them accountable. Minority languages 
were given official status while the Shiites were allowed “legal parity” with the 
predominantly Sunni country (Barfield, 2010, p. 299). The Mujahideen factions also won 
their demands that all laws should be in compliance with Islamic principles. Additionally, 
the constitution restored women’s rights, considered a controversial issue throughout the 
history of the country.  
 After the new constitution was adopted, next followed the presidential elections of 
2004 to pick a head of state in a full democratic electoral process. Eighteen presidential 
nominees were on the ballot, four of which were considered serious contenders along 
with the favorite Karzai (Barfield, 2010, p. 300). Others included Abdullah Abdullah, the 
Tajik leader of the former Northern Front; Dostum, the Uzbek head of the Junbesh-i-Milli 
Isamic party; and Mohaqiq, the Hazara leader of the Hizb-i-Wahdat party (p. 300). 
Hamid Karzai emerged as the winner with 56 percent of the eight million votes cast. The 
turn out had been very enthusiastic among Afghans who genuinely seemed to participate 
despite violent efforts by the Taliban to interrupt the elections.  
 Karzai’s votes came primarily from the eastern and southern Pashtun areas but he 
also surprisingly received high support from the Tajiks. The Hazara and Uzbek 
candidates “were confined to their own ethnic groups or the regions they dominated” 
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(Barfield, 2010, p. 300) Although the elections legitimized Hamid Karzai’s government 
in the eyes of the international community, its impact on Afghans was less clear. In other 
words, “The presidential elections were an innovation that while allowing the expression 
of popular opinion, could not by itself create political legitimacy” (Barfield, 2010, p. 
300). Karzai would be judged by how successful he would be in the future in bringing 
security, economic improvement and a stable government and an “electoral victory would 
mean nothing if he failed to do so” (Barfield, 2010, p. 301). 
 The parliamentary elections, initially scheduled to take place with the presidential 
elections, were held one year later in 2005. However, the newly elected president Hamid 
Karzai was “less enthusiastic about seeing a branch of government equally empowered” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 301). The president was against political parties in the parliament and 
refused to recognize them legally. He argued that forming parties would bring back the 
political instability of the PDPA and confuse voters. In an attempt to “Further weaken the 
emergence of an organized opposition, candidates could not even identify themselves as 
members of a political party on the ballot” (Barfield, 2010, p. 301). Such a tactic would 
undermine a candidate’s ability to appeal to the voters through “name recognition, 
ethnicity, region, and social standing” (Barfield, 2010, p. 301).  
 Because there were no run-off rounds in the “first past the post” voting system in 
the parliamentary elections, most winning candidates only received less than 10 percent 
of the votes because seats were contested by over a hundred nominees in some areas 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 301). Hence, “the chances of winning a seat better resembled a lottery 
than a political contest” (p. 301). Despite these initial blows to weaken the body as an 
opposing political institution to his administration, Karzai was dealt several blows by the 
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parliament, when in 2006, it rejected a proposed template for the parliament, as well as 
disqualifying his less educated conservative nominee to the Supreme Court Chief 
position.  
 Karzai’s government eventually failed to created an “institutionalized state 
structure” (Barfield, 2010, p. 304).  His “…model of government was patrimonial, in 
which the government administration and its assets were an extension of the rule. In such 
a system, personal relationships determined everything from who would amass personal 
wealth to who would be thrown in jail” (Barfield, 2010, p. 304). For instance, Karzai 
would often avoid confrontation with his enemies, replace and transfer incompetent and 
corrupt governors from one province to another. Moreover, “Karzai did not use assets of 
the state to centralize power so much as he used them to create a patronage network of 
personal clients bound to him” (Barfield, 2010, p. 304). However, Karzai’s popularity 
had started to decline after 2005 “…because of his inability to create an effective 
administration, a deteriorating security situation, and a lack of economic progress” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 310). 
 On the other hand, “The Afghan government…was treated less as a partner than a 
nuisance” by the U.S. (Barfield, 2010, p. 316). Karzai’s government was dependent on 
foreign aid but “75 percent of aid funds were disbursed and delivered outside official 
Afghan government channels” (Barfield, 2010, p. 316). Bush’s administration had 
declared Afghanistan a “mission accomplished” thereby slashing aid by 38 percent from 
$4.3 billion in 2005 to $3.1 billion in 2006 (p. 318). Internally, the situation became 
increasingly unstable amidst insecurity, a corrupt government and abuse of power by the 
Karzai administration. Afghans, who seemed highly enthusiastic about elections a year 
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ago, were discontent with the new government. Moreover, a deadly insurgency was on 
the rise as the number of suicide bombs increased by 400 percent between 2005 and 2006 
from 27 to 139 (p. 319). 
 Political and economic conditions contrasted so starkly by region that Afghanistan 
had virtually divided into two different countries: “the north, west, and center, which 
were relatively stable; and the south and east, which were not. Since the south and east 
were predominantly Pashtun, this division had an ethnic component as well” (Barfield, 
2010, p. 322). Eastern and northern regions were stable and thriving in the absence of 
violence and insurgent presence while the “south lacked security, had a stagnant or 
declining standard of living, and had become dependent on opium as a cash crop” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 323). Eventually foreign aid was stalled and reconstruction projects 
were often abandoned due to lack of security.  
 In mensurating the Hamid Karzai regime, Karzai’s attempts to build a strong base 
in his southern regions through promises of money and appeals to “moderate Taliban” 
were faltering (Barfield, 2010, p. 324). Although the U.S. had ousted the Taliban regime 
with ease in 2001, “There was no military follow up designed to ensure that they could 
not return to mobilize their followers, who had simply returned home after their defeat” 
(Barfield, 2010, p. 325). The Pashtun dominated areas bordering Pakistan had become the 
hotbed of the insurgency against the Afghan government, its ally the United States and 
the International Coalition Forces. The leaders of the insurgency were the same people 
fighting the Soviets, changed from angry young men to aging fighters who were now 
joined by Al Qaeda (p. 325). 
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 The Taliban had made a comeback as the ‘Neo-Taliban,’ launching an insurgency 
(0) against Karzai’s government (p. 246). Although they lacked an extensive support base 
since most of Afghanistan was under the authority of the central government, the Taliban 
were ‘quite adept’ in aligning themselves with dissatisfied elements by “exploiting local 
grievances, particularly those of non-elite Ghilzai Pashtuns directed against Durranis…” 
(Maley, 2009, p. 247) Moreover, both the Karzai government and the U.S. struggled to 
end the insurgency as their joint ‘counter-insurgency’ campaign faced multiple 
challenges such as ineffectiveness, misguided airstrikes, lack of on-the-ground 
intelligence, and the failed attempts to minimize casualties (p. 251). 
Table 27: H. Karzai Regime Scores 
DV Stability Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Legitimacy 1 1 
Regime Transition 1 1 
Uprising Frequency 0 0 
Power Consolidation 1 1 
Regime Failure 1 1 
Grand Total 4 
 
  Despite the security challenges, Hamid Karzai’s government marked the first in 
centuries where a regime had constitutional term limits (1) and was elected in free 
national elections (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 250). Similarly, Karzai’s second term 
as president also ensured that the government did not fall (1) amidst the power transition 
(p. 252). Hamid Karzai was elected as the democratically elected head of the state (1) in 
free national elections, even though there were claims of ‘fraud’ (Wahab & Youngerman, 
2010, p. 252). The first national elections had a turnout of 75% around the country and 
the other top three candidates included an Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum, a Shiite 
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Muhammad Mohaqiq, a Tajik Younus Qanuni, the first woman candidate Massuda Jalal, 
and the eventual winner Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun (p. 253). 
 Karzai’s cabinet was also ethnically balanced as he appointed (1) a former Ahmad 
Shah Massoud successor, the Tajik Mohammad Fahim as the Defense Minister (p. 253). 
Moreover, other top government positions (1) were also representative of virtually all 
ethnic groups, even though the Tajiks had dominated most key ministries (p. 253). Karzai 
appointed former Mujahideen warlord Ismail Khan as the minister of energy, Dostum to a 
top army position, as well as having a Hazara vice-president on his ticket (p. 253). 
Although there was a clear bias for appointing or rather awarding former warlords 
national and local government positions, political representation (1) was an all time high 
in decades (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 253). 
Table 28: H. Karzai Regime Scores 
IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators Scores Total 
Regime Leader 1 1 
Army Head 1 1 
Government Positions 1 1 
Political Representation 1 1 
Political Opposition 1 1 
Grand Total 5 
 
 Furthermore, in 2005, according to the new constitution, parliamentary and 
provincial council elections were held where more than 5,000 candidates ran for the 249 
seats in the Wolesi Jirga (“Lower House”) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 253). 
Members to the 102-seat Mesharano Jirga (“Upper House”) were ‘filled’ partially 
through votes and some by presidential appointment (p. 253). A large number of women 
were elected for the first time to the Parliament and the Constitution guaranteed ‘equal’ 
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rights for women as well reserving 25 seats for women in the Parliament (p. 269). The 
Constitution also guaranteed various political opposition (1) and fundamental rights such 
as freedom of speech, freedom of press and while making Islam as the state religion, it 
allowed people of other religions to practice their faith freely (Maley, 2009, p. 238). 
 With the end of Hamid Karzai regime’s analysis, this chapter ends the within case 
analysis of each regime. Here, the results of all the total 15 cases were discussed 
individually. The next chapter discusses the overall results of all the cases by highlighting 
the hypotheses, scores, and general trends. The scores for all the cases are presented in a 
table below. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 The goal of this study was to examine the relationship between regime stability 
and ethnic inclusion. Fourteen cases, consisting of all the regimes in Afghanistan from 
1880 until 2009, were taken under study. Each case was assigned two sets of indicators 
based on the dependent variable regime stability and independent variable ethnic 
inclusion. If the indicator met the criteria, it received a score of 1, for a total of 5 possible 
scores for each variable. However, if the indicators did not meet the criteria, they 
received a score of 0.  
 The scores were then used to test the hypothesis, which assumes that the more 
ethnically inclusive a regime is, the more likely it is to be stable. For instance, when a 
case scored low on one variable, it would similarly score low on the other, and vice-
versa. In other words, a hypothesis would be robust in cases with the lowest difference 
for their combined scores, while it would be weak in cases with the highest differences in 
scores.  
 The overall results for the hypothesis are divided into three categories: cases with 
perfect scores (i.e. a difference of 0); cases with the second lowest score (i.e. difference 
of 1); and cases with highest scores (i.e. difference of plus 1). As illustrated in the Table 
1.2 below, most cases fall into the first category including the regimes of Habibullah 
Kalakani, M. Nadir Khan, M. Zahir Shah, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, M. 
Najibullah, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Mullah M. Omar. In other words, all of these 
regimes had a difference of 0, which supports the hypothesis that if a regime was 
ethnically inclusive it was also stable; and vice-versa, that is, a regime that was not 
ethnically inclusive, was unstable. 
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Table 1. 2: Overall Case Scoring Results 
 
 
No. 
 
Case 
 
Ethnic Inclusion 
Scores 
 
Stability Scores 
 
Difference 
1 Abdur Rahman Khan 2 1 1 
2 Habibullah Khan 4 3 1 
3 Amanullah Khan 4 1 3 
4 Habibullah Kalakani 0 0 0 
5 M. Nadir Khan 2 2 0 
6 M. Zahir Shah 3 3 0 
7 M. Daud Khan 1 2 1 
8 Nur M. Tarakai 1 0 1 
9 Hafizullah Amin 0 0 0 
10 Babrak Karmal 1 1 0 
11 M. Najibullah Ahmadzai 2 2 0 
12 Burhanuddin Rabbani 1 1 0 
13 Mullah M. Omar 0 0 0 
14 Hamid Karzai 5 4 1 
 
 Analyzing this first category of regimes individually, Habibullah Kalakani’s 
regime had a total score of 0 for ethnic inclusion, and therefore, it also scored 0 on 
stability. This result is consistent with the case analysis since Kalakani’s regime, as stated 
earlier, was highly exclusive and highly unstable, as it fought a violent civil war through 
its entire 9-month in power (Fletcher, 2003). Nadir Khan’s regime, however, scored 2 on 
ethnic inclusion and 2 on stability, which reflects his attempts to assemble a Loya Jirga 
that appointed him as king, and a relatively stable rule, with only low resistance 
(Fletcher, 2003). M. Zahir Shah’s regime, which scored 3 on ethnic inclusion and 3 on 
stability, is often considered as the ‘golden years of stability’ in modern Afghanistan, and 
	 160	
hence, the scores reflect his efforts of opening up the system, allowing a liberal 
parliament and acknowledging various political parties (Barfield, 2010).  
 Hafizullah Amin’s regime, which scores 0 on both ethnic inclusion and stability, 
highlights his regime’s exclusivity and instability. He and his Parchami faction had taken 
over power by killing Tarakai, sidelining the Khalqi faction and fighting a violent civil 
war in over 70% percent of the country (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). Babrak Karmal 
regime’s respective score of 1 on each variable are based on his attempts to assemble a 
Loya Jirga, form a ‘national’ democratic government and increase political representation 
(Fletcher, 2003). However, his regime was weak as civil war continued and he was only 
able to stay in power through Soviet Union military support and aid.  
 M. Najibullah Ahmadzai’s regime scores 2’s on each variable. The scores reflect 
his attempts of seeking a truce, forming a national reconciliation process, adopting a 
constitution and ensuring a stable internal transition of power within the PDPA (Fletcher, 
2003). The Mujahideens’ Burhanuddin Rabbani’s regime scores 1’s on each variable for 
a peaceful transition and political representation because after the PDPA was defeated, 
the civil war had been over although the peace last only for a brief period (Fletcher, 
2003). And finally, the Taliban’s Mullah Omar regime scored 0 on each variable. The 
Taliban were an exclusively Pashtun-dominated regime that was headed by a supreme 
council under Omar’s authority (Barfield, 2010).  
 The second category include cases with a difference of 1 such as Abdur Rahman 
Khan, Habibullah Khan, M. Daud Khan, N. Muhammad Tarakai, and Hamid Karzai’s 
respective regimes. Abdur Rahman Khan’s regime scores 2 on ethnic inclusion for his 
policies to openly appoint various ethnic groups to government positions (Kakar, 1979). 
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His regime scores 1 on stability because it did not collapse, which reflects his highly 
centralized, dictatorial rule, where he aggressively pacified the entire country and 
eliminated any uprising against him (Kakar, 1979). Habibullah Khan’s regime scores 4 
on ethnic inclusion for his policy of allowing many political exiles to return, his inclusion 
of various ethnic groups in the government and giving power to the religious clergy 
(Dupree, 1973). The regime similarly scored high, 3, on stability for avoiding all attempts 
to go to war with the British Empire, continuing the national policy of neutrality and 
maintaining a nearly 20 year peaceful rule (Dupree, 1973). 
 Daud Khan’s regime is the only deviant case in this study where the regime 
scored lower, 1, on ethnic inclusion than it did on stability, contrary to the assumptions 
this study was based on. Daud regime’s ethnic inclusion scores are for his initial attempts 
to allow rise of political parties, appointing some PDPA leaders to government positions 
and for changing the state into a presidential republic (Fletcher, 2003). Otherwise, his 
rule was a dictatorial, single-party regime where political leaders and opposition were 
regularly eliminated (Fletcher, 2003). The reason the regime scores higher, 2, on stability 
is because Daud Khan had total control of the state by using the military as his tool to 
maintain the status quo, threaten and kill anyone who challenged his authority (Fletcher, 
2003). Nur M. Tarakai’s regime scores 1 only on ethnic inclusion, which reflects his 
willingness to share executive power with various ethnic groups (Wahab & Youngerman, 
2010). However, because he only ruled for a year, was out maneuvered politically by 
Amin while a bloody civil war continued throughout the country, the regime scores 0 on 
stability (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). 
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 Hamid Karzai’s government is the highest scoring case in this second category 
and in the study overall. The Karzai government scores positively on all indicators of 
ethnic inclusion and stability, with the exception of uprisings. After the defeat of the 
Taliban regime, transition (1) was peaceful as all parties came together to form a new, 
interim democratic government in an international UN-mandated conference in Bonn, 
Germany (Fletcher, 2003). The subsequent Loya Jirga, a new constitution, and national 
free elections gave the government legitimacy (1) and established clear authority through 
regular term limits for regime (Fletcher, 2003). As democratically elected president with 
constitutional term limits, the regime did not seek power consolidation (1) through means 
of authoritarianism. Although Karzai’s government did not collapse, the regime came 
close to failure (1) due to continuing rise of the Taliban insurgency. Hence, the regime 
doesn’t get a score only on one indicator, uprisings (0). Otherwise, the position of head of 
state (1) was democratically elected, other top government positions (1) such as the head 
of the army (1) were clearly established (Fletcher, 2010). Political representation (1) 
drastically increased as virtually all ethnic groups were represented in the political 
process while political opposition (1) was freely exercised (Fletcher, 2010). 
 The only case that falls into the third category—cases with a weaker correlation 
or difference of higher than 1— includes Amanullah Khan’s regime. The regime scores 4 
on ethnic inclusion and 1 on stability, with a total difference of 3. Amanullah Khan was a 
radical reformist king, who won the country’s independence, and initiated social 
modernization programs (Barfield, 2010). He established the country’s first Constitution, 
establishing state institutions as well as holding Loya Jirgas (Barfield, 2010). His regime 
was ethnically inclusive, with various ethnic groups appointed to the cabinet, council of 
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ministers and the bureaucracy at large (Fletcher, 2003). However, despite his twenty-year 
rule, his regime was highly unstable. The reforms soon backfired and gave rise to 
uprisings and rebellions nationwide. Eventually, his regime collapsed during the civil war 
of 1920s (Dupree, 1973). 
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CHAPTER	SIX:	CONCLUSIONS,	STUDY	LIMITS	AND	FUTURE	
RESEARCH	
 
 The existing literature argues ethnic societies are often vulnerable to ethnic 
conflict and violence (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset, 
1959; Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994). Ethnically diverse societies 
usually tend to be set along deep ethnic cleavages rooted in historical divisions and 
differences (Reilly, 2001). Hence, the lack of a system that fairly accommodates all 
groups in diverse societies often leads to disagreements between groups (Reilly, 2001). 
And because undemocratic options to reduce ethnic conflicts such as forcefully 
suppressing ethnic groups or entirely eliminating them are ‘almost always worst’, any 
arrangement to accommodate ethnic groups must come from a democratic framework 
(Anderson, 2013). 
 However, there is little consensus on how to design a system that accommodates 
ethnic societies. The consociational arrangement developed by Lijphart is one of the two 
competing arrangements against the centripetalist approach developed by Horowitz. 
Lijphart argues for power-sharing mechanism in ethnic societies among the elites based 
on political compromise such as coalition building (1969). Horowitz on the other hand 
argues for an incentive-based electoral system, which is predicated on rewarding different 
ethnic groups to work together (2002). While both of these approaches have their pros 
and cons, and regardless of which system works best, scholars agree that representing and 
including all ethnic groups fairly contributes to the overall stability in ethnically diverse 
societies (Lijphart, 1969, 1991; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Sen 
1999; Rustow, 1970; Dahl, Shapiro, & Cheibub, 2003). 
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 The question this study attempted to answer was how ethnic inclusion impacts 
regime stability in Afghanistan. The hypothesis was that ethnically inclusive regimes are 
more likely to be stable. Scores were assigned on the dependent and independent 
variables to illustrate the hypothesis. The first category of cases that scored the highest, 
4’s and 3’s, on ethnic inclusion includes Habibullah Khan, Amanullah Khan, Zahir Shah 
and Hamid Karzai’s respective regimes. These results are consistent with the literature as 
all of those regimes are known to be ethnically inclusive of various ethnic groups to a 
larger degree in government and political process.  
 Habibullah Khan inherited the throne and transitioned to power peacefully in 
1901 after his father died (Barfield, 2010). He allowed political exiles to return, opened 
up the system to all ethnic groups, and steered Afghanistan peacefully for nearly twenty 
years until his assassination in 1919 (Barfield, 2010). Amanullah Khan’s rule was 
similarly an open system where all ethnic groups were actively participated in the 
government and bureaucracy. The amir ruled for nearly ten years despite facing multiple 
rebellions but his regime was eventually brought down in civil war (Fletcher, 1965). And 
lastly, Zahir Shah’s regime was also highly inclusive as he established a liberal 
parliament, opened up the system to more political parties, and kept the internal stability 
of the country for nearly forty years during his rule (Dupree, 1973). 
 The cases with the second highest scores, 2’s, on ethnic inclusion include Abdur 
Rahman Khan, Nadir Khan and Najibullah Ahmadzai’s regimes. These regimes scored 
relatively high on ethnic inclusion and stability because, as noted in the literature, they 
similarly had a relatively mixed record on ethnic inclusion and stability. For instance, 
although Abdur Rahman Khan recruited, hired and promoted personnel in his 
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bureaucracy from minority ethnic groups such as the urbanized Tajiks, Uzbeks and 
Hazaras, Sikh and Hindu generals in his army, his track record on ethnic inclusion was 
primarily driven by self-interest and political gains (Fletcher, 1965). He only included 
those groups in the government that had promised not to rebel against him and most often 
oppressed, marginalized and intentionally left out different groups that he perceived as 
threats to his rule (Mishali-Ram, 2008).  
 Nadir Khan also attempted to legitimize his rule by allowing a Loya Jirga 
consisting of various ethnic groups to appoint the amir after he had ousted the Tajik 
Kalakani from power (Fletcher, 1965). Nadir also established a constitution, which 
allowed for a representative government to a greater degree. However, his persistence to 
maintain the status quo was marred by resentment among the population that eventually 
led to his assassination (Fletcher, 1965). Najibullah Ahmadzai was promoted to the head 
of state internally without a fight, and he took some concrete steps in ensuring ethnic 
representation and inclusion. He created the national reconciliation program by inviting 
opposition to form a coalition government as well as opening up the PDPA to non-party 
members, but all of these efforts eventually failed to materialize (Rasanayagam, 2003). 
Najibullah held on to power for over five years but the civil war raged on and he was 
eventually forced to resign (Rasanayagam, 2003). 
 The next category of cases that scored the second lowest, 1’s, on ethnic inclusion 
include Daud Khan, Nur M. Tarakai, Babrak Karmal, and Burhanuddin Rabbani’s 
respective regimes. Daud Khan’s regime is the only deviant case because it scored higher 
on stability and lower on ethnic inclusion. This nuance is noted in the literature and can 
be explained by the fact that Daud’s regime was more stable than it was inclusive. It was 
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a single-party, exclusive government that heavily relied on the military to eliminate any 
rivals and oppositions that threatened the status quo (Rasanyagam, 2003). He was able to 
maintain tight control over the state by simultaneously holding various high positions 
including the presidency, ministers of defense and interiors, and the commander in chief 
of the army (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).  
 Babrak Karmal similarly made attempts at reconciliation, calling for a national 
Loya Jirga, and allowing more non-party representatives in the PDPA (Rasanayagam, 
2003). However, all of these attempts failed to win him the broader support of the 
Afghans and he was eventually removed from power by the Soviet Union as instability 
continued during the civil war (Maley, 2009). Burhanuddin Rabbani and his Mujahideen 
supporters also initially gave people hope of stability, peace and inclusion when they 
formed a grand coalition government consisting of representatives from all major ethnic 
groups. However, internal power struggles soon led to a civil war among the Mujahideen, 
and any praise they had won for ousting the Soviet Union, quickly waned among the 
population (Barfield, 2010). 
 The last category of cases include those which scored the lowest, 0’s, on ethnic 
inclusion and were subsequently identified as the least ethnically inclusive and the most 
unstable regimes. These regimes, which were highly exclusively, closely authoritarian 
and made no attempt of ethnic inclusion, include Habibullah Kalakani, Hafizullah Amin 
and Mullah Omar’s respective regimes. Kalakani, a bandit who ascended to the throne in 
Kabul by overthrowing Amanullah Khan’s regime, established an exclusively small 
bureaucracy run almost entirely by his friends, relatives and sympathizers (Fletcher, 
1965). The first Tajik ruler to take over the central government in Kabul, Kalakani sent 
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shock through the Pashtun hegemony that had been in power for centuries. However, his 
time on the throne was continuously marred by a civil war, and less than a year in power, 
he was captured and publicly executed (Barfield, 2010).  
 Hafizullah Amin outmaneuvered and assassinated his political rival Nur 
Muhammad Tarakai and took control of the PDPA (Barfield, 2010). He ousted most of 
his rivals from the government positions and filled the government with his Khalqi 
loyalists (Barfield, 2010). However, he was able to rule for only a hundred days before 
Soviet commandos assassinated him in his presidential palace (Rasanayagam, 2003). And 
lastly, the Taliban’s Mullah Omar regime was also a highly exclusive regime, primarily 
run and dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns. The Taliban regime grew from a small 
military movement that eventually exercised complete control over the state 
(Rasanayagam, 2003). The regime openly marginalized, oppressed and eliminated groups 
for religious or political reasons. Mullah Omar was the supreme head of the theocratic 
regime and spent his rule fighting a civil war in most of the country (Maley, 2009). 
 In conclusion, various trends appear from the analysis of the cases above. The 
findings overall are consistent with the assumption that when a regime scored higher on 
ethnic inclusion, it was more stable. As scores on ethnic inclusion decreased, regimes 
tended to be less stable. Moreover, regimes that scored zeros on ethnic inclusion were 
also the least stable. In general, in all the cases over the past hundred years, ethnicity had 
an impact on the stability. This is consistent with the existing literature which stresses 
that ethnicity has been a major force in all aspects driving religious, ideological, 
geographic and linguistic differences in Afghan society (Mazhar et al., 2012; Sahar, 
2014; Rubin, 1995; Adeney, 2008). 
	 169	
 Lastly, it is also necessary to revisit the strengths and limitations of case studies in 
general and in the context of the present study. Case study methods are strong because 
they achieve high conceptual validity by measuring concepts that are difficult to measure 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). Moreover, case studies have the advantage of 
identifying new hypotheses and explaining deviant or outlier cases (p. 20). Furthermore, 
these methods allow a researcher to explore in-depth within-case analysis by the utilizing 
multiple variables (p. 21). And finally, case studies have the advantage of explaining 
complex causal relations (p. 22). The current study explored an in-depth historical period 
analysis of ethnic inclusion and regime stability in Afghanistan and thus a comparative 
case study design was selected as the appropriate method of research. 
 The trade-offs, limitations and pitfalls of case studies include case selection bias, 
lack of a strong cause-and-effect relationship, lack of representativeness and 
generalizability of results to a larger population (p. George & Bennett, 2005, p. 29). The 
present study controls for selection bias because it includes all cases within the period 
under study. Moreover, the present study applies process-tracing method to establish an 
association between variables upon in-depth analysis, trends and patterns discovered in 
the cases. For future research, a quantitative study with an extensive sample and more 
variables would be useful to explore a causal relationship between ethnic inclusion and 
regime stability over an extended period of history in Afghanistan. 
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